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Editorial

An important objective of academic journals in social sciences is to focus more on inter disciplinary studies. While bringing out the 10th volume of Journal of Polity and Society, an attempt has been made to include many inter-disciplinary articles. This volume consists of ten articles which focus on diverse aspects of politics and society, especially topics like youth in politics, political dis-empowerment of Muslims in India, public opinion on refugee crisis, cyber security challenges in digital India etc.

Immigration and refugee crisis are one of the important challenges of modern states. In 2015 the EU faced an unprecedented immigration and refugee crisis as thousands of people attempted to reach its external borders -mainly by the sea. The EU's member states in the periphery, such as Greece and Italy, bear the brunt to complete the asylum procedures, facing a chronic overcrowd. The article written by Nikos Marantzidis and George Siakas on *European public opinion attitudes and the 2015 Refugee crisis in Europe: the Greek case since 2015* focusses on the political implications and public opinion attitudes since 2015 immigration crisis, with a special focus to the Greek case.

Youth politics is crucial in the nation-building process. Lirar Pulikkalakath in his article *Locating Youth in Jordanian Politics* illustrates the role of youth in Jordanian politics. According to him it was mainly two events; the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 and the 'Arab spring' in 2011; brought them into the limelight. It was Jordan, the first country in the Arab world to produce a national youth strategy in 2005. It outlines a long-term and comprehensive plan and vision for the development of youths in the kingdom.

The humankind is increasingly being digitized, arguably moving towards what many consider as part of the Fourth Industrialization process that

is taking centre stage in the coming decades, if not years. The paper by Ramnath Reghunadhan on *Cyber Threat Landscape of Digital India: A Critical Perspective* entails by emphasis on the ramifications, risks, vulnerabilities and threats to the digitization. The argument of the paper is that technology and digitization that is overtly centralised through the national security narrative is not capable of providing viable solutions, but deteriorates when the state is in itself lacking technological wherewithal and know-how.

Mohammed Ghouse comments that the issue of the Muslim minority is still a policy of exclusion and inclusion in contemporary India. In his article on *Political Dis-Empowerment of Muslims in India: Role of the State* discusses the importance of the participation of minorities in politics as an essential component of a peaceful and democratic society. According to him, the religious minority, particularly Muslims, are lagging in the overall development of India. The necessity of the hour is to revisit the notion of development and to re-evaluate the entire discourse of inclusion within the ambit of the liberal democratic process. The attempt of institutional political exclusion of Muslims in India will lead to the disempowerment of the community and destroys the democratic and constitutional principles.

An important question raised by Ronie Thomas in her article *The Nirbhaya Effect and Media Sensationalism Revisited* is why Women issues were given low priority by the Indian media. The central argument of her paper is that there was a continued and systematic discrimination and negligence of women issues by the media. The Nirbhaya case was an eye opener, which exposed the neglect of the media in reporting issues of violence against women. This article critically evaluates the role of media, especially print media, in protecting women against violence, in the context of the Nirbhaya case.

In the post-cold war period Asia Pacific region has emerged as the center of geostrategic interest due to the triangular relations between three major powers: China, India and the United States. The article written by Suresh K titled on *India's Expanding Role in the Asia Pacific: Emerging China – India - United States Strategic Triangle* seeks to examine the basis and objectives of India's evolving approach to the Asia Pacific region and its possible implication on the triangular relations between China, India and the United States. He states that prudence, caution, and flexibility should be the guiding principle of India's policy toward the strategic triangle between China, India, and the United States.

Political Space of Muslim Community in Kerala by M.Rahim discusses the role of Muslims in the politics of Kerala. A large section of the Muslim community has found the Indian Union Muslim League as a major vehicle to articulate the interest of the community. Concentration of the Muslim population in north Kerala enables the Muslim League to send its candidates

to the Legislature on its own strength. In the Kerala Legislative Assembly (1957 – 2016), numerical strength of Muslim Members ranged in between 12 and 36 and most of them elected from traditional constituencies. As such, whenever the Muslim League was part of the coalition governments, it extended maximum support for fulfilling the community's interest.

In the post-cold war period relations between many countries witnessed sea-change . The case of the relation between the US and Cuba is a notable one in this direction. Satheesh Kumar P.K. in his article titled *U.S. Policy Towards Cuba in the 21st Century* illustrates the major changes in Cuba in the post-Fidel Castro period. According to Satheesh, Cuba has successfully adapted to survive and develop in the neo – liberal age. Its strategies included a wide variety of reforms at the social, economic, cultural and political levels.

Rajeevan R's article titled on *150 Years of Mahatma Gandhi: A Re-Reading of His Vision on Environment and Development* examines the significance of Gandhian ideas in the contemporary world. Mahatma Gandhi was one of the well-known environmentalists who detected many problems at an earlier time and prescribed the best medicine to cure it. He put forward an alternative notion of development which is apparently more humane and in harmony with nature.

The article on *Community Policing: A Theoretical Perspective* by Jose R. & Josukutty C.A. examines the theoretical basis of community policing by analyzing definitions, dimensions and theories. Community policing is a type of policing which seeks the responsible participation of the citizenry in crime prevention at the level of the local community conserving the resources, both of the community and of the police, in fighting crimes which threatens the security of the community. The article also focuses on the community policing scheme of Kerala Police in the backdrop of these theories.

Chief Editor

European Public Opinion Attitudes and the 2015 Refugee Crisis In Europe: The Greek Case Since 2015

Nikos Marantzidis & George Siakas

Abstract

In 2015 the EU faced an unprecedented immigration and refugee crisis as thousands of people attempted to reach its external borders -mainly by the sea-. The EU's member states in the periphery, such as Greece and Italy, bear the brunt to complete the asylum procedures, facing a chronic overcrowd. The immigration crisis had a major impact, both in EU decision making level and in EU's public opinion, revealing sentiments of fear and anxiety. This paper explores both the political implications and public opinion attitudes during the 2015-2019 immigration crisis, with a special focus to the Greek case.

Keywords: refugee crisis, immigration, Greek public opinion, European public opinion


The refugee crisis of 2015: data

Without any doubt, the year of 2015 constitutes in Europe's memory a turning point. During the summer of that year, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), some 1,000,573 people had reached Europe across the Mediterranean Sea. Some 856,700 people arrived in Greece during this year accounting for 80 % of the people arriving irregularly in Europe by sea in 2015. On the whole, according to Eurostat, 1,255,600 first-time asylum seekers applied for international protection in the Member States of the European Union (EU), a number more than double that of the previous year (EUROSTAT 2016).

The Eurostat report also clarifies the countries provenance: The number of Syrians seeking international protection has doubled in 2015 compared

to the previous year reaching 362,800 people, while the number of Afghans has almost quadrupled to 178,200 and that of Iraqis has multiplied by 7 to 121,500. These three countries represent the main origins of first-time asylum applicants in the EU Member States in 2015, accounting for more than half of all first-time applicants (EUROSTAT *ibid*).

In 2015, the highest number of first-time applicants was registered in Germany (with 441,800 first time applicants, equal to 35% of all first-time applicants in the EU Member States). During the same years 2015-2016 the number of dead and missing people was rising.



Source: Eurostat, Report 46/2017, 16 March 2017 and Report 46/2019, 14 March/2019

Third country nationals found to be illegally present in Europe 2010-2018

	European Union (28 countries)	Greece	Germany	France
2010	508,850	115,630	50,250	56,220
2011	474,660	88,840	56,345	57,975
2012	443,425	72,420	64,815	49,760
2013	452,270	42,615	86,305	48,965
2014	672,215	73,670	128,290	96,375
2015	2,155,485	911,470	376,435	109,720
2016	983,935	204,820	370,555	91,985

2017	618,730	68,110	156,710	115,085
2018	601,500	93,365	134,125	105,880

Source: Eurostat, 23/8/2019

Dead and Missing (in Mediterranean Sea)

Year	Number
2014	3,538
2015	3,771
2016	5,096
2017	3,139
2018	2,277

Source: UNHCR

European reactions

European governments were caught by surprise at the extent of the humanitarian crisis. Initially, given the fact that there was no central EU level coordination center, each state tried to develop its own policies largely dependent on public's opinion fear and political competition. A number of European governments (Hungary and the Balkan states) decided to close immediately the borders and built wire fences on the frontiers to prevent the refugees from entering their countries. UNHCR warned that refugees could "find themselves moving around in legal limbo" and that different border control measures by European states "only underlines the urgency of establishing a comprehensive European response" (Spindler 2015).

We could identify three distinct categories of reactions, depending on the policies and the style of discourse developed by the European governments on refugee crisis. On the one side, there was the fierce "anti-refugee" and "anti-migrants" rhetoric of Hungary, Poland, Austria, Czech Republic. Those governments constructed a narrative portraying the influx of refugees as a threat to Europe. The most prominent anti-refugee leader was the populist far-right wing Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orban. During the whole year of 2015 and even later, Orban rejected the label humanitarian crisis and systematically declared his opposition to any humanitarian effort to address the problem. For example, at a gathering of European conservative parties in October 2015, he characteristically said: "What we have been facing is not a refugee crisis. This is a migratory movement composed of economic

migrants, refugees and also foreign fighters. This is an uncontrolled and unregulated process. The Right to human dignity and security are basic rights. But neither the German nor the Hungarian way of life is a basic right of all people on the Earth”¹.

On the other side, we can identify the “pro-refugee” discourse of the Greek and the German governments. Though coming from opposing political families, both governments tried to spread a more humanitarian discourse, placing emphasis on the common European values and the need to respect the Geneva Convention. Their rhetoric was not merely limited to words. In 2015, Germany accepted one million refugees, almost 50% of the whole number of refugees that year. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, declared she had decided to open Germany’s borders to migrants fleeing war and turmoil in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. She stated that “It was an extraordinary situation and I made my decision based on what I thought was right from a political and humanitarian standpoint [...] It is no exaggeration to see this task as a historic test of Europe,”².

Finally, the majority of the European governments were positioned in between these stances, and tried to balance between humanitarian necessities and electoral purposes. There is no doubt that European public opinion put pressure on European leaders concerning the acceptance of refugees. In 2015 and 2016, immigration, followed by terrorism, had become the leading concerns cited in answers in the Eurobarometer: 58% rated immigration and 39% terrorism as one of the two most important issues facing the EU (Debomy & Tripier 2017: 16). To understand the change in public opinion’s mood, let us take an example: in 1997, almost twenty years ago, just 3% of the British public opinion mentioned immigration as a key problem in the UK. By 2004, this issue jumped from 3% to 26%, becoming the third most important issue in the UK, even though it was considered as a secondary issue (Shabi 2018). In a bit over a decade, in June 2016, immigration and asylum have become the most important issue in the UK: 56% of the respondents cited it as a key issue³.

Moreover, a high share of the public opinion associated refugees with terrorism. From 64% (in Germany) up to 85% (in the Netherlands) of Europeans think that “the large numbers of migrants currently arriving in Europe include potential terrorists” (Fourquet 2015: 5). But the concerns of the public opinion were not limited to terrorism. For the European citizens, the refugees were seen as a long-term problem. Between 70% and 80% of respondents in different countries agree that “if we accept large numbers of migrants into our country and into Europe, it will create a pull factor and cause many people living in Africa, Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan to move to Europe” (Fourquet *ibid*).

The Greek case

The situation in Greece was by far the most complicated in Europe because of the combination of economic and refugee factors. In short, since 2009 the country was experiencing an economic crisis, unprecedented since World War II. In 2009, as the cost of borrowing to refinance the debt could not be reached, the newly elected socialist government was obliged to recourse to the EU and the IMF for the procurement of debt financing in order to avoid default. Eventually, on Friday, April 23, 2010, the appeal of Greece to the support mechanisms of the EU, IMF and ECB was announced by the Prime Minister George Papandreou with a dramatic statement.

The bailout was accompanied by a Memorandum of Understanding between the lenders and the Greek government. The Memorandum involved reforms and serious austerity measures, which were negatively received by the Greek electorate. From 2010 and for the next five years, the country was divided politically, ideologically and psychologically between two different camps: the “pro-memorandum” and the “anti-memorandum” supporters. The first group acknowledged that the Memorandum measures were necessary and inevitable, whereas the latter fought against it believing that the bailout package was at best “the wrong recipe” and at worst a conspiracy action of corrupted elites, international speculators and imperialist powers (mostly Germany) (Rori & Marantzidis 2013: 79-80). In short, between 2009 and 2015, this cleavage between the two camps divided the country, and created deep social polarization. Notably, during these six years, Greece held 5 national elections and a referendum.

In January 2015, the radical left-wing and anti-memorandum party of SYRIZA (Coalition of Radical Left) won the national elections and formed a coalition government under the Premiership of Alexis Tsipras, the 41-year-old leader of the party. After six months, in the middle of simultaneous economic and refugee crisis, the new government, after long and dramatic negotiations, decided finally to step down and sign a new memorandum on July 2015.

During the dramatic negotiations between Greece and its European partners, the refugee issue erupted. As a party of the radical left, SYRIZA's stance was clearly pro-refugee. Long before the 2015 elections, SYRIZA argued for a more open and tolerant immigration management. This was also referred to SYRIZA's manifest for the 2014 euroelections. Notably, SYRIZA won the 2014 euroelection in May 2014.

SYRIZA's governmental program on immigration (September 2014) refers to refugees and immigrants as “desperate people... who are trying to find an economic refuge to wealthy European Countries”. The party proposed

constant and regular legalization of immigrants, creation of open hospitality structures and secure social welfare for the refugees. The party program argued also for the abolition of detention centers and declared its intention to forbid the use of the word “illegal refugee” in the public discourse, considering it as racist.

In January 2015, the SYRIZA MP Mrs. Christodouloupoulou, who is a well-known left-wing human rights activist, and who later became the Deputy Minister of Immigration Policy on the SYRIZA government (Jan-Aug 2015) argued for: “an “open route” in every border..., [...] everyone that declares himself as a political refugee should be accepted in Greece, [...] and [...] could remain in Greece”.

SYRIZA systematically denounced the previous governments’ immigration policy as inhumane. One major point of reference was the situation in the Amygdaleza detention camp that was set up in April 2012 by the right-wing government of New Democracy. Situated in an Athens suburb, the Amygdaleza’s camp was initially established to host undocumented migrants. The camp’s conditions were far from decent. “In Athens on the frontline of Europe’s worst refugee crisis since the second world war”, commented *the Guardian*’s correspondent in place, “it is a holding pen for innocents whose conditions [...] is not only deplorable but should never exist”⁴.

Despite its good intentions, the newly elected leftist government was completely unprepared to face the huge wave of refugees arriving on the Greek islands in the summer of 2015. The refugees arriving exhausted and hungry on the Greek islands faced terrible conditions. The refugee camp in Moria, situated in the north-eastern Aegean island of Lesbos, became notorious for its inhumane conditions, synonymous worldwide with human tragedy and the authorities’ inability to cope with the humanitarian crisis. Moria, notes *The Guardian*’s correspondent, “fails to meet just about every standard set by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). New arrivals are crammed into inadequate sports tents, or on to farmland where lighting has not been installed, and up to 190 refugees share one filthy toilet.”⁵. The mayor of Lesbos, Spyros Galinos, warned that the facility was starting to resemble “concentration camps, where all human dignity is denied”⁶.

In short, the situation, in Lesbos and the other islands near the Greek-Turkish border was desperate. The government attempted to alleviate the situation on the islands by distributing a number of refugees to camps inland. The cities of Athens and Thessaloniki mainly assumed this duty.

However, the great majority of refugees did not wish to remain in Greece; instead, they wanted to continue their journey towards Western European countries. For many of them, places like Germany or the Scandinavian countries were the ideal destination. When European countries began to close their borders, and the refugees entering Greece became stranded, many of them congregated in Idomeni, a village on the Greek-North Macedonian borders, where an informal camp was created.

The informal camp of Idomeni was the largest in Greece, with more than 10,000 people gathering hoping to be allowed to continue their journey. It remained infamous for its inhumane conditions, and was the subject of dozens of TV documentaries and NGOs interventions, who wanted to witness the reality on the ground. This is how a translator working for the international NGO 'ADRA', describes the conditions as such: "It was like a horror movie," he said. "People were actually starving. There was no food being distributed in the camp. [...] We had a truck and when people saw us, they ran after us. When we opened the door, they pleaded with us, 'Please give us something, we are hungry.'"

The Greek Public Opinion

As everywhere in Europe, the refugee issue featured massively both in the media agenda and in public opinion in 2015-2016. In September 2016, on a Survey on Migration / Refugee Issues conducted by the Public Opinion Research Unit (PORU) of the University of Macedonia, 80% of the respondents answered that they considered the issue as very important.

This attitude, had also political implications. First and foremost, the evaluation of the government's performance on the refugee issue was unsurprisingly negative. Only two out of ten people considered that the SYRIZA government managed the refugee crisis in the best possible way. Additionally, 60% of the Greek citizens thought that the Greek government didn't handle this issue properly (Marantzidis & Siakas 2016). During all the four years of SYRIZA's administration, the public opinion attitude on government's refugee and migration policy did not change that much. The tragic image of the wave of refugees arriving on the Greek island shores, and the feeling that the Greek Administration was unprepared to deal with it traumatized Greek opinion profoundly.

Despite the fact, that the Greek Media avoided to present the issue using populist and aggressive terms, as was the case in other countries (Fotopoulos & Kaimaklioti 2016: 275-276), the refugee issue exacerbated the negative attitude of Greek society towards foreign immigrants. In April 2015, the percentage of Greeks who thought that "the number of immigrants in the country is too high" was at the staggering level of 94.5% and remained

equally high until November 2015. The public was actually shocked by the images of the huge numbers of refugees who arrived that year, forgetting the fact that up to 90% of them left the country in a few weeks or months.

Although some years have passed since the peak of the refugee crisis, and the almost panic-stricken attitude has ebbed, the key figures still continue to point to the negative attitude of Greek opinion towards immigrants and refugees. They mainly show the uncertainty, fear and insecurity that prevails on a significant part of the population. From 2016 to 2018, negative outlooks on immigrants continued to dominate public opinion, while positive assessment of the refugees' and migrants' presence in the economy, demographic or culture is limited to between 20% and 35% of the respondents. In January 2018, the Greek Minister of Development -and Vice-president of the governing party ND- issued a statement referring to the immigrants as part of a plan to "ruin the country". In early February 2018, on a survey conducted by PORU⁸ 46% of the respondents tend to agree with that statement.

Of course, this is not a peculiarity of Greek public opinion, but an international trend that has been prominent over the past few years. Intense exposure by the media of illegal and mainly terrorist acts, and their association with predominantly Muslim refugees, increases fear and boosts anti-refugee attitudes.

The negative attitudes towards refugees and immigrants are influenced by two factors: age and education. In short, younger and better educated people are generally more open and friendly to immigrants. In contrast, older and less educated individuals exhibit higher rates of hostility. In fact, as the respondent's age increases, so the perception that immigrants' presence increase unemployment, goes also up. On the contrary, as the education level goes up, the more possible is to disagree with that statement.

**The presence of immigrants in our country
(% of those who answered 'I agree')**

	April 2015	December 2016	February 2018
Increases crime	74.9	64.4	72.1
Increases unemployment	69.8	58.0	65.4
Has a positive impact on Economy	34.6	34.4	32.5
Enriches our culture	29.0	33.7	30.0

It helps solve Greece's demographic problem	23.8	25.4	22.3
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Source: DiaNEOsis, "What the Greeks Believe".

**"The presence of immigrants in our country increases unemployment"
(in % according to age groups)**

Age group	18-24	25-39	40-54	55-64	65 +
Agree	39.7	49.7	56.1	63.5	78.0
Disagree	60.3	50.3	43.9	36.5	22.0

Source: DiaNEOsis, "What the Greeks believe", 2016.

"The presence of immigrants in our country increases unemployment (in % according educational levels)

Education	Primary School	High School	University Diploma	Post- Graduates
Agree	86.5	65.7	50.4	43.4
Disagree	13.5	34.3	49.6	56.6

Source: DiaNEOsis, "What the Greeks believe", 2016.

**"Immigrants ruin our country"
(in % according to age and educational levels)**

	Total	17-34	35-54	55+	Primary School	High School	University Diploma	Post-Graduates
Agree	46	31.5	50	54	66.5	48	43	37.5
Disagree	36	45.5	30	32.5	22	32	40	46.5

Source: PORU, February 2020

The majority of the public opinion, both in Europe and in Greece, saw the arrival of refugees as a double threat: (a) as a long-term demographic imbalance in favor of non-Christian or non-national minorities, leading to demographic and cultural changes and (b) in the short term, as a risk of Islamist terrorists flowing among refugees.

Unsurprisingly, in such conditions powerful far-right, nativist and anti-immigrant political parties tend to rise. This identity crisis, related mainly to feelings of insecurity and lack of perspective, affected the white Christian populations in Europe, the USA and elsewhere. In Europe, the crisis is politically stamped in a number of different ways.

In the economically wealthy European north, panic is expressed through the xenophobic and Eurosceptic parties of the new far-right. Political parties, like the “True Finnish” in Finland, the “Swedish Democrats”, the “Alternative for Germany” or the “Freedom Party” in Austria exploit the anger and anxiety of the citizens. Their voters are not necessarily fascists or extremists of any kind but due to growing anxiety and anger for the future, they are ready to tolerate fascism and extremism. These voters are scared that the immigrants threaten their security, their stability and the prosperity they enjoy for decades. Another cause of their anger is the fact that they see their governments being unable to deal with this issue effectively.

In the southern Europe, traditional anti-immigrant far-right parties like the “Front National” (National Front) in France, the “Legua” in Italy or the “Vox” in Spain (which became the third political force of the country in the latest elections in November 2019) saw their electoral power rapidly increased. In the European South, the impact of the 2015 refugee crisis was felt immediately, not only as a migration crisis but also as a cleavage between the European South and the North. The latter, according to the southerners, was unwilling to express a concrete solidarity to the countries suffering from the problem.

In Greece, the negative sentiments against “Muslims” have been rising over the last years. According to the Pew Institute, in 2016, 65% of the Greeks have negative opinion about Muslims, far above countries like France or UK but below Hungary, Italy and Poland.

Negative attitudes about Muslims in Europe (in %)

Hungary	72
Italy	69
Poland	66
Greece	65
Spain	50
Netherlands	35
Sweden	35

France	29
UK	28
Germany	26

Source: Pew Research Center, "Global Attitudes Survey", 2016

According to another survey, for the majority of Greeks the words Islam and Muslim "represent something bad". Even worse, yet, the trend seems to be increasing. In 2016, about one in two Greeks (46.4%) said the Muslim represents "something bad". In 2018, the percentage on the same question jumped by 20 points (65.1%)⁹. This pro-racist, we could say, attitude is also depicted in other aspects of the social values sphere: only 31% of Greeks responded that they would accept a Muslim as a member of their family. These are rates very close to the lowest in Europe¹⁰.

Despite all of the above, the majority (57.4% for 2016 and 53.7% for the same question in 2018) would not oppose the building of mosques in Greece, especially in Athens, where there is currently none. However, a strong minority (41.8% for 2016 and 45.3% for 2018) indicates that the presence of a mosque in Athens would be disturbed.

Notwithstanding negative attitudes about Islam and Muslims and concerns about the issue of Islam's association with terrorism, the majority of the Greek public in 2018 (66.8%) does not consider a jihadist attack against Greece likely in the next year. Even more interestingly, Greek public opinion does associate "all Muslims" with terrorism. According to the findings of the same 2016 survey, only one in three Greeks (32.4%) believe that there are many Muslims in the world who agree with jihadist terrorist attacks. On the contrary, the majority believe that there are few Muslims in the world who endorse such actions.

The attitude towards Islam is certainly not irrelevant to the position of Christianity and the Orthodox Church in the Greek national consciousness. Greece, on the one hand, is a country with a very high percentage of religious population and, on the other hand, the majority of the citizens consider Orthodoxy to be closely linked to the Greek national identity. In the 2018 the percentage of those who say they believe in God is 84.7%, one of the highest in Europe and the world¹¹.

According to a recent Pew Research Center survey in 13 countries, 54% of Greeks associate "Greeknness" with Christian Orthodox Church. This makes the country first on the relative list of countries where their inhabitants associate national identity with religion with a second, and indeed by a large margin, Poland (for Roman Catholicism) at 34%. It should not be forgotten,

however, that this percentage is decreasing as we age (65% for those over 65 and 39% for ages 18-30), indicating a dynamic change in the subject.

Conclusions

The exploration of the relationship between Greek public opinion and refugees/ immigrants could lead us to some important remarks. First and foremost, as all surveys affirm, the refugee issue is of particular concern to the European and Greek public, at least since 2015. Of course, the relation between the Greek society and the immigrants goes further back. Particularly, the first wave of migrants came in the country immediately after the fall of communism in the Balkans in the early 90s. In those years, large numbers of immigrants and refugees from Albania, Bulgaria, the former-Yugoslavia, and the former post-Soviet states arrived in the country. The 2001 census recorded some 760,000 immigrants from about 195 countries. The majority of them, about 60%, were mainly immigrants from Albania who had come to Greece in search of employment. Those immigrants -and especially the Albanians- were associated in the Greek popular culture of the mid-1990s, with extreme poverty, minor criminality or attached to major criminal activities (thefts, burglaries, murders), low educational attainment, temporary and uninsured manual labor (Marantzidis & Siakas 2019: 242-243, Tsaliki & Chandrinou 2008: 19-22).

Further, it is clear that during the last thirty years Greek society has difficulties to embrace its coexistence with people from diverse cultural backgrounds, and especially with people coming from poorer countries either from the former communist bloc or the Muslim world. A strong majority ranging from 60% to 80% still believes that Greece has too many immigrants and the best solution for people who have come to Greece to seek work and better living conditions would be to leave. The public is primarily concerned with security issues and, secondarily, with issues of cultural and national identity and unemployment.

The refugee crisis and the massive wave of refugees arriving in the Aegean islands in the summer of 2015 have been a powerful shock to the Greeks, who were particularly concerned about the long-term effects of the phenomenon. Despite all these fears, which can sometime take the form of local hysteria, there have been no signs of massive aggressive xenophobic reactions until the first months of 2019. On the contrary, in matters concerning children's education, healthcare, etc. Greek society seems open and compassionate.

There is, however, a substantial difference in the attitude of Greek society towards Muslim immigrants and immigrants from non-Muslim countries. This difference is related to the insecurity towards Islam that was sparked following the 9/11 attacks of the Al-Qaeda in the United States. Yet, this

insecurity is not confined to terrorist fears. It is a structural identarian, cultural insecurity, which intersects with both structural sociological realities (Muslim populations are significantly poorer) and events of critical political juncture such as terrorist attacks.

In conclusion, the attitude of Greek society towards refugees does indeed appear to be closed and conservative, but not aggressive or violently racist. It is more driven by fear and insecurity rather than feelings of hate or white supremacy ideology. But this is not necessarily comforting. The transition from fear to aggression is not as difficult as some may think. During the last weeks of 2019, such violent incidents appeared in different Greek cities –not massively though– signaling the potentiality of a worse-case scenario.

Notes

- 1 The Guardian, 25/10/2015
- 2 M. de la Baume, “Angela Merkel defends open border migration policy”, *Politico*, 27/8/2017. DW, “Merkel: Refugee crisis a ‘historic test of Europe’”, 15/10/2015.
- 3 YouGov, Top issues tracker, 2018.
- 4 The Guardian, 10 September 2016.
- 5 The Guardian, 13/9/2018
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- 7 www.adra.com/it.-was-like-a-horror-movie-idomeni-refugee-camp-greece/
- 8 PORU, February 2018
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Locating Youth in Jordanian Politics

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Abstract

In the various fields of academics, the study of population is a significant one. Though there are many branches in this field, the study of youth or young people deserves special attention. Youth in the Arab world did not get proper attention until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It was mainly two events; the 9/ 11 terrorist attack in 2001 and the 'Arab spring' in 2011; brought them into the limelight. The youth was the theme of Jordan's first Human Development Report published in 2000. It was based on the assumption that young people are a defining feature of the society and economy of Jordan, and they will long remain so. It was Jordan, the first country in the Arab world to produce a national youth strategy in 2005. It outlines a long-term and comprehensive plan and vision for the development of youths in the kingdom. This paper discusses the role of youth in Jordanian politics and also their participation in the process of decision making.

Youth in the Arab world did not get proper attention until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It was mainly two events; the 9/ 11 terrorist attack in 2001 and the 'Arab spring' in 2011; brought them into the limelight. These two events challenged many of the existing perceptions and hegemonic assumptions about 'youth' in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region. Before the two events, most of the international policymakers, academicians, and western publics considered youth in the region merely as a matter of demography. Jordan is located in a region notorious for political instability and external interventions as it shares borders with Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. It is considered as one of the lower-middle-income countries in the WANA region with scarce natural resources left. Remittances and

foreign aid contribute to a large share of the kingdom's economy. Thus, the kingdom is vulnerable to even smaller external shocks or regional turmoil. These actual and potential threats can pose challenges to Jordanian youth and influence their lives. This paper discusses perceptions of Jordanian youth on politics and also their participation in the process of decision making. Jordanian state's attitude towards its youth is also presented here. It also gives a critical account of the representation of youth in the public sphere, politics, and positions of power.

Youth Bulge in Jordanian Society

Historically, the age-grading has not been part of the feature of WANA societies. "young people" or "Youth" is used by social scientists, international organisations, etc. to include those age variously ranges from 15-29, 15-25, 14-25, under 30 and sometimes even up to 35 or 40 (Joseph 2011:5; OECD 2015:20; Goldin 2014: 6; UNESCWA 2009; Hafferkamp 2014:8;).

In Arabic language, youth "Shabab" "شابش" stems from the root word "Shabba" "ب-ش". As per Al-Munjid Lexicon the term holds several meanings: the beginning of; to burst into flames and grow quickly; become active and prance. The linguistic meaning implies several connotations including a dynamic phase of life, energy, vigor, adorn. As a statistical definition, there is a tendency to use an age range to determine youth category, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) defines youth for statistical consistency as individuals who are in the age group 15-24 years, while the League of Arab States define "youth" as the individuals in the age group 15-35 years old (UNESCO 2019: 24).

According to the Ministry of Youth (MOY), the Kingdom of Jordan, the legal definition of youth says they are the population category aged between 12-30 years. (Al- Mulla 2007; UNESCWA 2011a: 7; Jordan's National Youth Strategy 2004; UNESCO 2019: 24). It is also important to examine that the youth in Jordan is the theme of the kingdom's first Human Development Report published in 2000.

According to the Department of Statistics (DoS), Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018), nearly 63 per cent of the total population of Jordan is under age 30. Among them, almost 40 per cent are between the age of 10 and 30. It shows the demographic composition of the kingdom in favour of the youth. Despite the domination in number, their role in the political sphere or the decision-making process of the country is minimal. It needs to know about the political system and the nature of political parties there to understand the 'marginal' role of youth in Jordan.

Political System and Political Parties in Jordan

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy which “officially became the Kingdom of Jordan in 1949, but before this date, it was never a separate and standalone entity” (Abidi 1965). The King of Jordan holds the supreme power or the most senior executive power of the country. At the same time, the kingdom is considered as “a constitutional monarchy with a representative government” (PKF Doing Business in Jordan 2011: 9). For administration, the kingdom is divided into twelve governorates. A governor who is appointed by the King heads each of the governorates. It supports the political process with a multi-party system. The kingdom has over 30 active political parties they representing different political positions and different ideologies ranging from the extreme right (Islamic Action Front IAF, the political wing of Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan) to the extreme left (e.g., Jordanian Communist Party JCP) (ibid).

Political parties based on ethnicity, gender, or religions, race, are banned in Jordan, but the main opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), is tolerated. Despite recent legal reforms, the system favours tribally affiliated independents over political parties with specific platforms and ideologies, as does the patronage-based political culture. In the last parliamentary elections held in 2016, only 215 of 1,252 candidates ran for specific parties (Freedom House 2018).

The Islamist opposition holds only about 12 per cent of the lower house. The political system in the kingdom where there is an overrepresentation of rural voters limits the ability of any opposition party to make significant gains. Since the constitutional authority of Jordan means that no opposition force in the kingdom can win control of the executive branch only through democratic means. Voters and candidates remain heavily influenced by tribal affiliations and the state-sponsored patronage networks that accompany them even though they are generally free from overt threats or violence. Citizens’ political participation is also constrained by the fact that many important positions are appointed rather than elected (ibid).

Though there are many political parties in the kingdom, these parties have historically been very weak. It was mainly due to the implementation of Martial Law since the 1960s. Though the kingdom witnessed some attempts to democratise and liberalise the political system since 1989, political parties enjoy only a marginal role due to the strict set of laws governing them. It failed to develop experience or sufficient capacities. It also affected their ability to influence politics in the kingdom and blocked their attempts to disseminate their ideologies and programmes to the mass. It ultimately led to the lack of information about parties in Jordan, and most of the people

became less familiar with political party platforms (Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD) 2013/14: 6).

Political parties in Jordan are receiving proper attention in view to their potential effects, especially since the Arab spring. If we have a look at the foundation and influence of political parties in parliamentary elections of the kingdom and even in the democratic process, shows that it has witnessed several different political experiences. For instance, In the 1950s, political parties were permitted to operate in the kingdom, and parliamentary elections took place. But, that did not last long due to the regional turmoil and internal crisis during those days. Since then, it can be seen that the democratic process was brought to a standstill there, and the Marshall laws were imposed, as was the case in most parts of the Arab world. In 1989, Jordan started once again to the democratic life, parliamentary elections were permitted, and the political parties participated in the process. This new trend of democratisation is a positive step towards the respect of human rights; including the participation of the populace in the political life of this country. However, this step is considered an argumentative issue, posing many questions. Democratisation and political participation in Jordan require studies and examinations because they are related to the human being and the nature of the political regime in this country (Nahar 2012: 122)

Since the creation of the kingdom in 1921, the opportunities and freedoms available to these movements and political parties have been not stable and secure. The evolution of such movements and political parties in the kingdom can be classified into six separate phases. The first phase begins during the period between 1921 and 1950: mandate period traditional parties followed by the next phase witnessed the post-unification ideological parties during 1950-1957. The kingdom experienced a party ban and martial law¹ in the third phase from 1957-1989 followed by political liberalisation and democratisation in the next period between 1989 and 1992. The fifth phase, 1993-2010 witnessed confined party politics when the last and sixth phase led to the rise of political movements (*Hirak*) during 2010-2012 (NIMD 2013/14: 10; Deseret News 1992).

The economy of Jordan has a significant role in defining its political structure. External financial sources like aid, rather than internal taxes, continue to be a notable feature of the political economy of Jordan. As a result, collective political demands remained insignificant. Thus, the government of Jordan has successfully bypassed the introduction of a robust

1 Martial law in Jordan was imposed by King Hussein after the defeat in 1967 Arab-Israeli war. As a result restricted freedom of speech, press, and banned large public meetings. It had been in place there for 25 years. See Deseret News (1992).

democratic system by exploiting the external funds (Karmel et al. 2014: 25). The role of the Jordanian economy in shaping the political structure of the kingdom, especially the public engagement in politics is rooted in its history. As Karmel et al. (2014) describes:

During the British Mandate in (Trans) Jordan and the years immediately following the country's independence, the engagement of the Jordanian public in political affairs remained minimal. The extensively depoliticised disposition of the Jordanian people was a function of the economic system that emerged in the Kingdom. Initially relying on British funding and subsequently on financial contributions from the United States and oil-producing Arab states, Jordan developed an induced- rentier economy. Rather than relying on taxation from its citizens, the economy instead depended both on transfers from international donors as well as remittances from expatriate workers (ibid: 25).

Jordan has been considered as one of the most unrepresentative parliaments and one of the weakest political party systems in the region (Hamid & Courtney 2011: 1). The 1952 Jordanian Constitution guarantees freedom of association in the kingdom. When Article 15 guarantees freedom of opinion, Article 16 clearly states that "Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties" (Jarrah 2009: 3).

Jordanian laws and constitution guarantee the voting right to all citizens of voting age. Since 1989, the kingdom has relatively regular elections. The citizens have ensured their right to vote. However, the majority of the people in the kingdom are unable to participate in the decision making processes (Karmel et al. 2014: 25). It has many reasons; although there are political parties since the creation of the kingdom, they generally have only a limited impact on political life. It is more visible in parliamentary elections. Regional turmoil, domestic problems, social factors and Jordanian laws (especially Martial law) and even the parties themselves are responsible for this situation (Nahar 2012: 121).

In Jordan, age is relatively low for voting or joining a political party. In spite of that, the youth in the country are less devoted to taking part in elections or the political system compared to older people. A survey shows that half of the Jordanian youth believe that they are powerless or weak to change laws or influence to do so and most of them do not trust in parliamentary elections (G. Sosnowska 2005:14). The primary reason behind the limited political participation of Jordanian youth is due to a lack of trust in the efficacy of political action and lack of opportunities among

young people. Most of them aged between 15 and 29 see the performance of government institutions in the kingdom as good or excellent (JHDR 2000).

Since 1989, Jordan's political reform process has brought about positive changes. Jordanian government opened its political system in the face of the repeated popular demands for political and democratic life, and as a result of other socio-economic and political changes. Parliamentary elections have become more regular, Political parties are now legal, and other sectors such as economic reforms have been introduced. Since that time Jordan had five elections; in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007, produced various types of practices connected with the election process, a type of election culture. Moreover, this state has over 31 political parties, but most of which are small and inconsequential. These parties came into existence following the passage of the 1992 Political Parties Article.⁴² (Jordan Times, March 14, 2007)

Attitudes and Perceptions of Youth towards Politics

In social movement theory, the concept of 'youth' as a unit for social science analysis is problematic, because the biological factor especially ages that bonds young people together is not socially significant enough to treat them as a collective body. They come from different social classes and vary in their education and socialisation, which shape young people's political orientations in different ways (Bayat 2010; Yaghi 2015). Schwarz and Anika (2017: 5) opine that "youth and young adults were hardly described as political subjects, but rather as objects of policies that had to change. They were portrayed as passive victims of an eroding social pact between former generations and authoritarian regimes".

Youth in Jordan share a common negative view on "politics" and are a sceptic of political institutions there. Their participation in the public life of the country is minimal as they have a feeling of no role in the decision-making process. A good share of the youth in Jordan considers that commenting on political decisions or expressing their opinions to be a form of political participation (Mouawad 2007:4).

According to a survey conducted by Al-Hayat, youth in Jordan are not confident in parliament, and it found they are to be apathetic about politics. Its latest survey reveals that nearly half of the young Jordanians were not happy with the political reform and changes that were ultimately made. So they are disappointed with the existing governmental and social system in Jordan and are ready to act. Youth in the kingdom chose "not to participate as a form of political engagement", but that doesn't mean indifference. At the same time, a sizable number of youth populations get involved in politics at universities, including on the Political Team. "Students at the University of Jordan's faculty of international studies have formed this group to increase

political awareness among students so they can have better participation in the Kingdom's democratic process" (Hafferkamp 2013, National Democratic Institute (NDI) and Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development 2010).

Students participate only to a certain extent in universities in Jordan. When the administration of the university appoints half of the student councils, only the remaining half is elected by students. This is the case at the University of Jordan. As most of the students see it against the concept of democracy, many of them are preferred to abstain regularly from casting their votes, also "because all the candidates belong to the establishment. They have the same mentality. Universities are a place for recycling political ideas" (Mouawad, 2007: 11).

They see politics is to "be more related to diverse notions, such as taboo, foreign policy, competition between the East and the West; politics is a question of survival of conducting interest" (ibid: 8). According to Mouawad, most of the youth are:

interested in politics strongly believe in themselves and have high self-esteem that generates a certain degree of enthusiasm, regardless of all existing obstacles. This fact was noted, for instance, in the case of Jordanian youth, who expressed a strong interest in youth issues. In fact, more than fifty percent of those who do participate in public activities have upcoming plans and political ambitions for the future and even envisage a career either at ministerial or parliamentary level. 57.1% of all the Jordanians mentioned a seat in the parliament as their ultimate career goal (Mouawad 2007: 15).

Regarding political affairs, many younger tribesmen in Jordan saw themselves as different from their elders. Because, they do not like to see politics as a means to extort Makruma or payoffs such as jobs and welfare from the state. Rather most tribal youth activists prioritised politics because they could afford to do so. For example, Hirak,- an Arabic word which aptly means "movement"- members were mainly employed Jordanian male aged 20- 30 who were highly educated. They opine "What my elders want is not what I want . . . I don't want Makruma, even if it is a job. I can take care of myself. I want my political rights as a citizen" (Yom 2014: 243). It indicates that despite a sizable number of them are apathetic towards politics, a good share of Jordanian youth are progressive in their attitude towards politics.

The distribution of students' political views shows that the majority of them adopt Islamic political views, and a minority adopt either nationalist or liberal viewpoint. Students who belong to a political party constitute a small percentage (16 per cent) of all students, with almost half of those who do belong to a political party belonging to the IAF (52 per cent), followed by

the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party ASBP (24 per cent). The practise of politics in the form of membership in political parties is not common among Jordanian university students (Al-Azzam & Sayel 2014: 282). However, the role of youth in the Jordanian public sphere and opposition political parties cannot be neglected or underestimated. They are considered as a significant force in achieving and advancing political stability, democracy and peace in Jordan (Hafferkamp 2013). Besides, there are some youth coalition movements in Jordan.

Youth Groups and Political Parties in Jordan

The deep sociological, cultural, economic, and religious divisions in each society provide the essential foundations for the party system within it (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The resulting dimensions structuring political divisions are called cleavages. Each country has a specific number, type, and structure of cleavages that are shaped and influenced by its historical development (Abduljaber and Ilker 2018: 2).

Regional and domestic developments over the period since the establishment of Jordan were very much influential in defining and designing the nature and growth of political parties. According to Ghazi Saleh Nahar, "The experience of political parties in Jordan can be divided into four phases: the first phase from 1921-1950, called the Traditional parties; the second phase from 1950- 1967 called The Ideological parties; the third phase 1967-1989, the Martial law period; and the fourth one from 1989-2007, the initiation of political liberalization" (Nahar 2012: 125).

There are some active and inactive youth groups and political parties working in Jordan. Interestingly most of them were founded after 2010 except the Dhiban Youth Committee which was founded in 2006 (see table II.6). Parties like The Shabab Youth Reform Movement stands mainly to draft a new constitution based on justice and equal opportunities for all. It is also seen that a number of these groups are regional.

Table 1
List of Youth Groups and Political Parties in Jordan with Key Data

Sl. No.	Entity name	Founding date	Basis for creation/ Principle
1	The Jordanian National Youth Party (JNYP)	2011	Political and Education issues
2	The Dhiban Youth Committee	2006	Regional political and labour issues

3	The Independent Youth Political Thought Group	2012	Political and economic reform policy
4	The Jordanian Youth Movement	2011	Political and constitutional reforms
5	The Ma'an Youth Coalition for Reform and Change	2012	Regional party for constitutional reforms
6	The Sahab Youth Reform Movement	2011	Regional party for constitutional reforms

Source: Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD) (2014), Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Jordan and the Identity Center (2013/14), "Map of the Political Parties and Movements in Jordan", Amman.

The table 1 sketches the major youth groups and political parties in Jordan, except 'The Dhiban Youth Committee of Jordan', all youth groups and parties were founded after the outbreak of Arab spring in the region. It means the Arab spring induced demonstrations have been crucial in inspiring the minds of youth in the kingdom to unite, express their concern and ultimately to form their movements, groups, and parties.

'The Dhiban Youth Committee of Jordan' was first established as a labour movement in 2006 in the marginalised areas of Madaba Governorate and became a political movement in 2011. The organisation's initial demonstrations were to free trade unions from the grip of state security and to protect labour rights. It later worked for social justice, elimination of poverty, the development of basic infrastructure services and better employment opportunities (NIMD 2013/14).

Another important youth group established in mid-2011 in Jordan is the 'Independent Youth Political Thought Group' which is also known as "Youth for Reform". The group was started by the efforts of some independent youth activists. Interestingly, a large number of its activists have membership in other political parties in the country. It usually discusses political issues, holds open meetings with youth from different political backgrounds and make suggestions that are agreed and developed upon by the participating members. Its general demands include: the Prime Minister (PM) of Jordan has to be either selected by a parliamentary majority elected by people or be directly elected by the representatives. It also wants the legislative authority of the country has to be elected by the Jordanian people with the support of modern electoral law considering the existing socio-political composition in the country (ibid).

'The Jordanian Youth Movement' was established in the first months of 2011. It is considered as one of the active and also controversial youth

movements in Jordan due to a large number of protest activities organised, implemented, and joined by the movement. As a result, it became the main target of anti-reformist forces in the kingdom. Members of the movement include some of the most active political organisers and vibrant spectrum of the kingdom; from university students to previous political party's members to human rights activists. It also encourages interested youth irrespective of their prior experience to work with political parties. But interestingly it is not affiliated or associated with any of the political parties in Jordan. Its main demands are: "the nation shall be the source of powers", Constitutional amendments based on the principle consensual, democratic electoral law, ending corruption and economic inequality and also demands to create new economic policies in the country (ibid).

MYCRC was a regional movement based in the Ma'an city formed during the second half of 2012. The movement was popular for its opposition to the cancellation of subsidies on basic goods and fuel in Jordan in 2012. Its major demands are reforms in the constitution like public jobs, and importantly, the nation shall be the source of power (ibid).

'The Sahab Youth Reform Movement' emerged in Sahab, a marginalised area in Amman in the second half of 2011 calling for reform in Jordan. The area is notorious for pollution and high crime rate. However, the focus of the movement was not local but on national reformist demands. It stands for the dissolution of parliament and the resignation of the government of Jordan. It is also against corruption and the prevalent economic approaches of the Jordanian government such as selling the state assets, including public corporations and institutions. The movement is preparing a draft constitution with the objectives "to restore the rights of the nation to select its government, monitor it and hold it accountable while achieving justice, equality, and equal opportunities" (ibid). Its other demands include respect for human rights and ensuring freedom of opinion. One of the important demands that the movement raises is, "refusing all types of normalisation with Israel and creating an independent commission to be responsible for re-assessing the Wadi Araba agreement²", and its socioeconomic impacts on Jordan (ibid).

'The Youth and People's Coalition for Change' was a coalition of nine youth groups that emerged during the first wave of demonstration started among youth in Jordan in 2011. Its leadership is composed of active members from different political parties in Jordan, such as the JDP and JCP. The coalition movement has been successful in getting support from university students of the Kingdom to tackle issues related to political reform and educational

2 Also known as Jordan Israel peace treaty signed in 1994

institutions. Its other demands include; preventing an increase in price, to end submission of Jordan to the conditions of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The movement is initiating alternative economic policies stands for social justice. Ending corruption, freedom to all Jordanians, and increased economic responsibility for the state are some of the other demands of the movement (ibid).

The JNYP formed in Amman in 2011, one of the newest parties in the kingdom. Its slogan is, “Yes we dare”. Established mainly by youth, the Party stands for educational issues. The central pillars of the party’s political programme include: Improving the school and university environments in the country, decreasing fees in educational institutions, securing decent physical and moral life for the young people of the kingdom. The party takes the views of the country’s youth seriously and engaging in breaking the barriers of shame and fear and in fostering social participation among youth to participate in political life (NIMD 2013/14).

Weaknesses of Youth Political Parties and Movements

Though some political parties and movements are working for the cause of youth, all of them have some weaknesses, either organisational or functional or both. JNYP is more or less inactive and is not playing an important role in Jordan’s public sphere. The DYU was strongest between 2007 and 2012 as it was successful in organising numerous protests for socio-political and economic reform. However, now, its activities are reduced since some of its leaders joined other political movements, and some have separated. One of the important reasons behind its decline is that shift in its focus from regional (Dhiban) to national. ‘The Independent Youth Political Thought Group’ is not that much a significant movement in Jordan’s public sphere. Because, all the members of the movement are very active in other groups. Problem with the ‘Jordanian Youth Movement’ is the lack of a formalised permanent leadership. Though such a structure can give its members substantial freedom, it affects the inconstancy in decision-making. The MYCRC was only active at the initial stage, and now it is inactive. Lack of interest among the Salafis, the most powerful groups in Ma’an, to participate in the political process limits in the grassroots mobilisation for the movement. Immediate after its establishment in 2012, the ‘Sahab Youth Reform Movement’ had to face attack from Sahab. Because of their loyalty to the regime. The Youth and People’s Coalition for Change was launched by both nationalist and leftist and youth activists within political parties. Though the coalition is one of the well-coordinated movements in the kingdom as its members can organise state-wide activities, it has been struggling to mobilise people for

protests and demonstrations (ibid). Thus it can be observed that most of the youth parties or movements are inactive or failed to become a strong component in Jordan's political system, public sphere etc.

When some of the new parties in Jordan, such as the 'JNYP', the 'Stronger Party' and the 'Jordan National Union Party' tried to reach out to the youth, little progress has been made. This is mainly because most of the youth in the kingdom do not value political parties. Because, voting decisions in Jordan are still largely made based on tribal identity rather than political party affiliation or platforms. Also, political parties have a small proportion of seats allocated in the parliament (Greenfield 2013: 4). These limitations constrain the growth and strengthening of youth in the political process of Jordan.

Since King Abdullah II came to power, Jordan has been making continuous efforts to meet the needs of its youth through the introduction, reforms, and modifications of various legislations which provide rules for the political, social, and economic participation of Jordanian Youth and their advantage. One of the significant efforts is the publication of National Youth Strategy (NYS: 2004) for the period between 2005 and 2009 is that it regulates the issues of youth in the kingdom and intends to develop a national youth policy to promote the development of youth and to meet their needs. Thus, NYS identified priorities are: 1) participation, 2) recreational activity and leisure time, 3) civil rights and citizenship, 4) information and culture, 5) health, 6) IT and globalisation, 7) training and education, 8) environment and 9) employment. Each one of these priorities comprises a set of strategic and operational objectives (G. Sosnowska 2005:6; OECD 2015: 40; EuroMed Youth III Programme 2008: 22). Over the last two decades, the Jordanian Government has attempted to address various issues related to the youth. It introduced many policies and initiatives to counter youth apathy towards politics. The NYS 2005-2009 prioritised "youth and participation" and the creation of "a safe and conducive environment for young women and men to participate fully in all the fields of national activities" (Hafferkamp 2013). Its other objectives are to ensure participation of young people in political parties, councils of civil institutions, and parliamentary elections (student councils at schools and universities), etc. (ibid).

Jordan's NYS is a unique and first such party in the Arab world and an initiative by the King that outlines a long-term and comprehensive vision and also outlines a plan for the development of Jordan's young population. It also called for the contributions and needs of youth in Jordan to become a national priority during 2005 - 2009. Through which, it is hoped to understand the youth in Jordan and to raise their profile. The youth strategy also intended to act as a framework, national vision, their contribution to the

kingdom, active involvement in the state and society and also as a consensus regarding the overall development of youth in the kingdom (Jordan Higher Council for Youth 2004: 3).

In his speech at the inaugural session of the 14th Parliament in 2003, King Abdullah II referred:

to activating society's potential and involving all parties in its development, especially young people and women. The change which we aspire can only be achieved through mobilizing young people and listening to their views as they are the pillars of tomorrow and the substance of change." In His Royal Letter of Mandate for the Government, dated 20 July, 2003, His Majesty stated "Youth is our weapon for the future, therefore it is imperative to launch their potential and direct it towards public national service, and organise it in group frameworks to include concerns of our country (ibid).

Youth aged 10 to 24 constitute 32 per cent of the kingdom's total population. They also constitute the most educated category of Jordanian society. But, they fail to reach their full potential due to several reasons. Important among them are; barriers created by the Jordanian society and institutions, lack of access to information and knowledge, and lack of resources. However, the royal family in Jordan supports to tap their potential. It can be illustrated through the statement of King Abdullah II while referring the young people in Jordan: they are "the knights of change". His wife, Queen Rania Abdullah, opined: "the only way to predict our future is to have the power to shape our future. We have the power to do that. The power is our youth" (United Nations Population Fund UNFPA: 2015: 7). So the monarchy is pretty much confident and has hope in the ability and potential of the kingdom's most valuable human resource, the youth.

Conclusion

Youth is the theme of Jordan's first Human Development Report published in 2000. It was based on the assumption that young people are a defining feature of the society and economy of Jordan, and they will long remain so. It was Jordan, the first country in the Arab world to produce a national youth strategy in 2005. It outlines a long-term and comprehensive plan and vision for the development of youths in the kingdom. Young Jordanians share in the transition period of their life cycle; from dependence to independence, from adolescence to adulthood, and from being recipients of services of state and society of Jordan to becoming contributors to the kingdom's political, cultural and economic life. The kingdom's youth population is reckoned as its important asset and resource for its current and future development.

The social, economic and political agendas of Jordan in the last two decades recognise youth-related issues as one of its priorities. Since the youth constitute a significantly high representation in the demography of Jordan, there is a natural demand to improve standards of education, opportunities in the employment sector, and more opening in the fields of politics and public policy. Thus, they can be considered as both an asset in future and a burden in the present scenario. It can be assumed that the country's prosperous future is pretty much dependent on how well the current problems facing Jordanian youth in the existing socio-political set up of the kingdom, particularly in the fields of employment and education are addressed.

Though the Arab uprisings and protests were weak in Jordan compared to its neighbours, it resulted in the announcement of a series of political reforms by the current ruler King Abdullah II. It is observed that the response of the government of Jordan was quick to the demands of youth as the issue of employment could be seen in most of the national policy documents since then. However, it has to be critically evaluated whether the post Arab spring political reforms in the kingdom are satisfactory in accommodating its youth.

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Cyber Threat Landscape of Digital India: A Critical Perspective

Ramnath Reghunadhan

Abstract

The humankind is increasingly being digitized, arguably moving towards what many consider as part of the Fourth Industrialization process that is taking centre stage in the coming decades, if not years. The paper entails by emphasis on the ramifications, risks, vulnerabilities and threats to the digitization that have been carefully and systematically constructed so as to contextualize and critically analyse the scenario. The paper argues that technology and digitization that is overtly centralised through the national security narrative is not capable of providing viable solutions, but deteriorates when the state is in itself lacking technological wherewithal and know-how.

Keywords: *India, Digital India, technology, cyber threats, digitization*

Introduction

The twenty-first century has seen the emergence of ‘digital globalization’ in an institutionalized manner through the use and integration of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), of which internet was just one of them. The nature of threats and conflict towards as well as within a nation-state have become more complex due to the emergence of cyberspace, one which has a transnational spatial paradigm inherent to it. The use of smart technologies in the emerging digital society and the integration provides greater efficiency in decision-making and enables efficacious use of spaces. This is particularly important in urban areas where space is always a scarce public good and costly to afford. The integration of smart cities, which is interconnected to the digital ecosystem, in itself is expected to streamline

processes and efficacy in urban areas and reduce the incidences of choke points. This could be enabled through the extensive use of enhanced sensors and technological innovations.

The role nation-states are of transforming and will have a greater influence on the structural aspect as well, with India being among the “Great Powers” to be influenced by the events in cyberspace. India being the largest democracy and a prominent power in the world, India has frequently seen increasing threats in the form of breaches in data, phishing, trojan horse intrusions, organised cyber attack, an uncontrolled exploit such as computer worms or virus, malicious software codes, malware attacks, websites being compromised. The number of Indian users is reaching a mammoth scale and this has serious implications on the security aspect of the nation. According to reports by Bain & Company, there will be 600 million Indian users with smartphones in the next five to seven years. With content being consumed at an increased rate and transactions being conducted in a digitized world, the possibility to create immense opportunities and accessibility for individuals could greatly impact almost every sectors like finance, retail sector, media, travel, hospitality and healthcare. It will have a particular influence on the industrial sector and manufacturing, transforming the nature of working conditions in relation to the comparative cost advantage. The next decade will see India as the bright spot of continuous sequential development and growth, with impacts both vertically and horizontally (Singh, 2018). In the existing literature and narratives on Digital India, there are serious research gaps, especially in the field of social sciences whereby a ‘sociotechnological’ analysis of the Digital India Programme. In most of the cases, this is either lacking or too lackadaisical in providing a critical approach to the securitisation of cyberspace within the physical world. An increasing number of ‘scholarly mainstream literature’ of the national security narratives are increasing uncanny and uncaring to the serious threats and implications to the citizens, which is sufficed in the name of centralising technology under the State. The paper while delineating the important framework of the Digital India Programme has looked at the various aspects of (serious) vulnerabilities and loopholes through a critical perspective.

Methodology

The focus mainly centers on qualitative research, entailing a case study approach while positioning the narrative of emerging threats to increasing digitization in India, especially under the Digital India scheme. Additionally, extensive content analysis has been undertaken, with critical perspective undertaken to analyze the impact, vulnerabilities (both privacy and security) as well as implications through a case study approach to the Indian scenario.

Background


The major initiatives that provided much needed impetus to digital governance in the country are programmes like National e-Governance Plan (NeGP) and Aadhaar. The NeGP was institutionalised for focusing on the e-gov initiatives at the national level in order to enable accessibility to government services to citizens, through common service centres and outlets that can ensure effectiveness, transparency, accountability, efficiency and reliability of the services at an affordable cost. This enhances the integration of different levels, both centralised and decentralised level planning, implementation as well as dissemination of services. In 2011, along with the Mission Mode Projects and eight components were initially approved, while four more MMPs in Education, Health, Posts and Public Distribution System (PDS) being added. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) is in charge of creating infrastructure for the required ICT network including State Data Centers (SDCs), State Wide Area Network (S.W.A.N.), State Service Delivery Gateways (SSDGs), m-Seva and e-Gov application store. NeGP had several issues particularly the lack of integral and/ or proper process re-engineering by the governments in schemes, flagship programmes, projects and/ or missions. There was inherently problem of lack of integration as well as interoperability among these, with many of the MMPs having limited scope. The lack of an enabling innovation ecosystem to create and/ or develop emergent technologies in mobile or cloud computing have all been hindrances to the success of NeGP in the country (MeiTY, 2018a). Currently, India has a strong ICT infrastructural base with relatively lower wage cost than developed nations, which gives a comparative advantage in exporting big data analytics services. In the path to becoming a knowledge economy to provide greater accessibility to information (or knowledge) and clarity of processes. Recently, the Chairman and CEO of Dell Technologies complimented the activities of Indian digitization story and commented the capabilities that are “unique digital infrastructure to solve India’s problems towards presence-less, paperless and cashless service delivery” (IANS, 2018).

Digital India

The Digital India program of the Indian government, considered an important and exclusive program to achieve digital connectivity could transform the socioeconomic, demographic and political facets. The primary goal centers on providing inclusiveness through programs that ensure operationalisation and access to services for the citizens. The focus on end-user-cum-last-mile connectivity by expanding optic fibre linkages, creation of digital-legal identity, digitizing transactions and becoming a future cashless economy. Further, vertical and horizontal approaches to development of

human capital (digital literacy) and other related infrastructural programme, will provide with seamless as well as uninterrupted connectivity at a scale not seen hitherto earlier. This can but represent the new inception for India. There would be an increased institutionalisation of transparency, particularly to the demand-supply chain, value addition and related linkages. The possibilities include provisioning of public goods and services as well as in tackling leakages, finding bogus accounts, reduce duplicity but enhance interoperability, democratisation of governance structures and authentication in distribution and subsidies to the 'legitimate' end-user. The pillars of the Digital India Programme consists of Broadband Highways, Universal Access to Mobile Connectivity, Public Internet Access Programme, e-Governance- Reforming Government through Technology, e-Kranti, Information For All, Electronic Manufacturing, IT for Jobs and Early Harvest Programmes (MeitY, 2019) and is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Shows the nine pillars of Digital India



Source: Compiled by the author

The *Broadband Highways* that covers three sub components, and they are *Broadband for All – Rural*, *Broadband for All*, and *National Information Infrastructure (NII)*. The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) is the nodal department for the *Broadband for All - Rural*, and has covered more than two lakh village panchayats under the National Optical Fiber Network (NOFN). Under the *Broadband for All – Urban*, the service delivery and communication of new development projects and construction in the urban area. MeitY will be the nodal department for *National Information Infrastructure (NII)*. The NII would be integrated into the network as well as the cloud infrastructure within the country in order to provide high speed internet connectivity, linking various government departments, and is interfaced upto the Panchayath level. NII aims at integrating infrastructure components include networks such as National Knowledge Network (NKN), State Wide Area Network (SWAN), National Optical Fiber Network (NOFN), Government User Network (GUN) as well as the MeghRaj Cloud. It will also horizontally connect government offices / service outlets at the state, district, block and panchayat levels. The *Universal Access to Mobile Connectivity* project has the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) as the nodal department for the period 2014-18. This initiative focuses on the network penetration and bridging of gaps in relation to the connectivity in India. There are more than 50,000 villages in the country without any mobile coverage. A comprehensive development plan for providing mobile coverage to uncovered villages in North Eastern India has been initiated and will be provided in different phases (Ibid.).

The *Public Internet Access Programme* consists of two sub components. They are Common Services Centres (CSCs) and Post Offices (as multi-service centres). The *Common Services Centres (CSCs)* is being implemented by MeitY (as nodal agency). The CSCs would be strengthened and its number would be increased to 2.5 lakh amounting to one gram panchayat with one CSC, thus making it viable and multi-functional at different end-points for delivering services (both government as well as private). Currently the CSC 2.0 has been brought in place by the government under the National Rural Internet Mission (NRIM). It will establish a self-sustaining network in 2.5 lakh gram panchayats, empower District e-Governance Society (DeGS) under the district administration, to envisage transaction, ensure capacity building of stakeholders, and also to maximise the delivery of e-Services to the citizens in a viable manner. The *Post Offices* (as multi-service centres) numbering a total of 150,000 Post Offices are proposed to be converted into multi-service centres. The nodal department is assigned to be the Department of Posts (DoP) (Ibid.).

The *e-Governance- Reforming Government through Technology* that is aimed at re-engineering, simplifying and making government processes efficient and effective in various domains using information technology (IT). The citizens do not require the submission documents in a physical manner, integration of services and platforms like Aadhaar, payment gateway, m-Seva platform, sharing of data mandated to facilitate integrated and interoperable service delivery. The *e-Kranti (Transforming e-Governance for Transforming Governance)* is dovetailed to meet the needs for transforming governance in the current era digitization, particularly in promoting good governance in India has led to the approval of e-Kranthi by the Government of India (GoI) in March 2015. It enhances competitiveness as well as productivity of delivery of services; the use of common middleware (software that enables communication and data management for distributed applications), facilitates integrated service delivery to citizens and utilize the interconnected cyberspace to a greater extent. Currently there are around four dozen MMPs under the e-Krantiprogramme. It also enables disaster-related services, strengthening and enabling interoperability of Criminal Justice System (e-Courts, e-Police, e-Jails and e-Prosecution), financial inclusion through m-banking, micro-ATM program as well as the establishment of National Cyber Co-ordination Centre (NCCC) for ensuring safe and secure cyberspace in India (Ibid.). These mission mode projects are grouped into Central, State and Integrated projects (Table 1).

Table 1
Shows the existing Mission Mode Projects in India

CENTRAL	STATE	INTEGRATED
Banking	Transport	India Portal
Insurance	Land Records / DIL-RMP	NSDG
Income Tax	e-District	Common Service Centres (CSCs)
Central Excise	Commercial Taxes	Financial Inclusion
MCA 21	Treasuries	e-Trade
Pensions	Municipalities	e-Courts
Passport	Agriculture	e-Procurement
National ID / UID	PDS	e-Biz
Immigration Visa	Employment Exchange	NationalGIS

e-Office	Education	Road and Highway Information System
Posts	Health	Social Benefits
Central Paramilitary Armed Forces	e-Panchayat	Urban Governance
e-Bhasha	CCTNS	
NMEICT	Agriculture 2.0	
e-Sansad	e-Vidhaan	
	Rural Development	
	Women & Child Development	

Source: MeitY, 2019

The *Information For All* project include initiatives like Open Data platform for ministries/ departments for use, reuse and redistribute, online hosting of information & documents to facilitate open and easy access to information for citizens. The government has been utilising social media to inform as well as interact with citizens, particularly for facilitating a two-way communication that enables good governance; online communication through emails and SMS. The *Electronic Manufacturing* focuses on the promotion of indigenous manufacturing of electronics in India and targets “NET ZERO Imports” by 2020. It takes a coordinated approach in dealing with taxation, incentivisation, elimination of cost disadvantages and focuses on micro-designing and manufacturing (fab-less), smart-energy meters and further research and development. There is also a National Policy on Electronics (NPE) which was launched by the Indian Government in 2012 for the creation of a conducive environment to attract global and domestic companies to investing in the electronics sector. The *IT for Jobs* focuses on enabling the training and skill development of the youth population for availing employment opportunities in the Information Technology and allied sectors. It includes eight components in the likes of Information Technology trainings and targets to train one crore students over five years, with MeitY as the nodal agency for this scheme. It focuses on setting up business processing outsourcing (BPOs) in every north-eastern states for facilitating ICTs. It focuses on training three lakh service delivery agents and five lakh rural workers as Telecom Service Provide (TSPs) or Internet Service Providers (ISPs) with Department of Telecommunications (DoT) as the nodal department. The *Early Harvest Programmes* that consists of projects like IT Platform for Messages (mass messaging for elected representatives

and Government employees), Government Greetings to be e-Greetings, Biometric attendance (covering all Central Government offices in Delhi, Wi-Fi in All Universities, secure email within government, with upgradation of the infrastructure. The standardisation government email design, public wi-fi hotspots in cities with population of over one million, school books to be e-Books, SMS-based weather information, disaster alerts, child protection and welfare schemes are the extensive features that are available (MeitY, 2019).

International Cooperation

India is increasingly pursuing international cooperation by enabling national nodal centres in various countries for information sharing, coordination, cooperation of global service providers like Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Twitter and others with the law enforcement agencies of respective country (or countries as the case may be). This most importantly includes legal frameworks for cyber governance, increasing resilience, credibility and trustworthiness between different actors and the creation of constructive international role and alliances (Mallik, 2016). The need for dealing with cyber threats requires international cooperation that enables information sharing, multi-stakeholderism, greater coordination. In 2015, India has declared its support for multi-stakeholder approach for Internet governance at international level to deal with cybersecurity. Often cooperation with international organisations like INTERPOL, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or even bilaterally as well as multilaterally with different countries take place in the form of agreements and mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). Internationally, India has signed mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with 39 countries including Australia (2011), Azerbaijan (2013), Bahrain (2005), Bangladesh (2011), Belarus (2006), Bosnia & Herzegovina (2010), Bulgaria (2008), Canada (1998), Egypt (2009), France (2005), Hong Kong (2009), Iran (2010), Indonesia (2011), Israel (2015), Kazakhstan (2000), Kyrgyz Republic (2014), Kuwait (2007), Malaysia (2012), Mauritius (2006), Mexico (2009), Mongolia (2004), Myanmar (2010), Russia (2000), Singapore (2005), South Africa (2005), South Korea (2005), Spain (2007), Sri Lanka (2010), Switzerland (1989), Sultanate of Oman (2015), Tajikistan (2003), Thailand (2004), Turkey (1993), Ukraine (2003), United Arab Emirates (2000), United Kingdom (1995), United States of America (2005), Uzbekistan (2001) and Vietnam (2008) (CBI, 2018).

Cyber Threat Landscape in India: A Critical Perspective

India's rise in the international arena, but have to be complemented with the development of infrastructure, connectivity, mobility and living

standards. This is mainly directed through the use of internet-broadband connectivity, and provision of smart solution(s) as well as service(s). But despite being a leader in the Information Technology (IT) sector and related frugal innovation, it is one of the weakest performers in terms of “broad-based ICT adoption,” especially in cities and is ranked at a dismal 117th place (Schwab, 2018). One major challenge will be to streamline and provide equitable access for the population in the new “smart spaces.” Many scholars have argued that with the emergence of such a massive initiative and the resultant “smart framework,” will face serious challenges, drawbacks and implications as well (Praharaj, Han and Hawken, 2018: 35-38). But the cyber threats that are often targeted, focus on the security vulnerabilities and loopholes, one which the country might have to deal with, especially with the possible integration of biological intelligence and machine intelligence. The prominent examples of cyber-attacks (cyberwarfare and cybercrime) on smart cities were against Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) and Kyrgystan (2009), where government ministry websites, essential smart services, critical infrastructure and governance were crippled. A large number of malicious viruses and trojans were sent to computers and devices connected and/ or networked together and were collectively rendered inoperable to its original users. The information stored in these systems is transmitted and wiped clean of the respective system, leaving no digital footprints for further tracking (Kozlowski, 2014: 238-240). Besides, the emergence of new technologies from digitally equipped cars or smart cars to self-driving, and autonomous vehicles (AVs) are going to increase in number, all of which will be interconnected and controlled through smartphones, Wi-Fi and other related technologies (Meulen and Rivera, 2015).

In India, a 243-page document titled *White Paper of the Committee of Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India* was brought out in November 2017 (MeitY, 2017). This came out due to two reasons: the Senate hearing that occurred in the US particularly due to threats from alleged election hacking by Russia as well as Cambridge Analytica using (non)personal information from Facebook and other related digital devices as well as platforms. Now there are some major areas in which the threat level impedes more into the security, with implications at individual-level as well. The governmental organizational framework in (directly) dealing with cyber-related threats (both defence and civilian sector) contains more than five dozen. This in itself creates issues of interoperability, information exchanges, sharing, the technical skill of the personnel in these agencies, one which should be complemented by other stakeholders, particularly in the bureaucracy. Secondly, due to the rising need for a general framework in dealing with data protection and privacy across the world, one which is largely lacking in India (Dilipraj and Reghunadhan, 2018: 115-134).

The extensive use of Aadhaar for linking every citizen in the country has had its own share of narratives and counter-narratives, on the debate between 'national security versus individual privacy'. Currently, Aadhaar has been used for the provision of various government schemes and for storing biometric data of citizens, one which is linked to various databases for validation and verification. Besides, security experts and scholars have argued the uses of Aadhaar in increasing efficiency and security in terms of governance like Automated Teller Machine (ATM) security, improving banking security and verification through Know Your Customer (KYC) service, improving disaster readiness for denture identification, e-healthcare, Public Distribution System (PDS), cashless transactions, storing digital documents (Digilocker), distributing benefits and increasing accessibility. Some futuristic suggestions like the introduction of cloud-based e-voting that replaces Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) are being floated as well (Raju, Singh and Khatter, 2017). There are various reports of Aadhaar software and/or system being hacked, the data of the citizens being used by foreign agencies, which can cause serious threats to the national security and the political system of the country (Khaira, Sethi and Sathe, 2018).

According to the report by NCRB, in 2015, a total of 11,592 cases of cybercrime were registered in comparison to 9,622 cases registered in 2014. It showed an increase of around 20.5 per cent increase, with the State of Uttar Pradesh (UP) reporting the highest and accounting for nearly one-fifth of total number of cybercrimes. It was followed by Maharashtra (18.9 per cent) and Karnataka (12.5 per cent). In 2015, the total number of persons registered saw an increase of 41.2 per cent, with the UP reporting the maximum number of persons arrested. In 2015, in regard to the cases registered under the IT Act there was an increase of 11.7 per cent, with 81.6 per cent of the cases being related to computer-related offences, this was followed by 10.1 per cent under publication / transmission of obscene/ sexually explicit content. With 14,121 cases pending in 2015, 486 cases trials were completed and only a meagre 193 cases ended in conviction. The age-wise categorisation of the arrests under IT Act, 2000 showed that 62.5 per cent of the offenders were in the between the age of 18–30 years and 30.8 per cent between the age of 30–45 years. Around 0.019 per cent of the total number of offenders is below legal age and is thus considered as juvenile offenders.

According to NCRB, in 2015, with respect to the number of cases registered under various sections of IPC during the year 2015 there was an increase of 50.6 per cent, with 65.9 per cent of them being related to cheating followed by 2.5 per cent coming under data theft. The total number of pending cases nearly doubled, with forgery (81 per cent) and data theft

(76.5 per cent) respectively showing the greatest pendency rate. In the year 2015, out of total persons arrested under the cybercrimes 35.3 per cent, but maximum persons have been arrested in cases of criminal breach of trust/fraud accounting for 45.1 per cent and persons arrested under cheating cases accounting for 26.3 per cent. The age-wise categorisation of persons arrested in cybercrime cases under different sections of IPC showed that 55.2 per cent of the offenders between 18–30 years and 36.1 per cent between 30–45 years. Around 0.018 per cent of the total offenders were below legal age and are considered as juvenile offenders. The conviction rates were 0.016 per cent with acquittal around 0.045 per cent. In 2015, under the total number of cases booked under Special and Local Laws (SLL) around 90.4 per cent were related to that of Copyright Act, 1957, 53.84 per cent of the cases completed investigation, 48.07 per cent of the charge-sheets were submitted and 46.15 per cent cases remaining pending for investigation. There should also be exchange of data on threats as well as vulnerabilities between CERTs in various countries, incident management and information sharing on any global threats and issues, establishment of international clearing house to share information on threats to CII or CNI (NCRB, 2017; Mallik, 2016).

In 2018, the Supreme Court of India in the famous case *JusticePuttuswamy (Retd.) & Another vs. Union of India & Others (2012)*, passed a landmark judgement that entailed on the use of Aadhaar among the population, emphasizing on the security of the current software system while privacy should be pertinent to legal backing, legitimacy in the intention of the state and “proportionality” (SCI, 2018). But the reports of data breaches at more than thousands of “businesses, major government agencies like including Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), stock exchanges, internet service providers (ISPs), banks and enterprises, with the data reportedly being on sale in the black market of cyberspace, the ‘darknet’. The reported vulnerabilities of Indian Registry for Internet Names and Number (IRINN) and other databases reveal a grim picture of the situation of existing security systems in place. The increasing concern has emerged due to issues of “data breach”, as well as “hacking” that is but emerging as a concern (BT Online, 2017; Singh, 2017).

The huge impact and extent of perpetuation of malignant and/or malicious online activities can be seen in the likes of Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), routine hacking, Sybil hacking, spoofing or middle-man attacks, air-gapping had but created more security concerns in the emerging digital ecosystem. Another major hindrance in dealing with these issues is a large number of policies. The policies that directly deal with the cyber threats in the country are more than two dozen,

making them unviable, repetitive and stagnant in dealing with the threats. The institutionalization of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) by the European Union (EU) was a step forward but the efficacy, impact, implications and effect, particularly on Digital India is yet to be seen. The Personal Data Protection Bill (2018) has imbibed many of the aspects of GDPR, looking at issues of “data protection obligations”, on the use of (sensitive) personal data, new fundamental rights in digital space, issues of transparency, accountability, data sovereignty, authority and punitive measures. There is also a need to bring in awareness, training, skilling as well as coordination among various actors/ users in the cyber domain in creating greater understanding of our environment (both cyber and physical) as well as increase accuracy in prediction and response to (potential) issues, threats and/ or conflicts, whichever is necessary (MeitY, 2018b: pp. 6-56).

Conclusion

The sociotechnological paradigms of emerging digitization in the world is humungous and transforming at an accelerating rate. Due to this increased interconnectivity between the physical and virtual world, the transformation of various facets of human life in itself is taking place. In India, the decentralisation and the democratisation of the cyberspace, primarily through broadband connectivity as well as android devices are but a big step, but has far reaching consequences due to humongous number of internet users. If leveraged through the collection, dissemination and usage of various public services, Digital India could transform the current digital economy and the related business environment. In the emerging times, the thought process, ideas, human consciousness and political systems are becoming susceptible to cyber-related attacks, while ideologies and mass psychological conditioning will be utilized to control various political systems and actors. Further, the integration and centralisation of the digitization has created more issues of privacy and security vulnerabilities, for which the current government with its current capabilities are inept to deal with, atleast in the upcoming future. Besides the existing challenges and related security issues in related products and/or services, and victimization of citizen-users have increased. There are greater concerns about the emerging complexity of problems related to cyber-related warfare, crimes, terrorism, all of which jeopardize the existing safety and security of the State and its citizens. Besides the issues related to technical-cum-security, interoperability, the legislative and regulatory hindrances, challenges and/ or bottlenecks have to be dealt with in a timely manner to provide clearly demarcated security guidelines and framework. Concomitantly, this is the overall scenario in almost all of the countries in the world, and India is no exception to it.

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Political Dis-Empowerment of Muslims in India: Role of the State

Mohammed Ghouse

“Modern democracy offers the prospect of the most inclusive politics of human history. By the same logic, there is a thrust for exclusion that is a by-product of the need for cohesion in democratic societies; hence the resultant need for dealing with exclusion ‘creatively’ through sharing of identity space by ‘negotiating a commonly acceptable political identity between the different personal and group identities which want to/have to live in the polity.’ Democracy ‘has to be judged not just by the institutions that formally exist but by the extent to which different voices from diverse sections of the people can actually be heard.’ Its ‘raison d’être is the recognition of the other.”

(Hamid Ansari, Former Vice President of India 2007-2017)

Abstract

Meaningful participation of ethnic minorities in political life is an essential component of a peaceful and democratic society. Experience in Many democratic countries has shown that, in order to encourage such participation, governments often need to determine specific arrangements for national minorities. This argument implies that the inclusion of minorities within the State and enable them to maintain their own identity and characteristics, in so doing promoting the good governance and integrity of the State (OSCE, 1999). After India achieved its independence, policymakers, founders of the constitution, politicians and the social reformers were concerned about the upliftment of the downtrodden masses through the inclusive strategies to integrate them into the mainstream for fulfilling the constitutional obligations of a democratic, socialistic and secular country (Hasan, 2009). In contemporary India, the issue of the Muslim minority is still a policy of exclusion and inclusion. It is discussed by many political scientists that religious minority, particularly Muslims, are lagging in the overall development of the country. The necessity of the hour is to revisit the notion of development and to re-evaluate the entire discourse of

inclusion within the ambit of the liberal democratic process. The attempt of institutional political exclusion of Muslims in India will lead to the disempowerment of the community and destroys the democratic and constitutional principles.

1. Introduction

This article examines and attempts to explore the participation of Minorities in general and Muslims in particular regarding political discourse in India, through the prism of representation in Parliament from 2004 to 2014, i.e., Fourteenth General Elections to Sixteenth General Elections. India has a considerable population of Muslims consisting of around 15 per cent of its total population. Politically India is governed through federal structure guided by written constitution having separate legislative and executive body both at Central level and state level. With the recent capture of power at the centre and majority of states by the right-wing party having worldview of majoritarian view to rule the country has raised the question about the security and political relevance of Muslim in the country. Such recent political change has questioned the credibility of democracy and its institutions. The cultural identity related to the Minority and the idea of Inclusion becomes a distant dream as the idea of majority rule replaces democratic values. Several questions are unanswered during the recent incidents of cow vigilantism and slaughter ban where the party in power has maligned the Right to Food (Choice of Food).

The deliberative model of democracy where Majority-Minority relations are addressed through pluralistic norms, i.e., equality, participation and consensus are the significant factors and tools to achieve the higher model of prosperity. While the disempowerment of Minorities or cornering them in the political landscape. The nation cannot prosper in terms of social and economic fields without their proper share and participation. Participatory democracy gives the spaces for the voice of voiceless communities. Hence the role of the state and its institutions are crucial for the safeguard of minorities and their rights at all levels. The fundamental right of Minorities is political right where they can convey and communicate their voices for the protection and progress as par the majority communities. Ruling Political party having a hidden agenda of annihilating Muslims is the real challenge to the nation inclusive model of development. Hence a comprehensive model for deliberative and participatory democracy is a need of the hour where the Minorities of the state can be heard nationally and internationally. It is possible only when they are empowered and included in the political activity of the state. This study could be one of the tools for the establishment of “The State of Accountability”.

2. Methodology

This study covers the primary and secondary data to conclude the objectives of the paper, i.e., “Political Dis-Empowerment of Muslims in India: Role of the State”. The popular journals and writings have been quoted or referred. The interviews of the public representatives also have been referred to while drafting this paper. Apart from the empirical data of political empowerment/ political representation of Muslims from 2004 to 2014 General Election of House of People (Parliament) and party-wise analysis; theoretical perceptions of Inclusive concepts and Policies for the participation and representation of all groups and communities in the country has been focused. These perceptions have been generalised for democratic dynamics as the role of the state in general and India in particular.

3. Concept of Political Empowerment and Political Engagement

The concept of political empowerment is related to an argument that there is the exclusion of any such entity/group which needs some organised effort according to their conditions to come as per the other empowered class. It relies predominantly upon the capacity of groups and the favourable environment to facilitate positive change. In human culture, Power should not be understood by the mere exercise of power, but instead, it must be perceived as an exercise of power according to the aspiration and motivation of the excluded community. Accordingly, at the point of planning, arranging, and actualising, propose of policies should conform to the appropriate aspirations of the excluded groups.

The bottom line is that an excluded community should be part from the primary stage of the development process, i.e. at time of definition, planning and design so that one can ensure project development process meets one's needs. This insight does provide a democratic set up in approaching the social and other problems arising out of growing inequality. It redefines the problem in a much more egalitarian mode. The main arena for fundamental change is at the policy level itself; wherein there must be included through project development.

4. Concept of Dis-empowerment

Growing uneasiness and social unsteadiness among disempowered subjects raise questions on the existing political setup, which ultimately undermine a nation's political soundness. The term “(dis) empowered native” portrays the dynamic that is rising out of the exchange of two patterns: one enabling, one undermining. People feel enabled by changes in innovation that make it less demanding for them to assemble data, impart and arrange. In the meantime, people, everyday society gatherings, social developments

and nearby groups feel progressively avoided from significant investment in conventional primary leadership forms and debilitated as far as their capacity to impact and be heard by foundations and wellsprings of energy.

With progressively (dis) empowered natives sorting out and activating, governments and organisations alike need to deal with the routes in which they might be compounding the main drivers of national discontent. They should comprehend the dangers and work out how to acclimate to a changing working condition and another societal scene. Past financial vulnerability, the dangers for nations include:

Undermined authenticity of the administration order; increased social polarisation; Political impasse and the difficulty of inciting changes, where applicable; and – under more severe conditions –Possible breaking down of a nation’s administrative framework and other falling dangers that may effortlessly develop in a genuinely globalised, interconnected and complex world (Christian, 2016).

An inclusive society which enabled societal performing artists who are adjusted behind a joint vision for the nation is a solid flag that a state is steady and precise, with more prominent straightforwardness, bring down debasement and a more grounded the rule of law – exceedingly essential variables for working together. From a monetary point of view, organisations advantage from a steady social and political condition for running their operations. They work as per gauges and situations that factor in socio-political dangers and flimsiness build their operational expenses, diminish edges on speculations and undermines nearby systems. Social and political turmoil can cause misfortunes in income, property harm, barricades, bureaucratic postponements, general financial lull and an un-favourable trade condition.

5. Discrimination and Democracy

Discrimination strikes at the core heart of being human. It treats someone differently merely because of who or what they believe. The question of discrimination, as far as it is considered in the field of philosophy, cannot be perceived as a problem which can be effectively combated. Even the most precise diagnosis of human nature will not restrain people from defining others as evil and inferior (Wypych, 2013). The idea of democracy and the practice of a liberal political system is the very base on which it is included that discrimination and other social evil will be eradicated from the human society. Most of the liberal democracy in the world governs through a formal constitution which specifically criminalises all type of discrimination based on religion, race, gender and caste. However, unfortunately, in practice, among all the liberal democracies from Europe to the US and also India,

there still some prejudice and discrimination exist. The discourse of Discrimination and Democracy are counter-beneficial. Democratisation was comprehended to allude to a procedure of opening up roads of more broad political interest to a larger population because of objectively gathering the support with the prominent opportunity of articulation and data and open political contestation with specific lawfully ensured procedural structures. Henceforth majority rule government ought to be challenged and comprised covering all social and social gatherings of a state with the goal that the separation can be tended to through protected system (Schlosser and Kersting, 2003). In the case of India, several reports argued that more than 70 per cent of Muslims in the country living in deplorable conditions and suggested many affirmative actions. Therefore a comprehensive policy design is necessary by involving Muslims in national political activity.

6. Political Participation and Political Equality

Most law based on political frameworks is fundamentally equalitarian. They depend on all-inclusive suffrage whereby every individual has a stake expecting some output. Practically speaking, it does not work that way. There is a wide discrepancy in the political outcome practised by the ruling elite. One purpose behind this is most-likely all-cutting edge vote based systems are neither on a fundamental level nor practically speaking equalitarian with regards to social and monetary issues. A stark contrast exists among people in wage, instructive achievement, and word related status. Such contrasts imply that subjects are differentially invested with assets that can be utilised for political action and impact. As natives change over such assets into political impact, political imbalance shows up. By political investment, we allude to those lawful demonstrations by private natives that are pretty much specifically went for affecting the determination of legislative staff or potentially the moves that they make. The historical backdrop of majority rules system is in a large piece of the historical backdrop of the advancement of logical and legitimate channels through which residents can express their inclinations and apply weight on the legislature to agree to the inclinations. Hence without political participation and representation, accurate idea of political equality cannot be achieved (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). It is possible with the concept of representation in the policy framework.

7. The Concept of Constituency

A constituency is an area for which a person is elected as the representative in a parliament or government. *The constituency* is the portion of a nation, state, or locality represented by a particular elected official or other political leaders. The term can refer to a cluster of people or a geographic area a substantial number of citizens resides. Political scientist Richard F.

Fenno Jr. (1978) praises the term more finely, to incorporate four types of constituencies. *Ageographic constituency* is described by boundaries fixed by legislative or court action; it can be established on a district's size, location, industrial or business character, the socioeconomic status, ethnicity, or other characteristics of the population. *Are-election constituency* consists of the people in a district whom a representative considers his or her supporters: that is, those likely to vote for the candidate's re-election. *Aprimary constituency* includes a representative's most reliable supporters his or her "base" commonly including activists for groups that support themselves with the candidate. Lastly, the term *personal constituency* refers to a representative's closest advisers and confidants, who may influence his or her decision-making. When a representative speaks of the *constituency*, then, a social scientist must determine how the representative defines that term. Power of a constituency to decide on its representatives is vital to the working of a democratic system, in that it offers the possibility for popular control over the government.

The Parliamentary constituencies in India have been reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and even Anglo Indian Communities to achieve political equality and adequate representation in the country. As such Muslims' representation in the country not adequately elected and represented since the first general election of the Lok Sabha. As such specific Muslim majority populated, parliamentary constituencies have been reserved for the SCs and STs as mentioned and reported in the Sachar Committee Report. On 30 November 2006, the 403-page report of the Sachar Committee, on the social, economic and educational condition of Muslims in India, was tabled in Parliament. This committee was chaired by former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court Rajinder Sachar (Sachar Committee, 2006). Hence a positive intervention is required for the next delimitation of the parliamentary constituencies so that more demographic representation could take place rather geographic representation. Presence of Muslims according to its proportional numbers, will help in substantive deliberation on any policy is to be formulated by the government.

Former Vice President of India, Hamid Ansari has emphatically upheld the privilege to disagree in a pluralistic nation like India, keeping up any endeavours to contradict "lessens the just substance". Ansari's comments come surprisingly close to his unequivocally pitching for governmental policy regarding minorities in society for Muslims as essential to guarantee the achievement of the administration's 'Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas' vision (The Economic Times, 24 September 2015). Further, he added that in a democratic society, including our own, the need to acknowledge the difference of opinion is a basic element of plurality. In that sense, the

privilege of contradiction (dissent) likewise turns into the obligation of a difference since strategies to disagree a tendency to lessen the popularity based pith,” Ansari said in a discourse in Gwalior. The former Vice-President included that the world over the part of civil society in the explanation of dispute keeps on being thoroughly talked. “Each native of the Republic has the privilege and the obligation to judge. Thus lies the vitality of difference” (The Indian Express, 24 September 2015). Democracy and deliberation are contemporary to each other. In true democracy expression of views and ideas should be encouraged. Prominent Muslim Member of Parliament from Hyderabad Lok Sabha constituency Barrister Asaduddin Owaisi has asserted that socio-economic issues can be addressed if the community has a political voice. He has expressed in an interview that Muslims have politically disempowered (Live Mint, 8 October 2015). Hence the political argument which is debated in any political circle within India is how to bring the concept of inclusion of Muslims at the implementation level.

8. Participatory Pluralism

They are addressing the issues of extending the meaning of democracy beyond voting and representation value and feasibility of what he calls “participatory pluralism. Political pluralism is a participatory form of government in which the needs and wants of many define the politics of the country. In a politically pluralistic society, one can say that there is no majority. The fundamental ideas of government are perceived through the ideas of individuals and groups to make sure that all the needs, as well as the wants of society, are taken care of. In embedding inclusive political participation and representation, it is informative to interrogate the spaces and avenues available which contribute to or impede the realisation of this ideal. In this regard, political parties are a critical vehicle for ensuring that party politics adhere to and respect diversity and indeed offer favourable opportunities for political inclusivity. Pranger’s extremity of ‘Politics of Power’ versus “Politics of Participation’ is misrepresented, since the motivation behind interest is to practice control, yet it significantly accentuates a crucial element of every present-day society: a couple of administering the numerous. Subsequently, the majority of subjects are moderately weak to impact political decision making (Sachar Committee, 2006).

The political journey of Muslim community in India we can say “Power to Poverty” can be traced to centuries of Pre-Colonial Period. British India and Post-Colonial India have witnessed severe backwardness of the community in all socio-economic fields. The political leadership has not emerged after the demise of Moulana Abul Kalam Azad. Though many National and Regional political parties originated, leadership has not yet emerged.

The powerlessness of the Muslim community leads to backwardness and community has cornered in all developmental parameters.

9. Political Representation of Muslims in India: An Overview of 2004, 2009 and 2014 General Elections.

As of late, a large number of nations have set up reservations to increase the representation of women and minorities in a democratic form of governments. Arrangements for women exist in more than one hundred nations. Individual political parties have received vast numbers of these arrangements. However, the more significant part includes legitimate or established changes requiring that all gatherings select a specific extent of female candidates. Policies for minorities are available in more than thirty nations. The data of political representation of Muslims for the last three elections of House of People (Lok Sabha) are elaborately discussed hereunder. Muslims elected for the Lok Sabha during the elections of 2004 to 2014 are 36, 28 and 23. The lowest Muslims representation is recorded in the year 2014 after independence. This data is evident that Muslims have minimum representation share (43 Percent) in the house and overall deprivation and dis-empowerment ratio of Muslim community is 57 per cent. Such political shift can be alarming towards to Muslims community regarding their security and future.

Table - 1
Muslims in Lok Sabha

No.	Year	Total Elected Members/Constituencies	Muslims Elected	The ratio of Representation on Population Basis	The ratio of Disempowerment/Deprivation
XIV	2004	543	36	66	45.45
XV	2009	543	28	66	57.56
XVI	2014	543	23	66	65.00
Total			87	198	57.00

Source: Based on Ansari 2006, 99-102 & Updated figures derived from the Reports of Election Commission of India

Political Representation of Muslims (Party Wise) for the last three General Elections of Lok Sabha 2004 to 2014

The story of political disempowerment or political exclusion of Muslims in India is as old as political history of Indian democracy during 2004, the United Progressive Alliance under the leadership of Indian National Congress has the total M.Ps from Muslim community are 36 out of which ten are from INC which is double-digit scored in 2004 elections, the second-

highest 7 Muslim MPs elected from Samajwadi Party. The Worst performance has been recorded by the BJP which has no Muslim M.P in the country though the party has allotted tickets to 8 candidates. No political party has allotted tickets more than 10 per cent, which has a lesser share in terms of demographic share to Muslim in the country to contest elections except Muslim parties like AIMIM, PDP and NC.

Table - 2
No. Of Muslim Candidates Contested (Provided Tickets) by Major Political Parties (National/Regional/State/Registered) and their Success Rate During 2004 General Elections

Sl. No	Name of the Political Party	Total No. of Constituencies Contested	No. of Muslims fielded by the party / given tickets	No. of Muslims M.Ps Elected	Success Rate of Muslim and Overall share
1.	Indian National Congress	417	25	10	40% (6%)
2.	All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen	02	02	01	50%
3.	Telugu Desham Party	33	01	-	- (3%)
4.	Samajwadi Party	237	25	07	28% (10%)
5.	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	69	08	05	62% (7%)
6.	Bharatiya Janata Party	364	08	-	- (2%)
7.	Janata Dal United	73	03	01	33% (1.36%)
8.	Bahujan Samaj Party	435	47	04	8.51% (1%)
9.	Rashtriya Janata Dal	42	04	03	75% (7%)
10.	Nationalist Congress Party	32	01	-	- (3%)
11	Janata Dal (Secular)	43	04	-	- (9.3%)
12	Indian National Lok Dal	04	01	-	- (25%)

13	Jammu & Kashmir National Conference	06	03	01	33% (50%)
14	Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party	03	02	02	100% (67%)
15	Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party	07	02	-	- (28%)
16	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	16	01	01	100% (6.25%)
17	Rashtriya Lok Dal	32	03	-	- (9%)
18	National Loktantrik Party	18	02	-	- (11%)
19	Communist Party of India	34	01	-	- (3%)
20	All India Trinamool Congress	33	02	-	- (6%)
	Total			36	

Source: Election Commission of India (www.eci.nic.in)

The elections of 2009 have decreased the representation of Muslims in the Lok Sabha from 36 to 28. As such the Congress has not increased its Muslims candidate figure of M.Ps in the election. This election has got one Muslim M.P by BJP. Most of the National Parties and Regional Parties have not opened the account. Again UPA has got the power in central government.

Table - 3
No. Of Muslim Candidates Contested (Provided Tickets) by Major Political Parties (National/Regional/State/Registered) and their Success Rate During 2009 General Elections

Sl. No	Name of the Political Party	Total No. of Constituencies Contested	No. of Muslims fielded by the party / given tickets	No. of Muslims M.Ps Elected	Success Rate of Muslim and Overall share
1.	Indian National Congress	440	26	10	38% (6%)
2.	All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen	01	01	01	100%

3.	Telugu Desam Party	31	02	-	- (6%)
4.	Samajwadi Party	95	21	-	- (22%)
5.	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	82	08	01	12.5% (10%)
6.	Bharatiya Janata Party	433	03	01	33% (1%)
7.	Janata Dal United	27	02	01	50% (7%)
8.	Bahujan Samaj Party	500	58	04	7% (11.6%)
9.	Rashtriya Janata Dal	44	10	-	- (23%)
10.	Nationalist Congress Party	68	04	-	- (6%)
11	Janata Dal (Secular)	21	03	-	- (14%)
12	Jammu & Kashmir National Conference	03	03	03	100%
13	Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party	06	03	-	- (50%)
14	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	22	01	01	100% (5%)
15	Communist Party of India	56	06	-	- (11%)
16	All India Trinamool Congress	27	03	02	67% (11%)
17	Praja Rajyam Party	40	05	-	- (12.5%)
18	Assam United Democratic Front	16	12	01	- (75%)
19	Lok Janshakthi Party	94	06	-	- (6%)

20	Muslim League Kerala State Committee	15	08	01	12% (53%)
21	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha	30	02	-	- (7%)
22	Biju Janata Dal	18	01	-	- (6%)
23	All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	23	01	-	- (4%)
24	Telangana Rashtriya Samithi	09	02	-	- (22%)
25	IMUL	01	01	01	- (100%)
	Total			28	

Source: Election Commission of India (www.eci.nic.in)

The election of 2014 gives a clear mandate to BJP and defeat of secular parties. Rise of right-wing politics weakened secular and democratic politics. The representation of Muslim M.Ps in this house has further deteriorated from 28 to 23. Most of the candidates of secular and regional parties have been defeated. The consolidation of national parties resulted in the weakening of regional parties.

Table – 4
No. Of Muslim Candidates Contested (Provided Tickets) by Major Political Parties (National/Regional/State/Registered) and their Success Rate During 2014 General Elections

Sl. No	Name of the Political Party	Total No. of Constituencies Contested	No. of Muslims fielded by the party / given tickets	No. of Muslims M.Ps Elected	Success Rate of Muslim and Overall share
1.	Indian National Congress	464	27	04	15% (6%)
2.	All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen	05	02	01	50% (40%)
3.	Telugu Desam Party	30	01	-	- (3%)
4.	Samajwadi Party	78	14	-	- (18%)

5.	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	82	11	02	18% (13%)
6.	Bharatiya Janata Party	428	09	-	- (2%)
7.	Janata Dal-United	38	05	-	- (13%)
8.	Bahujan Samaj Party	503	49	-	- (10%)
9.	Rashtriya Janata Dal	29	06	01	16% (21%)
10.	Nationalist Congress party	36	02	02	100% (5%)
11	Janata Dal (Secular)	26	01	-	- (4%)
12	Jammu & Kashmir National Conference	03	03	-	- (100%)
13	Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party	05	04	03	75% (80%)
14	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	35	02	-	- (6%)
15	Communist Party of India	47	01	-	- (2%)
16	All India Trinamool Congress	45	04	04	100% (9%)
17	YSR Congress Party	38	04	-	- (11%)
18	All India United Democratic Front	10	04	02	50% (40%)
19	Lok Janshakthi Party	07	01	01	100 (14%)
20	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha	21	01	-	- (5%)
21	Indian Union Muslim League	02	02	02	100%
22	Aam Aadmi Party	432	05	-	- (1%)
23	All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	40	01	01	100% (2.5%)
24	Telangana Rashtriya Samithi	17	04	-	- (23%)
	Total			23	

Source: Election Commission of India (www.eci.nic.in)

10. Conclusion and Recommendations

The political empowerment of Muslims in the country is very low and more than half of the community is under-represented. It has resulted in further marginalisation of the Muslim in the country. All the parties have used Muslims merely as the vote bank and hence with the rise of BJP Muslims become even more irrelevant politically. Moreover, the major issue of public life in the country is the over-representation of upper castes and economically dominant classes. The indicator of socio-economic development is also not satisfactory and alarming to adopt affirmative action and to achieve political equality. When the constitution has been provided political reservations to SCs, STs and Anglo-Indians, then why it should not be extended to Muslims, hence a comprehensive policy shall be adopted to achieve political empowerment. To protect the identity and security of Muslims and the democratic principles, the Muslims should be adequately represented. This study also shows that India has not achieved a genuine democracy where the norms of inclusive democracy shall be respected. The political parties are also equally responsible for the disempowerment of Muslims. Their attitude towards the Muslim community is arrogant and not commendable. The parties are using the Muslim community as a vote bank and have never tried for addressing their issues. Thus community has pushed to margins at all levels. The general perception of the Muslim community in the country perceived that Indian democracy has only shaped the power, not sharing the power. The data shown above is also evident that the performance of the political parties at national and regional levels is not appreciable. Democracy runs by political parties and their agents. Hence the role of the state is inevitable to adopt a policy measure to achieve participatory democracy. Without the presence of Muslims, political deliberation and discourse in the country cannot progress. The voice shall be protected as this is a necessary device of democracy. Separate constituencies shall be created for Muslims in populated areas through the delimitation process. The present strength of Lok Sabha shall be enhanced to 900 so that the Muslims and women can be accommodated simultaneously. Reserved constituencies for Muslims will create an atmosphere of trust and confidence in the democratic system of governance. It will create leadership in the Muslim community.

All political parties shall allot tickets and provide B forms to contest elections as per the population share of Muslims. The contemporary politics has emerged new threats to Muslims to their lives, properties and cultural identities. Recent deadly attacks of cow vigilantes and growing intolerance and hatred are also made the biggest challenge to Muslims in the country. Muslims should initiate the process of dialogue with the majority community. Community is hopeful for their representation in upcoming general elections

of 2019. Interfaith dialogue is one of the solutions and strategies to bridge gaps between the communities. Muslims should establish alliances with major regional and caste-based parties so that the share of representation shall be increased.

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The Nirbhaya Effect and Media Sensationalism Revisited

Ronie Thomas

Abstract

The media has played a decisive role in perpetuating gender stereotypes and in maintaining the statuesque of the deep-rooted patriarchal culture of Indian society. There was a continued and systematic discrimination and negligence of women issues by the media. Women issues were given low priority and handled with very little sensitivity, particularly where patriarchal values and perspectives still decided the content and value of news. Unless there was a huge political or civil society outrage, issues of violence against women were often neglected by our mainstream newspapers. The Nirbhaya case was an eye opener in this regard and since 2012, there was a drastic change in the approach of media in reporting women issues especially rape cases.

The main objective of this research paper is to evaluate critically the role of media, specifically print media, in protecting women against violence, in the context of the Nirbhaya case. Case study method, content analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis methods have been used for this study.

Keywords—Nirbhaya Effect, Media Sensationalism, Media sensitize.

Introduction

Since 2012, December 16, there was an unprecedented coverage on issues of rape, sexual harassment, and violence against women in Indian news media. Though women issues have been ongoing in India, they were always attributed to underlying socio-economic factors such as dowry deaths, domestic violence, child labour, inadequacy in nutrition, limited access to education, health and property rights, thereby generalised as women issues

across the country. The patriarchal societal restraints portrayed in media restricted women from self-expression and raising their voices in the fight for justice. However the Nirbhaya case changed the role of media to one that would be radical and revolutionary. Prior to this case, women issues were seen as largely prevalent in rural India, and not reported as serious concerns by the Indian news media, whose target audience was primarily urban, literate, middle to upper class Indians. However, the Nirbhaya case changed the old perceptions and media stood alongside protestors in Raisina Hills in the fight for justice and the protection of women against violence. This was to be a milestone in the history of media where priority was set for women issues and the media took up the issue as a responsible fourth estate. The Nirbhaya case intensified the need for understanding the space of sexual assault against women in India and propelled the introduction of the fast track court (FTC) for speedy trial of sexual offence cases (India Today 2012), the Government of India passing the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2013 and that rape is now a serious crime rather than a women issue (India Today 2014).

The “Nirbhaya effect” as it was noted in the academic world, was discussed beyond newspapers and television, in films, street plays, illustrations and many social experiments. Every year since then, the media has shown affirmation and solidarity to Nirbhaya in the memorialisations, narrativism, provocations to the authorities and definitely the sensationalisation. Nirbhaya case became a media spectacle, flooding the news stream worldwide with articles, commentaries, blogs, and images (Taylor 2012). The mediated deployment of space, place and time as potent signifiers of gender and sexuality in news coverage was widely discussed thereafter. Even after seven years, Nirbhaya case hits headlines and this paper is an attempt to revisit how Indian media moved from sensationalization to reporting the Nirbhaya case with vigor, spirit and compassion as it took up the fight for Nirbhaya.

Media and Violence Against women

It is a widely established fact that media can play a major role in protecting and promoting human rights in the world. It can make people aware of the need to promote, protect and preserve human rights. Media is a communicator of the public (Khadpekar 2009: 8). Today its role extends not only to giving facts as news, it also analyses and comments on the facts and thus shapes the views of the people. The impact of media on society today, is beyond doubt and debate. The media has been setting the social, political economic and even cultural agenda of the nation. The media can perform this role in different ways. It can make people aware of their rights, expose its violations and focus attention on people and areas in need of the protection of human rights and pursue their case till they are achieved.

According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) World Report on Violence and Health 2002, "... while no conclusive research results are yet available on how exposure to violence through the media affects many forms of violence, the media can be used to change violence-related attitudes and behaviour, as well as social norms." (WHO Report, 2002)The WHO includes the media among the community-based efforts to prevent violence, activities meant "to raise public awareness of and debate about the issues, stimulate community action, address the social and material causes of violence and make provision for the care and support of victims. Margaret Gallagher opines that over the past decade, discussion of the links between the media and violence against women had come to be crystallized around two focal points. One was the extent to which negative and stereotyped women's images in the media, particularly in fictional content, contribute to gender violence in society. The second point is concerned with media coverage of actual incidents of violence against women without any bias (Gallagher 2010: 37).

The Toolkit to End Violence against Women, brought out by the US National Advisory Council on Violence against Women and the Violence against Women Office, has a whole chapter on "Engaging the media, advertising and entertainment industries" in the fight against gender violence. According to the document, "The responsible voice of the mass media is critical to communicating that violent behaviour is unacceptable. Violence against women, in any of its forms, should never be condoned or romanticized under any circumstances. Although reducing violence in the media is the central goal, messages that promote violence prevention are equally important" (The US National Advisory Council, 2005).The toolkit calls upon the media to refuse to justify, glamorize, sanitize, or normalize violence and, in addition, to employ its power to support efforts to end violence against women. Among the various actions listed in the document under the heading, "What the Mass Media Can Do", is this suggestion addressed to the news media: provide coverage about the incidence, prevalence, and impact of violence against women and the need for comprehensive, coordinated systems and community response. The toolkit highlights the importance of reporting the consequences of violence, especially the negative impact that violence against women has on both victims and society. It also suggests that the experiences and opinions of survivors of violence be included in stories and programs on violence.

However, except for a few examples, the attitude of the media towards violence against women is one of indifference and passive recognition. The crimes against women are often reported in the form of an ordinary, mundane and predictable feature of daily life and they barely enter readers'

consciousness, let alone impinge on their conscience. As an article by Carolyn Waldron published by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) pointed out, the “media implicitly tell us how to rank the importance of public issues according to the amount of press coverage devoted to an issue (Sharma 2010: 39). In other words, a topic that does not get adequate, appropriate media coverage tends to be perceived as unimportant. Public awareness of gender violence is bound to be affected if such stories are either not reported at all, or reported in a manner that does not catch the attention of, make sense to, and enhance the understanding of the audience. Clearly the news media have yet to wake up to and inform themselves about the grim and gross reality of gender-based violence.

International media consultant Margaret Gallagher reports, in her book “Gender Setting”, the result of a two-year study of 30 newspapers in Sri Lanka by the Women and Media Collective’s Women’s Rights Watch. The study came to disturbing conclusions, which apply to the situation in India. The survey revealed that “The press rarely initiated any substantive debate about the causes or consequences of violence against women, and there was little comment on laws, law enforcement or policy” (Khadpekar 2009: 58). Similarly, quoting Gallagher again, research covering 20 Canadian newspapers concluded that stories about violence against women generally lacked analysis or context, depicting the crimes as the isolated, freak actions of, for example, a ‘serial killer’, rather than as being part of a larger problem. Clearly there is no major North-South divide in this regard.

Indian news media are not unique in the manner in which they tend to cover or not cover, gender violence. There is no doubt that there is some improvement in the Indian news media’s coverage of gender violence, especially in terms of analysis and comment, by journalists as well as academics, activists and other professionals, that has positivised the media. However, this positive development is barely reflected in regular reporting, which is extremely important, because that is how history comes to be recorded. Given the scenario, the following section critically examines the role of Indian newspapers in this regard.

Violence against Women and Newspapers in India

In India police records say that “a woman is molested every 26 minutes; a rape occurs every 34 minutes; sexual harassment take place every 42 minutes; a woman is kidnapped every 43 minutes...and every 93 minutes a woman is killed....”In its report on the crimes in relation to women in India, National Crime Records Bureau states that, by 2010, the rate of violence against women will be higher than the rate of population growth.

Violence against women surfaced as a significant issue in India in the early 1980s, when the feminist movements took up the campaign against

custodial rapes. It was the Supreme Court judgment in the Mathura rape case in 1979-80 that sparked off a new national movement which demanded an amendment in the Indian Penal Code. At the same time there was a movement to highlight the issue of the so-called 'accidental deaths in kitchens' wherein the victims always happened to be daughters-in-law.

The press was an important participant in this early struggle, focusing on violence against women and the pursuit for legal reform. In the wake of public outrage against the verdict in the Mathura case and the emerging issues of "bride burning", the newspapers actively reported incidents of dowry deaths and rapes across the country. As sociologist, Shilpa Phadke says, "One of the distinguishing features of the struggles mounted in the 70s was the generous support received by the media and one cannot overestimate its role in arousing public opinion in support of the women's movement at this point in its history. It was instrumental in bringing to a wider audience the realities of women's lives, especially around issues of violence" (Phadke 2003: 4567).

It was no coincidence that this was also the time many young women (and men) who were keenly involved in women's issues and other social change movements joined the press as reporters and sub-editors, and played a substantive role in creating visibility to the issue of gender violence in the media. The impact of the women's movement on the media at this time, cannot be underestimated. According to Ammu Joseph and Kalpana Sharma, who did an in-depth study of the Indian press in the 1980s, there was a noticeable quantitative and qualitative improvement in several newspapers on the coverage of dowry and rape, coinciding with the anti-dowry and anti-rape campaigns organised by women's groups (Joseph 2006: 7). Without this, it is entirely possible that dowry deaths would have continued to appear as two-line items under crime briefs on the city page of most newspapers, they argue. Similarly, rape coverage increased considerably though it was the editorial and features pages that were more responsive to the issue than the news sections. The agitation by women's groups around the issue of violence eventually led to several new laws and amendments dealing with crimes against women. At critical junctures, the press helped to publicise many of these legal changes and examine the complex issues surrounding them.

However, the role of press in taking part in the issues concerning violence against women had undergone changes after the post-globalized era, which witnessed the ascendancy of 'glamour, consumerism and show business' over and above issue-based journalism. Even though the press continued to report violence against women, the focus and content were shifted to sensationalism and voyeurism, instead of showing respect for the victims

and a will to change the social conditions that make these sexualized human rights violations of women and girls. Further, the reporters are often influenced by patriarchal gender images and use language / terms that show that the reporters have not understood anything about the dynamics of violence. It is interesting to note that this negative role of the press is taking place at a time when the new social media such as blogs, Facebook or Twitter started giving women huge possibilities to articulate their life conditions.

When we examine some of the leading Indian press in English, it is true that women are no longer invisible in the media here. They may even be audible on occasions. It is also true that those perceived as glamorous receive disproportionate media attention than those who actually deserve it. Similarly, it is true that many events and issues of particular concern to women do receive coverage in the Indian media. But news reports reflecting information or insight in to their gendered nature or its implications, are rare. Autonomy and equality in the status of women is often addressed by the press. Nevertheless the same media also endorses the idea that women are around to be gazed at through advertisements, films, contests, and the like. The bias, class consciousness and voyeurism of the press is discussed below.

Delhi Gang Rape Case or Nirbhaya Incident: This incident was a gruesome tragedy by any standard. It involved rape and fatal assault that occurred on 16 December 2012 in Munirka, a neighbourhood in South Delhi. The girl and her male friend were returning after watching a movie, the American survival drama “Life of Pi”, on that night. While travelling in a private bus she and her friend, Awindra Pratap Pandey were beaten up, the girl was gang raped, and tortured. Widespread protests erupted across the country demanding strict action against the accused. Police identified and arrested all the six accused. Eleven days after the assault, the girl was transferred to a hospital in Singapore for emergency treatment but died from the injuries sustained, two days later. Since Indian law does not allow the press to publish a rape victim’s name, the victim has become widely known as Nirbhaya, meaning “fearless”, and her life and death have come to symbolise women’s struggle to end the rape culture in India and the long-held practice of either denial of its existence within the country or, blaming the victim rather than the perpetrator.

In 2013, the trial court had awarded death penalty to all the four convicts. The prime accused Ram Singh allegedly committed suicide in his cell in Tihar jail in March 2013 and hence the proceedings against him were abated, while the convicted juvenile was sentenced to three years of punishment in a reform home. Later on, Delhi High ‘court upheld the death sentence awarded to the four convicts in terming it the ‘rarest of rare, most brutal, barbaric and diabolical attack.’ On appeal, the case came up before

the Supreme Court of India, and the apex court also upheld the Delhi High Court judgment that had concurred with the trial court decision to give death sentence to the four accused (SW Staff 2017)

As one moves to the details of Nirbhaya case compared to the earlier similar women related abuse incidents, one finds that there is a tremendous change in the media's attitude.

Table: 1.1
Coverage of Nirbhaya Case

Newspapers	Space used	Space available	As % of total
The Hindu	21,253	4,57,600	4.64
Malayala Manorama	16,796	4,16,000	4.04
Desabhimani	10,462	2,24,000	4.67

Note: Space in cm²
Source: Content Analysis

This case got the maximum attention of all the media, though the order of significance attached to it changed among the various language newspapers as well as English dailies. Among the three newspapers analysed for this study, this time around, The Hindu emerged first in regard to the attention bestowed on the incident. In terms of space its allocation was 21,253 cm² (4.64per cent) out of a total space of 4,57,600 cm². It came up with 12 days of coverage with 74 news items of which 10 were front page news and the rest (64) remained scattered in other pages. Additionally, The Hindu carried six editorials, three edit page articles and seven photographs. The space devoted in page number one itself came to 3460cm² besides 5,334 cm² in the edit page. Further the size of the headlines measured 556cm².

Table 1.2
Detailed Analysis of Nirbhaya Case

Newspapers	No of days of coverage	No of news items	No of News Items			Photo-graphs	Size of head-lines (in cm ²)
			Page one	Edito-rial	Editori-al page article		
The Hindu	12	64 [21253]	10 [3460]	6 [4302]	3 [1032]	7 [900]	10 [556]
Malayala Manorama	11	54 [16796]	17 [3716]	2 [840]	2 [896]	4 [1216]	17 [860]

Desabhi- mani	11	34 [10462]	11 [4169]	NIL	2 [624]	9 [1380]	11 [770]
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Notes: 1. Figures in square bracket indicate the covered space in cm²

2. Last column indicates the size of the headline used in page one to discuss the story.

Source: Content Analysis

In the case of the regional dailies, they remained, more or less, at par in reporting the case with some minor variations here and there. For instance, in terms of space allocation, Manorama was better placed with 16,796 cm² out of a total of 416,000 cm². But if one goes by percentage distribution, Deshabhimani had a better record with 4.67 as against the 4.04 of Manorama. This was because the total space available for Deshabhimani was only nearly half (22,400 cm²) of what Manorama had (see Table 1.1). It was out of this that the former devoted 10,462 cm² for covering the issue. In other fields, the distribution for Manorama was as follows: total days of coverage, 11; 71 news items of which 17 were in the front page; editorials 2, with 840 cm² space utilisation; edit page articles 2 (896 cm²); 4 photographs and headlines occupied a space of 860 cm². Deshabhimani also carried the news for 11 days and published two edit page articles. However, the number of news items it carried fell short of the number carried by Manorama. It carried only 45 items (11 front page and 34 other pages) as against Manorama's 71. Deshabhimani also did not carry any editorials though it published nine photographs with a total space coverage of 1380 cm². Its space allocation between pages is as follows: front page, 4169 cm²; edit page, 624 cm²; and photograph 1380 cm² (Figure 1.1).




Fig. 1.1
Coverage of Nirbhaya Case

It is significant to note that all the media privileged human rights violation against women as against that of men. No doubt as with The Hindu here also, Nirbhaya case got maximum coverage with eleven days continuous reporting, 71 news items, two editorials and two edit page articles and seven photographs. Manorama carried 17 reports in the front page devoting a total of 3716 cm² space of that page. Further, of the total space devoted for human rights violations cases, 89.41 per cent went for reporting Nirbhaya case. Put it differently, total space devoted for it was eight times higher than the combined space used for discussing the other cases.

However, Nirbhaya case got better coverage in terms of number of days in the three newspapers. With regard to the number of news items carried and front page reporting also the two newspaper establishments- Malayala Manorama and The Hindu varied significantly. When The Hindu had only 11 items Manorama carried 17 items of which two were front page reports.

Coming to Deshabhimani daily, though the pattern was the same as in the case of Manorama, there were some differences. As was the case with the other two papers, here also Nirbhaya case got better coverage with 10,462 cm² (63.37 per cent) space being devoted for its discussion. Total days of coverage was 11 and number of reports 45 of which 11 were front page reports. Additionally, the paper carried two edit page articles and nine photographs.

In analysing media reportages qualitative analysis is as important as quantitative analysis in both significance and seriousness. This is because more than the number of reportages and space earmarked for them, the words and phrases used in describing the event will leave a long lasting impact on the readers and thereby on the civil society. One critical news item will be more than equivalent to a series of uncritical and unreflective pieces. Also of great salience here, are various aspects of the issues taken up for discussion. It is necessary that the media should go beyond a mere reflection or narration of the issues to the reasons which are responsible for the germination of such issues, particularly the structural deficiencies of the system which create the necessary conditions for the eruption of these incidents. This is particularly so in the case of human rights violations. The media has to speak the truth, both to the power and to the people.

As stated previously, Nirbhaya case which happened in Delhi got the most elaborate media coverage in recent times. All the newspapers came down heavily against the culprit. Manorama's reports went like this: 'Gang rape in moving bus in Delhi: driver arrested', 'Condition of the girl critical', 'Gang rape: tempest of protest in Delhi', 'She should not have been a victim', 'India's heartbroken', 'Teardrop', 'Stunned Delhi', 'Drinks added cruelty to

the inhuman act', etc. Deshabhimani was also not behind in decrying the act and capturing its cruelty. The description of the event went like this: 'Gang rape in moving bus in Delhi', 'Delhi: rape capital', 'Condition of the girl critical', 'Fire consumes her: bows head', 'She, daughter of India'.

In fact The Hindu outwitted all the other newspapers, by not only offering a graphic account of the event, but also by using words in a manner that they conveyed the gravity and brutal nature of the situation very poignantly. 'A nation outraged: shocked MPs demand strict speedy action against rapist' was the first description of the paper about the event. On the same day (December 19) it wrote an editorial with the title 'time to be ashamed', followed by another one on December 24, titled 'the rage after the rape'. Other descriptions of the event included, 'waves of protests slams Raisina', 'Rape victim fighting for her life', 'A young woman dies, a nation mourns', etc.

While the description of the events and the words used – sensational, banal or sharp and serious enough to capture the heinous nature of the crime – varied with the newspapers as already stated, one important question stands out. To what extent these newspapers tried to unearth root causes of human rights violations? The answer seems to be mixed. Even though sensationalisation of the event continued here also, some small initiatives to go beyond the surface reality were launched by the newspapers.

The only exception found in the Nirbhaya case in which The Hindu carried three authentic articles and wrote an editorial condemning the patriarchy. In the editorial published on December 19, it said categorically that "rape is not simply about law and order or about deranged individuals nor is the problem going to be solved by more laws, more police in our streets, and more CCTV cameras on our buses or stiffer sentences for such activities". Further, in the three signed articles published – 'Rape and the rise of Indian masculinity' by Ratna Kapur, 'The danger to women lurks within us' by Praveen Swami and 'Here rape is a form of caste oppression' by Chander Suta Dogra – the paper came down heavily on patriarchy.

The comparative account of the news coverage of the human rights violation cases shows that all the newspapers, more or less, followed the same pattern in reporting them with very subtle differences when one comes to minutes details. All of them accorded top priority to the tragedy that happened in the national capital. This was partially due to the heinous nature of the crime, and further due to the fact that it has attracted international attention. However, more important than all these and, perhaps, the actual game changer was the civil society movement, which took place throughout the country in support of the victim and condemning

the crime in one voice. Following the event a number of protest marches, sit in strikes, candle light vigil and demonstrations were organised by many civil society organisations, particularly women's groups throughout the length and breadth of the country. Such movements were even reported from the capitals of some of the Western countries where women groups came out into the street to express solidarity with the victim. This placed the incident in the limelight for a considerably long period of time. Importantly, some of these movements even turned violent. All these created a situation where the media had no option but to perform earnestly its role as the Fourth Estate or the watch dog of the people.

To the media, an event becomes newsworthy not necessarily by sheer dint of its merit or its inhuman nature or the social impact. While all these may constitute the necessary condition, *per se* they won't constitute the sufficient condition. And for the latter to take place, the issue should become something that affects the dominant sections of the population or at least of great interest to them. Stated differently, with rare exceptions, only those incidents which affect the sensibility of the elite or the Indian middle class become newsworthy. Take for instance, the case of thousands of farmers committing suicide throughout the country. They mostly appear in newspaper/media as a matter of statistics than as a human tragedy. So is the case with regard to the victims of displacement induced by development. Whether it is the case of Narmada Dam or the mining of natural resources which oust huge number of people from their habitats, the media silence is noticeable. What Claude Moisy said is applicable here also. He said:

Except for the major breaking events that impose restrictions for treatment, news organisations much more often select a story because it is already there, in the air, initiated by someone else, having already caught public attention, and in the process of becoming topical, at that time and place. They deem that they could not afford not to cover it without failing in their obligation towards their audience or readership. Journalists and their editors are much more reactive than creative (Moisy 1996: 26)

Further, except in very rare occasions, the media went beyond the usual banal and sensational description of human rights stories. To them the basic priority is to make each news item appealing to the people, who often prefer exciting, spectacular events, violence, scandal or disaster (Uscinki 2009: 12). Human rights reporting exactly suffer from this mentality. The human rights violation case discussed above is a standing testimonies to the state of affairs in our country. From the manner in which the media establishments handled them, it is evident that they are concerned more about the sensational aspects of the events, rather than about their more grievous and serious socio-economic and cultural aspects. Also, except

in the case of The Hindu, which attempted to address the issue of Indian patriarchy, vis-a-vis the position of country's women folk in the Nirbhaya case, no serious moves were found from the media to address the same issue from the vantage point of Indian women. Even The Hindu undertook such an initiative only in this case, while maintaining a studied silence in the other two cases. This proves the third hypothesis of this study, that even in regard 'to the instances of human rights violations where media activism is palpable, it stops short of unearthing the structural deficiencies of the system which lead to such violations and in rare cases it even legitimises them. Rather than deeply reflecting on them, the media merely reports such issues'. Thus the media's tryst with human rights leaves much to be desired.

Conclusion

An analysis of the Indian Press and its coverage of violence against women, shows that while the media has considerable potential to challenge and change existing preconceptions about gender and violence against women, most mass media tend to justify or trivialize violence against women. The press is a safeguard to democracy, human rights and gender equality. When the public sphere is in crisis, voices from the press are the ones that reach out, fighting for the marginalised sections especially women, particularly against gender bias. But in most cases this is not true. Even in the Nirbhaya case, there was the dimension of blaming the victim and the media published the news with relevance with a large number of stories, focusing on a 'victim' and 'assault' narrative, limiting the exploration of causality to the attacker over the complex causes of gender inequality and reports of outlandish statements by politicians, on the impracticality of gang-rape, providing a scapegoat to the problem. The country wide protests and the brutality of the incident made Indian media stand with the victim and thereafter even as the sensationalism continues, women issues are getting a better space coverage and importance. With better sensitisation, media is taking a proactive step to protect the women of India after the Nirbhaya effect.

Now, the challenge before the media is to move beyond clubbing what happens to women with routine crime briefs and sensational stories. The press should have the inclination to concentrate on, to cover, and to show the courage to unravel the mysteries of "the greatest human rights scandals of our times"-violence against women.

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India's Expanding Role in the Asia Pacific: Emerging China – India - United States Strategic Triangle

Suresh K.

Abstract

In the post-Cold War period Asia Pacific region has emerged as the center of geostrategic interest due to the triangular relations between three major powers: China, India and the United States. A stark feature of this triangularity was that none of the powers seem inclined to contain one another and upset the power equations developing among them. India, being a part of this triangle, has a very significant role in deciding the future course of Asia Pacific. This paper seeks to examine the basis and objectives of India's evolving approach to the Asia Pacific region and its possible implication on the triangular relations between China, India and the United States.

Key Words: Asia-Pacific, Strategic triangle, Post-Cold War, China, India, and the United States.

One of the conspicuous features of India's foreign policy in the post-cold war period has been its increasing economic, political and strategic engagements with the Asia Pacific region. The ideological baggage of the cold-war bipolarity gradually began to recede and in its place, a more nuanced foreign policy based on the realities of the new international order began to emerge. India has adopted deliberate steps for engaging and enhancing bilateral ties with all the key global players. This has included reordering India's relationship with the United States, the only superpower in the post-cold war era, links with its immediate neighbours in South Asia, its full spectrum strategy to address sensitive issues in dealing with China and Pakistan, improving its presence in Africa and the Middle East, and its expansion eastward towards the Asia Pacific (Sharma 2014:55).

The article is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief analysis of the concept of triangles and its applications in international relations. Second section deals with the history of India's engagement with East Asia. The bilateral relations between the three major powers and their possible implications on the strategic triangle are discussed in the third section. The fourth section provides an analytical view of the possible role that India can play in this triangularity for bringing about peace, security, and development in the wider Asia Pacific region.

The concept of Triangle

A triangle relationship is one of the most common relationships in international relations (Gancheng 2016:2). The study of the triangle has its origin in sociology and social psychology with an emphasis on the individual as the unit of analysis. There are different approaches to the study of triangles. Kenneth Waltz and David J. Singer pioneered the concept of Level of Analysis approach in the study of triangles. Both of them focused on three different levels of analysis; individual level, state level, and the international system level. At the individual level, the focus of explanation will be on the personality, perceptions, choices, and activities of individual decision-makers and individual participants. If the analysis is based on the state level or domestic factors, the focus of explanations will be based on the characteristics of state like the type of Government, the type of economic system, interest groups operating within the country, or even the national interest. If the international system level is the focus, then the explanations rest with the anarchic character of that system or with international and regional organizations and their strength and weakness (Singer 1961:20-29).

In international relations, the study of triangles was influenced by sociological coalition theory and the theory of structural balance. For the coalition theorists, the distribution of relative power among various players decides who is to align with whom (Caplow 1956:489-493). Structural balance theorists argue that the fate of the remaining side is determined by the nature of the other two relationships because players pursue cognitive consistency (Mc Donald and Roscrane 1985:57-82). But these two theoretical explanations are not adequate enough to explain interstate behavior under triangularity. Lowell Dittmer had used the rational choice approach in defining the triangularity among states. He developed a typology of three ideal patterns of interactions in a triangle; the *menage-a-trois*, the romantic circle and the stable marriage (Dittmer 1981: 489). The *menage-a-trois* is a pattern of symmetrical relations of amity among all the three players. The romantic circle consisting of amity between one pivot player and the two wing players but enmity between the latter two. In the stable marriage, there is amity between two of the players and enmity between each and the

third. Thus the position of states in a strategic triangle can be ascertained by observing the nature of the three bilateral relations.

But all the above theoretical insights are not sufficient to explain the strategic triangle among India- the China-United States in the Asia Pacific region. This strategic triangularity is influenced and shaped by the mutual engagement and the foreign policy objectives of each player and the systemic and sub systemic changes. Based on these objectives, the triangularity may be either cooperative or hierarchical or competitive or a combination of the above two. As far as the discipline of international relations is concerned, the objective of the theory is to guide the foreign policy makers to comprehend and explain the behavior of states in the international system or regional subsystems.

Geostrategic Significance of Asia Pacific

The Asia Pacific is geostrategically significant as it comprises three major economic powers, Japan, the United States, and China. Geographically, Asia Pacific refers to Asia including Australia and the West Coast of North America covering about 22 % of the global land area. The concept Asia-Pacific emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, endorsed by the United States, Australia, and Japan. From a political perspective, the concept the Asia Pacific legitimizes the United States involvement in the East Asian region (Sana 2012:104). Europe and the United States were the centers of gravity in international politics for a long period of time. In the post-cold war period, the center of gravity has shifted from Europe to the Pacific. There are several reasons for the growing importance of Asia Pacific as a geopolitical and geostrategic space today. First, the region's strategic and economic significance is growing exponentially. The countries of East and Southeast Asia, which host about one-third of the world population, began to produce one-fourth of global exports. They have also earned about \$6 trillion in foreign exchange assets which are about two-thirds assets of the world. Second, all the countries in the region are focusing more on the sea and adopting maritime-oriented strategies for ensuring their economic development, commerce, and security landscape. The Asia Pacific is strategically significant as it lies at the crossroads between North America, East Asia, Middle East, and Europe providing an ideal trade route to international trade. The region consists of many of the world's vital choke points for global commons, including the straits of Malacca, which is very critical for the growth of the world economy (Bishoyi 2016:92). The Straits of Malacca is one of the most important shipping routes in the world with around 600 vessels passing through per day. The oil from the Middle East and Africa is also transported through this route. In terms of security, controlling the Straits of Malacca, a state could effectively deploy forces from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and then to the gulf in a short span of time. It can also

serve as a fallback to the fleets operating in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Therefore, the territorial conflicts between China and South East Asian States and the involvement of the United States on these carbon-rich area stretching between China and East Asia have become strategically significant. Finally, the growing economic and military power of China has unsettled many regional countries prompting them to encourage other major regional and extra powers to engage in the region. Many states are apprehensive that their political and strategic interest may be under threat with the rise of powerful China and its assertive maritime behavior.

India and the Asia Pacific

For a long period of time, India considered Asia-Pacific as a distant place in the radar of its foreign policy. India was primarily concerned with engaging its immediate South Asian neighbours. The trust deficit due to the cold war politics kept both India and South East Asian states from any substantive engagement. India suspected the Association of South East Asian states (ASEAN) as an extension of U.S hegemonic interest in the region. ASEAN was also suspicious about India's increasing attachment towards the Soviet Union. The end of the cold war cleared all these doubts and their relations began to develop and strengthened over the years. The decline of the most valued economic and strategic partner the Soviet Union, the economic crisis in 1991 and the development of China as a major economic and military power compelled India to have a relook at its foreign and economic policy. Therefore, the Prime Minister of India Narasimha Rao initiated the famous Look East Policy to extract the economic potential of South East Asian countries. This policy has gradually expanded to include strategic engagements with major powers such as the US, Japan and Australia in the Asia –Pacific region. The look East Policy has played a vital role in enabling India to become one of the major powers in the Asia Pacific (Naidu 2004:332).

At the outset, India engaged nations in the region through economic diplomacy and subsequently deepened the partnership in strategic and military dimensions (Sharma 2014:57). India has also used soft power to establish its civilizational and cultural links with the members of the region. Broadly speaking, India's interest in the Asia-Pacific region lie in a set of issue-based themes, including: preventing the region from being controlled by any single power; ensuring the economic and energy security; protecting the global commons; protecting the values of democracy and free society; tackling the threat of terrorism and religious extremism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and managing climate change and assisting in the event of natural disasters and ensuring the safety and security of Indian diaspora in the region (Sharma 2014:56).

India has also become an active partner in various regional multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific. In 1992, India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN, followed by a full dialogue partner in 1995. India also becomes a member of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1996 and actively participated in its meeting. It participated in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1996. India was a regular participant in the ASEAN Summit along with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. On 13th August 2009 at the Bangkok, the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement was signed which apart from the economics, science and technology and development sector, it also includes political and security issues such as tackling terrorism and transnational crime, combating corruption and promotion of good governance. Since India became a full dialogue partner in of ASEAN in 1995, it worked consistently for the advancement of closer association with ARF member nations. India also became a member of various regional multilateral bodies like the East Asian Summit (EAS), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC). All these bodies are involved in various multilateral issues such as technical cooperation, climate change, water security etc. India's Look East Policy has now been transformed into Act East Policy to ensure greater leverage over entire Asia -Pacific region. India is also keen to build bilateral relationships with all major players, which is reflected in its approach to engagement with the countries of the Indian Ocean, Northeast Asia, Central Asia, ASEAN, the Pacific Islands and Africa(Nautiyal 2017:21).

Strategic Triangle in the Asia- Pacific

The security architecture of Asia Pacific has become increasingly complex due to the constant changes in the alliance relations among major powers in the region like China, the U.S, and Russia or China, Japan and the U.S or China, India, and Japan or China, India, and the U.S. But over the last two decades, due to the emergence of new powers like India and China, it is unclear what pattern the triangle will evolve into. Some speculate about a US-India alignment against China; others emphasize a Sino-Indian cooperative framework against the unipolar world order led by the US (Harding 2004:323). But it is apparent that while competition for power and influence continue to dominate the triangle, the common goals of maintaining regional stability, access to markets and capital, and accruing benefits from the ongoing globalization compels them to have a consensus. Cooperation would give both the benefit of holding their own in the international arena. Therefore, despite the trust deficit the three countries continue to cooperate to maintain both their sensitive issues and areas of common interest.

The triangular relations between China, India, and the U.S is encompassing a combination of different strategies like engagement and estrangement, cooperation and competition and confrontation and accommodation. In this strategic triangle, India's relations with China and the United States have made substantial progress despite having differences on various grounds. The bilateral relations between India–China have been influenced by historical suspicions, cultural prejudices, geographical rivalry, and competing priorities. China is much more powerful than India both economically and militarily. The magnitude of China's economic and military lead reinforces the risk that China could become Asia's dominant power and the imperative for India to pursue strategies of internal and external balancing to hedge against this danger (Twining 2015). Other contentious issues include China's continuing opposition to India's nuclear weapon programme ; its deep inroads into Myanmar and support to its military regime; its covert assistance to the now almost defunct Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka; its increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal; its attempt to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) while keeping India out of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation(SCO); and ,its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh (Kanwal 2010:140).China's support for India's smaller neighbours suggests that it wants to limit Indian power and influence within the sub-continent(Sehgal, 2017). China's military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan's war-waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India.The Gwadar port in Pakistan acts as a strategic corridor for China to gain access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean(Mukherjee 2017: 69). Geopolitical frictions notwithstanding, Beijing is also extremely reluctant to accept India's rise in the international system and to accommodate India in global regimes and institutions as equal (Pant and Das, 2018). Despite all these conflicts, India was prudent enough not to escalate the India – China conflicts to a zero-sum game.

After the Cold War, India seems to have pursued a new strategy that attempted to reduce tensions with China while at the same time enhancing the strategic relationship with the United States. China, on the other hand, has sought to improve relations with India by breaking off from its strategic containment policy while also seeking continued stability in its relations with the US (Schmidt 2014:208).India has always tried to strengthen its economic relationship with China. Trade and economic relations have substantially increased over the years and there is also genuine interest on both sides to solve their boundary disputes amicably. The rapidly growing appetite of both the countries for energy and their high dependence on oil and gas imports is forcing both to secure oil equity abroad. While China is

eyeing big commercial opportunities in India's infrastructure and technology sectors, India is keen to expand the range of its economic relationship with China. Therefore, India cannot afford to jeopardize the hard-won gains made in this relationship. Positive engagement with China will enable India to keep tabs on evolving threats and to establish a common interest in peaceful coexistence. Moreover, there is an increasing realization that India cannot be prevented from being a dominant power in the Indian subcontinent and from creating space for its larger role in Asia. This realization is one of the reasons for China's positive attitude towards solving several contentious issues and also understanding the nuclear doctrine of India, the minimum nuclear deterrence and other security-related issues. Both countries are working on a code of conduct for border control and confidence-building measures. However, resolving the dispute must evolve a set of dynamic inter-dependent changes that involves de-escalation of conflict behavior changes and a positive change in its attitude. A strategy based on cooperation rather than competition will help both the countries to secure better terms and will enable them to share their risks (Kanwal 2010:138). Economic interest, therefore, is a significant motivation behind expanding the network of diplomatic relations. Realizing the triviality of a direct military confrontation with China, India has also modified its foreign policy for the promotion of a peaceful environment and consolidating its economic interest.

Despite having a common history of shared democratic values, during the last seventy years of India's independence, India-U.S relations drifted into a state of estrangement. But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of India as a major power, in economic and military fields, the relationship between the largest and greatest democracies began to increase. In the September 2014 Washington Summit, both Modi and Obama agreed to deepen their cooperation on a wide range of areas. This includes the South China Sea, where they announced a joint interest in freedom of navigation and overflight, and against the use of force to change the status quo (Twining 2015). The strategic relations between India and the United States received major attention during the presidency of Barack Obama. Obama called the U.S-India relationship as the "indispensable partnership of the 21st Century", while his Secretary of Defence called "India the linchpin of the US rebalance strategy". During his three days visit to India on 2015, Obama made it clear that the two countries will ensure cooperation and deal with a wide range of issues like trade, environment, security, energy, technology etc. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region not only mentioned about the South China Sea but also emphasized on the need for the two countries to work together with other like-minded states on issues in the Indo-Pacific region. In this respect, the visual emphasis on

forming a loose security network involving US, India, Japan, and Australia. The Indo-American partnership includes the civilian nuclear deal, defense agreements, American investment in India and a whole range of other items (Mukherjee, 2017:69). The Summit also resulted in various measures for strengthening defense and security cooperation. These include a new 10-year defense agreement to facilitate joint military education and training as well as enhanced U.S defense sales to India and defense co-production premised on the sharing of sensitive but potent U.S military technologies. The threat of terrorism and the need to contain Chinese regional muscularity, along with growing economic synergy in the high-tech sector, transformed U.S ties with India (Malik 2016:47).

While India-U.S and India-China bilateral relations steadily improved, the relations between China and U.S became much more strained. China-U.S. relations are rapidly deteriorating on a variety of critical fronts, including trade and technology transfer, military-to-military ties, Taiwan, and the South China Sea (Valencia 2018). A new wave of anti-China acrimony is currently gripping Washington, especially in the Congress, fuelled by assertions about China's military build-up, threatened posture towards Taiwan, unfair trading practices, product pirating, human rights violations and attempted buyouts of U.S companies (Chatterjee, 2011:90). Despite these concerns, there is no turning back from the growing interdependence of the three countries, including in the vital area of energy supplies. The two societies are deeply intertwined economically and in other ways, while the two governments interact extensively over a wide range of bilateral and global issues (Inderfurth and Shambaugh 2005). China and the U.S. would find it impossible to completely sever economic ties. As the world's two largest economies, there will always be strategic competition between China and the U.S., but that it does not lead to being a zero-sum game. It can be healthy competition, even if it evolves from competition amid cooperation, to cooperation amid competition (Monan 2018). Moreover, economic growth strategies in China and India need the cooperation and support of the United States. Given America's need to access two of the biggest global markets, the US may become a positive factor in Sino-Indian relationship if it enhances regional stability and economic growth in East and South Asia (Schmidt 2014:208). But America could play a negative role if it is able to utilize the 'India card' or plays the 'China card' against the other country. Managing these expanding relations has become a key challenge for Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi. The pressing task for China, the U.S and India are to build and sustain substantial and purposeful dialogues to find a viable mechanism for communicating their interests and concerns to each other, managing the impending rivalry and generating synergy for stability and prosperity (Zhao, 2013). The three sets of bilateral relations

have become quite fluid and accommodative. The task for all the three is, therefore to manage ties as a virtuous circle rather than a competitive triangle (Inderfurth and Shambaugh 2005).

Triangular Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of India

The U.S-China-India triangular relationship is a strategic Rubik's Cube. All the three needs each other (Malik 2016:56). For China, the United States is the principal strategic adversary; for India, it is China. India's deterrence capabilities are China-centric, while those of China's are U.S- centric. The U.S interest requires it to cooperate with China on some issues and with India on others, and sometimes with both (Malik 2016:56). For China, its economic relations with the United States is vitally important as its biggest export market. For India, its ties with the United States facilitate its rise as a major power and augment its position in Asia. For its part, Washington does not want a single power to dominate the Asian continent and its adjoining waters and supports the rise of several powers, India chief among them, with the United States acting as an engaged offshore power balancer (Malik 2016:56). Therefore, how China and India manage their differences on their border dispute, trade imbalance, Tibet, Pakistan, regional integration, and the UN Security Council reforms will have significant implications on the United States place in Asia. In the context of the present international system and also due to the geostrategic changes in the Asia-Pacific region, a new dynamic pattern of interaction between China-India and U.S began to emerge.

As a rising power, India can play a decisive role in emerging China -India-United States strategic triangle. With its lasting ambition to become a global power and maintaining its strategic autonomy and equal footing with a major power, India is seeking to play a balancing role between the U.S and China (Gancheng 2016:10). Since both China and United States are engaging in diplomatic and material resources for establishing their sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific region, India can seek to maximize the benefits from the bilateral relations between China and US. In the triangular power balance, Beijing fears India's participation in the U.S- Japanese containment of China. Denying India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers group, repeatedly blocking UN sanctions against Pakistan-based terrorists and ignoring sensitivity over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are the outcome of this vision (Jacob 2017). Conversely, India fears a Sino-U.S alignment that would allow Beijing to curb the growth of Indian power or lead to U.S acknowledgment of the South Asia/Indian Ocean region as China's sphere of influence. All the three countries benefit from a degree of competition but lose if competition turns into overt rivalry and confrontation (Malik 2016:57). Therefore, India should avoid any formal alignment with Washington as it invites China's

counter move in the nature of alignment with India's immediate neighbours which will exacerbate India's security dilemma. In this respect, India can effectively play the role of a balancer and thereby ensure its strategic and security interests.

India has undertaken a series of measures for the attainment of this goal. During the office of Manmohan Singh, India's relations with U.S and China developed rapidly but having a different focus. During Obamas period, Washington has supported India for its permanent membership in UN Security Council, promote bilateral defense cooperation and increase in arms sale to India. There was also increasing economic relations between the two countries. The China-India bilateral trade started with less than US\$ 2 billion at the beginning of the 21st Century and is calculated to have reached about 70 billion at present (Gancheng 2016:12). At the diplomatic level, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Washington in September 2014 and welcomed his counterpart Obama three months later in New Delhi. Similarly, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping visited India in September 2014, just before Mr. Modi flew to Washington and Mr. Modi made a returning visit to China in May 2015. Moreover, proper utilization of the U.S perception would reward India with additional resources in its strategic pursuit. But this strategy can have some potential risks as offending China in any way would be costly for India. As a regional power, India also needs to consider its geostrategic limitations and one of its major interests is to ensure that the changing contours of the Indo-US relationship do not disrupt the balance of power between India and China and consequently the peace and tranquility in the neighborhood (Chatterjee 2011:81). Under the circumstances, India should avoid perceiving the triangular relationship purely in terms of the balance of power. Its goal should be to work towards the initiation of a virtuous cycle of improving relations with both the United States and China (Rajamony 2002:43-44).

Conclusion

India's interactions with the United States and China are entering a particular phase based on its economic and geostrategic interests. Despite the India - United States strategic convergence and growing American support to India's role both at the regional and global level, India should be conscious enough not to embark upon any actions that might jeopardize its relations with China. Moreover, giving more emphasis to the United States will restrict India's room for strategic flexibility. In this respect, India needs to learn a lot from the sophisticated foreign policy adopted by the United States and China. The economic relations between the United States and China have become so intertwined that it is impossible for both countries to disassociate itself from others. The biggest challenge in Asia -Pacific

region is the accommodation among one hegemon and two rising giants. Since India is at the balancing side of the triangle, New Delhi has a decisive role in determining the future course of Asia Pacific peace, security, and development. Therefore, prudence, caution, and flexibility should be the guiding principle of India's policy toward the strategic triangle between China, India, and the United States.

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Political Space of Muslim Community in Kerala

M. Rahim

Abstract

In democracy, political mobilisation is a channel to articulate interest and to get due share in power. It is not only on secular or ideological ground, but also be on identities based on caste, or religious, or communitarian solidarity. Religion is imbibed by birth and very influential in forming the identity of individual. The electoral trend in Kerala, though not absolutely communal, has generally expressed that religious and communal groups have to play a great role. In Kerala, a large section of the Muslim community has found the Indian Union Muslim League as a major vehicle to articulate the interest of the community. Together with it, the Muslims have been found enrolled in branded secular parties as well as in non-League Muslim dominated political parties. Concentration of the Muslim population in north Kerala enables the Muslim League to send its candidates to the Legislature on its own strength. In the Kerala Legislative Assembly (1957 – 2016), numerical strength of Muslim Members ranged in between 12 and 36 and most of them elected from traditional constituencies. Maximum space that the Muslim Community enjoyed in state politics during the period whenever the Muslim League stayed in coalition Governments as a major partner.

In general sense, politics is an art and affairs of governance where collective exercises are significant. Involvement and inclusion of all sections or groups, in the affairs of state, are needed to strengthen the spirit of representative democracy. Each group strives to safeguard its interest to a maximum extent. Political mobilisation is a channel to articulate interest and to get due share in power. In a system based on the principle of 'one man, one vote and one vote, one value' numbers are significant and hence individuals join hands

together to obtain a political space. Political mobilization always need not necessarily be on secular or ideological ground. It can also be on identities based on caste, or religious, or communitarian solidarity. Religion is imbibed by birth and, hence, it is a very influential factor for individual in forming identity. It is a social force on its own right and can be considered as the first societal interaction from which individual behaviour begins to grow and develop. In India, it is an inescapable historical fact that religion, as a socio-cultural dynamic, occupies a place in human affairs that cannot be expected to wither away [Banatwala, 1992: 2]. In recent times, at national and regional levels, India experiences identity-based politics with an upperhand over ideological and secular politics. [Rahim. M, 2013 : 71]. The demographic concentration of the Muslim population in the state is numerous enough in some pockets to enable an exclusive Muslim party to return its candidates to the Legislature on its own strength [Puri, 2007: 61]. Under the context, looking at the political space of Muslim Community is relevant, not in sense to promote communal politics but an academic discourse on an undeniable reality.

Political history of pre-independent India has an inscription of Muslim rule for about seven centuries, mostly in the North. It had begun with the establishing of the Delhi Sulthanate by Qutb-ud-din Aybek in late 12th century and ended by the Rebellion of 1857, the beginning of the agitation against the British rule. But, the history of the Muslims in Kerala is entirely different from it, with an exception of two occasions of Muslim rule. The first was the rule of the Arakkal Royal Family during the period from the mid-sixteenth to early twentieth centuries in a pretty kingdom in Kannur. Another one was the Mysorean rule under Hyder Ali (1761-82) and Tipu Sultan (1782-1799) in Malabar coast in the 18th century.

The Muslim community in Kerala has a long tradition and a record of historical significance. While following a religious identity of a foreign origin, they keep a cultural heritage born and brought up in Kerala with a slight difference. There were wide variations in political developments in three constituent divisions of Kerala - Thiruvithamcore (Travancore), Kochi (Cochin) and Malabar), on account of their different political antecedents. Malabar, having been a part of the former Madras Province of British India, forged ahead in the struggle for independence, while the princely states of Thiruvithamcore and Kochi lagged much behind [Azeez,1992 : i]. In Travancore, Muslims struggled for due representation in early 1930s. Along with other religious and communal groups, viz, Christians and Ezhavas, Muslims waged the Abstention Movement in 1933. It was the first mass political agitation in Kerala in which the Muslims also participated [Ibid : 32].

During the period of struggle for Independence, the Muslims of Kerala were in the same stream of national leaders in expressing their loyalty. Many political and religious leaders like Vakkom Moulavi, Moidu Moulavi, Muhammed Abdurahman Saheb, Seethi Saheb, et.al had been there in the forefront in various phases of the struggle such as the salt law protest, and non-cooperation with the rulers. Notably, the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements brought the Muslims to the mainstream nationalism. It was the first mass movement, in which large number of common people, both Hindus and Muslims, had participated [Ibid :12]. The 'Malabar Rebellion of 1921' resulted a break on the fluent communal relations in Malabar. The *Mappilas*, who lost employment opportunities on the coast, caused by the European occupation, migrated to the interior parts of Malabar and became labourers and cultivators [Ibid,7]. The majority of the agrarian population were *Mappilas* and their landlords were mainly the *Namboodiris* and the rich Nairs [Kurup, 2006 : 26]. The British authorities supported the landowners. The social relationship between the landlords and peasants had deteriorated to an almost unbelievable extent [Lemerciner, 1983, 218]. An unfortunate turn of it to a communal nature provided a way for religious concentration on the part of Muslims. It was the fact that the Hindu-dominant feudal system and the British recruitment of *Gurkha* troops of Hindus, among the tribal people, to collapse the Hindu-Muslim entente of the north against the revolt [Ibid, 219]. As it was not based on religious intolerance; it did not make a communal polarization on permanent nature.

Consequent to the partition of India, there was a trend among the north Indian Muslims, especially rich and educated, to migrate to Pakistan. Then, the attitude of Muslims in Kerala could be observed with different nature from their brethren living in other Indian states. There was made only a little effect among the Muslims of Kerala. In post-independent India, compared with most other Indians, they have been remaining well versed and keen participants in the political process. They have a due claim of their own contributions in socio-economic and political activities of state. Besides, when the political preference of Muslims in other states are highly dispersed, a large section in Kerala has found the Indian Union Muslim League as a major vehicle to articulate the interest of the community. Together with it, the Muslim masses in the State have been found enrolled in branded secular parties as well as in non-League Muslim dominated political parties with difference in degree.

The League Politics and the Community

The Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) was formed under the leadership Muhammed Ismail Saheb, K. M. Seethi Saheb and B. Pokker at Madras in 1948 [Azeez, 1992 : 36] and it became a full-fledged political party in 1951.

Ideologically it is framed on secular, democratic and socialist ground. The party has been projecting itself as the champion of the progress and welfare of Muslims in Kerala. So it is known as a communal political party though not accused of causing or fomenting any serious disturbance of communal nature. The party is deep rooted in Malabar region, in Kerala, where Muslim concentration is at high rate. In the peculiar political situation of the state, where no party could win clear majority to form government, the support of Muslim League (major party of Muslims) could tilt the balance in favour of any leading political party [Ibid : ii]. Every political party in the state individually or collectively at one time or other has accepted the Muslim League as political ally. Though the party is comparatively feeble in central and southern Kerala (former Thiruvithamcore-Kochi regions) the non-Leaguers including anti-Leaguers within the community could not crush the League on a permanent basis.

Looking at the stronghold of the Muslim League in Kerala, various historical backgrounds can be seen behind it. First, the All India Muslim League of pre-independent India had its presence in Malabar and it could make some of its representatives to Madras Legislative Assembly. Second, larger concentration of the *Mappila* Muslims in one geographic area, Malabar, provided a space for the effective function of a strong Muslim political party [Khalidi, 1996, 6]. Third, a strong feeling sprouted in the minds of Muslims, consequent on the Malabar Rebellion of 1921 that the Congress was wholly unreliable due to the overall bitter experiences and it led them to the formation of an anti-Congress political organization [Sharafudeen, 1993 : 63]. Fourth, traditionally promoted 'non-touchable attitude' to the Communists based on religious-ideological fixation among the masses and Lefts' own failure in certain critical areas vis-à-vis the community on the other side have made a gap in between the Muslims and the Communists.

Fifth, in the post-partition India, by the formation of the Indian Union Muslim League in the south, uncertainty regarding Muslim politics was answered. In Kerala where there was more communal harmony than in the North, the Muslim League got acceptance without any great obstacles [Panicker, 1976 :61]. Sixth, the leaders of the Muslims League argued for educational and social uplift of the community since the beginning. Whenever it shared power in Government, they did the 'possible-maximum' for promoting the Community in all walks. Seventh, propaganda of the Muslim League that the party is the sole contributor of the privileges that the Community enjoys has well fixed in the minds of larger section. It has created strong ripples and an emotional touch between the Muslim League and the mass. Equally important is that, sometimes, it has been felt that the Muslim League could not satisfy the community, especially the young blood. For the reasons, the party has committed to taste a sore in electoral politics. 'The

distracted youth seeking new locations' is observed in contextual politics. Eight, it has demonstrated its ability to retain its identity and support base even while working with a cadre party CPI(M) and a mass party like the Congress.

The League along with the Congress was in the forefront of the fight against the Communist Party in 1957. The Liberation Struggle ended the splendid isolation of Muslim League in Kerala, when other two communities (*Nairs* and Christians) pressurized and the Congress had given indirect gesture to accommodate the League with them [Radhakrishnan, 2004 :255-257]. The 1960 election was a milestone in the history of Muslim League as it could establish it was a force to be reckoned within the Political set up of Kerala. The electoral tie-up of the League with the Congress and Praja Socialist Party (PSP) in the year opened a new chapter in Kerala Politics. But from 1962 onwards relations between the Congress and the Muslim League began soaring. Gradually the IUMML moved to the Communist Camp in 1967 and found a place in the Coalition Government formed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist)CPI(M). As a gratitude for their services, the CPI(M) carved out a separate district for them – Malappuram in 1969, despite of many blames on it. The Calicut District Congress committee strongly opposed the move for a Muslim District in Malabar and described that it would be great threat to communal harmony and was the revival of Muslim League's old demand for *Mappilastan*. [Radhakrishnan, 2004: 122]. To counter it, the CPI(M) on its part explained that the formation of a Muslim majority district was no way going to affect communal harmony. [Azeez, 1992 :82]. In addition to the formation of a district, the alliance benefited the League in creating an image that it was the mobilising force at the initiatives in starting the Calicut University, provision for appointing Arabic teachers as full-time par with the other language teachers, appointment of untrained Arabic teachers (to fill the vacancies in the absence of trained teachers) on condition that they had to undergo training subsequently, etc. [Rahim. M, 2013: 97-98.]

In 1969, the relations between the IUMML and the CPI(M) worsened and in the break-up which followed the Muslim League found a secure position in the Congress-CPI led United Democratic Front Ministry [Ghosh, 1987 : 5]. Since then, the party has been continuing its political partnership with the Congress (I). In Kerala Legislative Assembly, many times the Muslim League has emerged as a very powerful partner of the ruling governments and has been playing its trump-card to secure benefits for its community [Ghosh, 1987, 6]. Since the first to the last general elections to the Kerala Legislative Assembly, the party has had number of contingents in between 4.5% and 14.28% including non-Muslim member. The highest score is registered in 2011 when 20 out of its 23 contesters were elected, while the lowest in 2006¹ when only 08 out of 22 its own candidates were elected. Subsequent to the

first time sharing of power with CPI(M), it adopted opposition stand during the four later chances - 1980-1981, 1987-1991, 1996-2001 and 2006-2011. Along with the Congress, it shared the government during 1970-1977, 1981-1987, 1991-1996, 2001-2006 and 2011onwards. It had representation in UPA Government since 2004. As a coalition partner, the party has assumed brilliant opportunities in cabinets at various Governments, holding the office of Chief Minister (51 days in 1979), Deputy Chief Minister (1982-1987), Speaker (1960-1962 and 1970-77) and many important portfolios including Finance (1967-1969), Home (1969-1977), Education (27 years) Industries (20 years), Public works (20 years), etc. As a partner of government, it has a long record of aggregate 35.5 years within the sixty years history of Kerala state. These achievements make them a peerless communal fraction without any serious crime of record in disturbing communal harmony in the political fabric of Kerala.

Acceptability to the Non-League Parties

Political parties, expecting base among the Muslims in Kerala, other than the Muslim League haven't succeeded in getting a comfortable space in coalition politics. The All India Muslim League (AIML), formed on consequent a split in the Muslim League in 1974. As break-away fraction of the Muslim League, it received political patronage from the CPI(M)-led Left front. Its political aspiration concluded after a short-term enjoyment as a partner in Government and Deputy Speakership (1981-1982) hardly for 22 months. Consequently, it merged together with the parent organization in 1982. Another one the Indian National League (INL) emerged as a political party in 1994 under the leadership of Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait who was an erstwhile stalwart of the Muslim League and also a leader with nation-wide appeal.[Rahim.M, op. cit., 116]. Continuation of the Muslim League – Congress alliance after the demolition of Babri Masjid was the basic reason the breakaway from the League which resulted in its formation. This ground was sufficient enough to make a rapprochement between the LDF and the INL. And, since the beginning, the CPI(M) has given it an 'off-camp concern', without admitting as an insider of the LDF. In all the five elections (1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016) to the State Legislative Assembly, INL contested with the LDF support. Although it has an aspiration to get an acceptance among the Muslims that has not been significantly proved in the elections. Its electoral performance first time in civic elections in 1995 benefitted the LDF when the Muslim League lost its hold in all the five Municipalities in Malappuram district. In the Assembly poll in 1996, in addition to the contest in two constituencies with the support of LDF, it had its own candidates in twelve constituencies. Net result of the contest was defeat in all seats and aggregate vote was 0.45% of the state total and 3.94% in the seats contested. Result of the Assembly elections, 2001, was also a soaring experience to

the party because of the defeat of its two candidates. A little thing of solace happened in 2006, when it won one seat (Kozhikode II) out of the three contests. The next election (2011) did not produce a favourable result anywhere in its three seats. Total votes polled in three constituencies together was only 28.55% when the opponents tally raised to 51.98%. [Rahim.M, op.cit., 117 - 120]. In the latest election (2016), even when the performance of the LDF was clear and comfortable to form government, performance of INL is noted not for failure alone but its candidate in Kazargod constituency was pushed back to the third place. In the constituency, its vote was 21,615 against 64,727 of the winner (IUML) and 56,120 votes of the runner-up (BJP). [Assembly Election 2016, Detailed Result, ceo.kerala]

Another political party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) formed in 1993, hasn't proved as worthy and acceptable to the community. In 1996 election, it fielded 50 candidates as its own across Kerala, but polled only 102,226 votes with 0.21%. [Election Commission, 1996: 8]. In the following Assembly elections, the party merely extended its support to either of the two Fronts – UDF (2001) and LDF (2006). Again, in 2011, the party fielded its own candidates in nine constituencies, which resulted in a poor performance of polling aggregate of 18,766 votes (0.11%) only. The highest polling in favour the party was in Kottackal constituency, Malappuram district, with 3,027 (02.56%) votes [Assembly Election, 2011, Detailed Result, ceo.kerala]. The 2016 election also proved a poor performance, when it fielded 61 candidates including 14 non-Muslims. Its aggregate polling was only 48,401 votes (0.24%). Vallikunnu constituency in Malappuram district contributed the highest number of votes (2,975; 2.17%) and in Kottackal its earlier tally declined to 2,763 (1.86 %). This time, electoral performance of it did not affect the results of LDF or UDF.

The Socialist Democratic Party of India (SDPI) with the support of a cadre wing, the Popular Front of India (PFI, formerly the NDF), attempts to switch on a trend against all other parties and to get a wide acceptance among the marginalized sections. Electoral performances of it show that the Muslim community hasn't extended the desired support. When first ever it contested in a by-election to the Kannur Assembly constituency (November 2009), its candidate, P. Abdul Majeed Faisy, General Secretary of the party, there was only 3,500 votes in his favour. But, in the elections to Local bodies, in 2010, it won total seven seats as its own and two independents with its support to Grama Panchayats/Municipalities and one seat to Block Panchayats. It could not disturb the Muslim League in Muslims concentrated Malappuram district, where its success is extended only at the large of an independent with its support. [Rahim. M, op. cit., 127]. In the election to the Legislative Assembly, 2011, it contested in 80 constituencies and secured aggregate 1,58,885 votes which was only 0.91% of the state total [Statistical Report :

GE-2011 : 46, ceo.kerala]. In Malappuram district, the party contested in all 16 seats but obtained only 02.34% votes [Assembly Election 2011, Detailed Result, ceo.kerala, 20.06.2011]. In the latest election to the Assembly (2016), it fielded 88 candidates including 17 non-Muslims, and polled aggregate 1,23,100 votes (0.61%). Another party supposed to get an acceptance among the Muslims is the Welfare Party of India (WPI). In 2016, it fielded 25 Muslims and 16 non-Muslims and it won 61,653 (0.30%) votes. The maximum votes to WPI was 3,999 in Mankada constituency.

Generally, electoral data show that, non-Muslim League political parties' dream of emerging as an alternative to the Muslim League has proved futile. One prominent reason for this is the bipolar nature of state politics where a party has to identify itself with either of the two fronts – LDF and UDF – or face political oblivion. In electoral politics, the votes polled, and happen to poll, by political parties having a say among the Muslims have no way to flow to anybody else other than the LDF or UDF. In the light of performance of non-Muslim League parties in various elections, an inference is that they may be able to shock the League, to an extent, but never can be an alternative to the League. No one of these parties has possibility to get the status of a as State / Regional party because individual performance in electoral politics would not contribute them required number of votes or seats to be recognised.

However, recently, presence of non-League political outfits in Kerala politics raises the question of relevance. As they stand outside coalition Fronts (LDF and UDF), it is imperative to look at the effect of them in election results. In 1996, the PDP polled vote (5238) in Mattancherry constituency was found a cause for the defeat of IUML. The League candidate (T.A.Ahamed Kabeer) faced a set back and the LDF candidate (M.A.Thomas) won the seat with a nominal margin of 425 votes. [Rahim.M, op. cit. :124]. In 2011, the SDPI polled votes in three constituencies – Azhikode (2935), Manalur (2293) and Vadakara (3488) - were higher than the margins of the winners (Azhikode, UDF : 493), (Manalur, UDF : 481) and (Vadakara, LDF : 847).

Table 1
Significant Performances of Non-Leaguers in 2016 Election

Sl. No	Constituency	Major Contestants polled				Muslim-dominated parties Polled			
		Winner		Run-ner-up	Margin	SDPI	PDP	WPI	Three parties together
		Votes	Party						
1	Manjeshwaram	56870	IUML	56781	89	0	759	0	759
2	Mananthavady (ST)	62436	CPI(M)	61129	1307	1377	0	0	1377

3	Thiruvambadi	62324	CPI(M)	59316	3008	569	517	2226	3312
4	Perinthalmanna	70990	IUML	70411	579	698	335	1757	2790
5	Mankada	69165	IUML	67657	1508	1456	273	3999	5728
6	Wadakkanchery	65147	INC	65144	3	477	0	0	477
7	Kochi	47967	CPI(M)	46881	1086	2108	386	2357	4851
8	Karunagappally	69902	CPI	68143	1759	1738	1620	0	3358

Source :<http://www.trend.kerala.gov.in/views/index.php> [Assembly Election 2016]

Under the context of the election result of 2016, it can be observed that performance of three such parties had significance in eight constituencies shown in the Table 1. Of these, margins of LDF in four constituencies (Mananthavady, Thiruvambadi, Kochi and Karunagappally) were below the number of votes polled by these parties individually or collectively. It is to be specially noted that the SDPI polled 7645 votes in Karunagappally constituency in 2011. But in the latest election it has steeped to 1738 and the CPI won the seat over the Congress (I) by the margin of 1759 votes. Presence of these parties in 2016 was favourable to the UDF results in three constituencies (Perinthalmanna, Mankada and Wadakkanchery). Another notable case is in Majeswaram where the IUML candidate won over the BJP by a very narrow margin of 89 votes, when the PDP polled 759 votes.

Secular Parties' Concern to the Muslims in Parliamentary Politics

In the light of facts, it is felt that, on the one side, the community members those who are proud in the tradition of a Muslim political party do not intend to share or transfer their support to other than the League. Together with it, a section in the community expresses an attitude to promote non-Muslim League outfits though not a wide range. On the other side, the secular parties like the Congress (I) and the CPI(M) get an amount of support from the community. In 2001, when the LDF was defeated and the UDF won 100 out of 140 seats, the CPI(M) Central Committee observed the loss of confidence of the Muslims as a cause for failure. Later in 2006, the LDF agreed that the favour of the Muslims and Christians were behind the sweeping victory of them. Also observed that the base of the coalition could be broadened through the support of religious minorities estimated nearly 45% [Prakash, 05.01.2010]. Usually, the political parties dominated by Muslims, as coalition partners, select their candidates purely from among the community members, in all general elections. An exemption to it is the fielding of non-Muslim

candidate by the Muslim League and the AIML under a special context.² So, other secular parties give only minimum seats to Muslims.

The electoral history of Kerala shows that fielding of 10 Muslim candidates in 1970 election was the least in the account of the non-Muslim League parties having significance in electoral politics. The 2011 election, the non-League parties fielded 32 Muslims candidates with the split-up CPI (M) – 19 (including two Independents); Congress (I) – 11; Kerala Congress (M) – 01 and RSP – 01. This time, Muslim candidates representing the Coalition Fronts were there in total 44 constituencies. Out of it, contests in 14 constituencies were between the Muslims. In the election of 2016, in addition to the Muslim candidates from the League (23), the UDF fielded 12 candidates representing the Congress (I) and each from the Kerala Congress (M), Janata Dal (U) and RSP. On the side of the LDF, besides the INL nominees (03), the CPI (M) fielded 12, the CPI – one and 10 independents were there. It is the election notable for the contest of maximum number of Muslims candidates (38) in all times elections from among the secular parties. Out of the total 32 constituencies that elected the Muslims to the Legislature, the LDF-UDF belligerents were the Muslims in 22 seats. Among the 14 Muslim MLAs of secular parties, 12 are from the LDF and the rest (two) the Congress (I). Thus, presently, the LDF has 12 and the UDF has 20 MLAs in Kerala Legislative Assembly who have societal, or emotional, or religious tradition with the Muslim community.

Muslim Representation in Kerala Legislative Assembly

Following Table shows the figures of Muslims elected to the Kerala Legislative Assembly in all elections during the period 1957 - 2016.

Table 2
Numerical Strength of Muslims Elected to the Assembly : 1957 - 2016

Year	Muslim League		Others		Total		Muslim Members in %
	Fielded	Elected	Fielded	Elected	Elected	Seats	
1957	18	7	24	06	13	126	10.32
1960	12	10	18	07	17	126	13.49
1965	16	06		13	19	133	14.29
1967	15	14	15	05	19	133	14.29
1970	21	12	10	05	17	133	12.78
1977	16	13	29	09	22	140	15.71
1980	20	13	27	12	25	140	17.86
1982	18	13	30	14	27	140	19.29

1987	23	15	23	09	24	140	17.14
1991	21	19	30	11	30	140	21.43
1996	20	13	19	13	26	140	18.57
2001	23	16	25	11	27	140	19.29
2006	22	07	29	19	26	140	18.57
2011	23	20	39	16	36	140	25.71
2016	23	18	43	14	32	140	22.86

Computed from Statistical Report on General Elections & Detailed Results to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala 1957-2016, www.ceokerala.

As seen on the Table, 36 Muslim representatives in Legislative Assembly formed in 2011 was the highest ever in number, which is 25.7% of the total strength and it is nearly proportionate to the strength of their population. The least, both in number (12) and percentage (9.5%), members from the community was elected in 1957. Another thing that reflecting is that

Table 3
Assembly Constituencies from where Muslims elected : 1957-2016

	Constituency	1957	1960	1965	1967	1970	1977	1980	1982	1987	1991	1996	2001	2006	2011	2016	Turns
1	Manjeswarom									L	L	L	L		L	L	6
2	Kasargod			In		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	12
3	Thaliparampu							C	C								2
4	Edakkad						A	A									2
5	Thalassery										C	C				C	3
6	Kuttiadi															L	1
7	Azheekkode														L	L	2
8	Kannur			In	L										I		3
9	Peringalom					L			A		L						3
10	Koothuparambu			G						C							2
11	Peravoor							L	Y	I	I	N	I				6
12	Nadapuram		L								P						2
13	Perambra													C	C		2
14	Balussery					I											1

15	Meppayur					L	L	A	A								4	
16	Quilandy								I								1	
17	Koduvally						L	L	L	L	L	L	Ci	L	Ci		10	
18	Kozhikodu II/ South			In	L		A	A	A	C	L	C	L	Inl	L	L	12	
19	Beypur						I	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	10	
20	Kunnamanga- lom					L									C	Ci	3	
21	Thiruvambadi										L	L	L		L		4	
22	Eranad														L	L		2
23	Nilambur			C	C				C	I	I	I	I	I	I	Ci	10	
24	Manjeri	I	I				L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	12	
25	Malappuram	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	15	
26	Kondotty	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	15	
27	Vengara														L	L		2
28	Vallikkunnu														L	L		2
29	Thirurangadi	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	15	
30	Thanur	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	Ci	15	
31	Thirur	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	15	
32	Kottackal														L	L		2
33	Thavannur														C	Ci		2
34	Ponnani		L		L	In					C	C		C			6	
35	Kuttippuram	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	Ci	x		all	
36	Mankada	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	Ci	L	L	15	
37	Perinthal- manna			C	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	Ci	L	L	13
38	Pattambi									P		P	P	I	I	I	P	6
39	Shornur															C		1
40	Ottappalom							L		N		N	N	T	C	C		7
41	Srikrishna- puram														C			1
42	Mannarkadu						P	L			L	L		L		L	L	7
43	Palakkad				C								C			I	I	4

44	Vadakkanchery														C			1
45	Kunnamkulam																C	1
46	Guruvayur			In	L		L	L		L	L	L	In	L	C	C	C	12
47	Kodungallur	I	I															2
48	Vadakkera			In														1
49	Mattanchery			In	L					L	L	L		L	L			7
50	Kalamassery															L	L	2
51	Aluva	I	I	I	In	I	I	L		N	I	I	I	I	C	I	I	15
52	Kunnathunad									I		I		I				3
53	Idukki												D					1
54	Alappuzha		I															1
55	Aroor														C	C	C	3
56	Kayamkulam	C	P		G									I				4
57	Karunagappally						P	P										2
58	Kundara					I	I											2
59	Kollam	I	I															2
60	Eravipuram			I								L		R	R	R	C	6
61	Varkala	C		I	P	P	P						C	I	I	I		9
62	Kazhakkuttom				L		I			Y	C				I	I		6
63	Thiruvandrum West							L		L	I	I						4
64	Andathode @		L															1
Total	League	7	10	6	14	12	13		13	13	15	19	13	16	7	20	18	
	Others	6	6	13	5	05	09		12	14	09	11	13	11	19	16	14	
	Grand	13	16	19	19	17	22		25	27	24	30	26	27	26	36	32	
A – AIML; Ci/CPM Independents – League Dissidents as CPI(M) Independents; C-CPI(M), D- Janata Dal, G – SSP; I - Cong(I), In – Independents, Inl – INL; L – IUML; Li – IUML Independents, N-Cong(S), P-CPI, R-RSP, T-N C U-Cong (U), Y- Cong (A), x – abolished @ - Constituency abolished after1960.																		

Compiled from Statistical Report on General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala 1957-2006, and General Election 2011 & 2016, Detailed Results, www.ceokerala.in in almost occasions, except in 2006, the share of the Muslim League is more than 50% of the members belonging to the community in the Legislature. In 2006, there were 26 Muslims (18.57%) in the House, while the Muslim League had only seven (26.92%) MLAs.

To the Kerala Legislative Assembly, since the first to the last, 15 election had been conducted. In an overall view, it is seen that 64 constituencies have the record of electing Muslim candidates, at least one time. Among such constituencies, eight constituencies, namely, Malappuram, Kondotty, Thirurangadi, Thanur, Thirur, Kuttippuram/Vengara, Mankada and Aluva – all times elected the Muslims only. In a sense, Manjeri³ is also can be counted together with it. These constituencies, except Aluva in Ernakulam District, belonged to Malappuram District. Besides, Perinthalmanna from the same district has been continuously opting the Muslims since the 1965 election. Kozhikode II/South is one that can be considered as another Muslim dominated constituency in Malabar, as it opted Muslims eleven times. Muslim electorates are very dominant in newly constituted four constituencies in Malappuram District, namely Vengara, Vallikkunnu, Kottackal and Thavannur those elected Muslims in 2011 and 2016.

Many times, these constituencies witnessed face-to-face fight between the Muslim candidates, belonging to major parties or alliance. In the latest election (2016), such scenes were there in 22 constituencies. Mandates of the Muslims in Malabar region, except in Nilambur, largely based on the attitude toward the Muslim League. In the central Kerala (former Kochi state), the Muslim League has got electoral prospect only from Mattanchery and its new incarnation Kalamassery from where Muslims were elected eight times. In south (former Thiruvithamcore), Varkala constituency extended their confidence to Muslim candidates ten times. But different from Malabar, Aluva and Varkala have not expressed a political allegiance to the Muslim League. Aluva constituency inclined to a pure Left party only once in 2006, when the CPI(M) won the seat. Varkala constituency did not express such a fixed favour to the Congress of Communists.

Consideration to Muslims in Cabinet

Until now, twenty-two Governments have been formed in Kerala since 1957. Of these, whenever the Muslim League was a major partner in the Congress led UDF coalition in power,

Table 4
List of Muslims on Political Offices – 1957 onwards

Legisla- ture and term	Heads the cabinet	Name of Muslim of- fice bearer	Office held	Political party
First 1957- 1959	1. E.M.S. Namboodi- ripad	K.O. AyishaBai T. A. Majeed	Deputy Speaker Public Works	Comm- nist Comm- nist
Second 1960- 1964	2. PattomThanuPillai [22.2.'60-26.9.'62]	K. M. SeethiSaheb A. NafeesathBeevi P.P. UmmerKoya	Speaker Deputy Speaker Education	IUML INC INC
	3. R. Shanker [26.9.'62-10.9.'64]	P.P.UmmerKoya	Public works, Fisheries	INC
Third 1967- 1970	4. E.M.S. Namboodi- ripad [6.3.'67-1.11.'69]	M.P.M. Jaffer Khan E. K. ImbichiBava P.K. Kunju C.H. MuhammedKoya M.P.M. Ahmed Kurikal [6.3.'67-24.10.'68] K. AvukhaderKutty Naha [9.11.'68-21.10.'69]	Deputy Speaker Transport, Com- munication Finance Education Panchayat, Social Welfare	IUML CPI (M) SSP IUML IUML
	5. C. AchuthaMenon [1.11.'69-1.8.'70]	C.H. MuhammedKoya K. AvukhaderKutty Naha	Home Affairs, Education Local Self-Govt.	IUML IUML
Fourth 1970- 1977	6. C. AchuthaMenon	K. Moideenkutty Haji C.H. MuhammedKoya K. AvukhaderKutty Naha Chakeeri Ahmed Kutty	Speaker Home Affairs, Education Food, Local Self- Govt. Education	IUML IUML IUML IUML
Fifth 1977- 1979	7. K. Karunakaran [25.3.'77 - 25.4.'77]	Chakeeri Ahmed Kutty K. AvukhaderKutty Naha C.H. MuhammedKoya	Speaker Local Self-Govt. Education	IUML IUML IUML
	8. A.K. Antony [27.4.'77 - 27.10.'78]	C.H. MuhammedKoya [27.4.'77 - 20.12.'77] and [4.10.'78 - 27.10.'78] / U.A.Beeran[27.1.'78- 3.10.'78] K. AvukhaderKutty Naha	Education, Social Welfare Local Self-Govt.	IUML IUML
	9. P.K. Vasudevan Nair [29.10.'78-7.10.'79]	K. AvukhaderKutty Naha C.H. MuhammedKoya	Local Self-Govt. Education, Social Welfare	IUML IUML
	10. C.H. Muhammed- Koya [12.10.'79-1.12.'79]			IUML

Sixth 1980- 1982	11. E. K. Nayanar [25.1.'80 - 20.10.'81]	M.J. ZakariaSait AryadanMuhammed P.M. Aboobaker	Deputy Speaker Forest, Employ- ment Public Works	AIML INC-U AIML
	12. K. Karunakaran [28.12.'81 - 17.3.'82]	C.H. MuhammedKoya	Deputy Chief Minister	IUML
Seventh 1982- 1987	13. K. Karunakaran	K.M. HamsaKunju [30.6.'82 - 7.10.'86] / Korampayil Ahmed Haji [20.10.'86 - 25.3.'87] C.H. MuhammedKoya [24.5.'82 - 28.9.'83] / K. AvukhaderKutty Naha [24.10.'83 - 25.3.'87] E. Ahmed U.A. Beeran K.P. Noorudeen	Deputy Speaker Deputy Chief Minister Public works Industry Food and Civil Supply Forest	IUML IUML IUML IUML INC-U
Eighth 1987- 1991	14. E.K. Nayanar	T.K. Hamsa	Public Works	CPI-M
Ninth 1991- 1996	15. K. Karunakaran [24.6.'91-16.3.'95]	C.T. Ahmed Ali P.K.K. Bava P.K. Kunhalikutty E.T. MuhammedBa- sheer T. H. Musthafa	Local Self-Govt. Public Works Industry Education Food & Civil Supply	IUML IUML IUML IUML INC
	16. A.K. Antony [22.3.'95-9.5.'96]	C.T. Ahmed Ali P.K.K Bava P.K. Kunhalikutty E.T. MuhammedBa- sheer AryadanMuhammed	Public works Local Self-Govt., Social Welfare Industry, Urban Development Education Employment, Tourism	IUML IUML IUML IUML INC
Tenth 1996- 2001	17. E.K. Nayanar	K.E. Ismail PaloliMuhammed- Kutty V.C. Kabeer	Revenue Local Self-Govt. Health, Sports	CPI CPI-M INC-S

Eleventh 2001- 2006	18. A.K. Antony [17.5.'01 - 29.8.'04]	M.M. Hassan P.K. Kunhalikutty NalakathSooppy CherkulamAbdulla Dr. M.K. Munir	Parliamentary Af- fairs, Information Industry, Social Welfare Education Local Self-Govt. Public Works	INC-I IUML IUML IUML IUML
	19. OommenChandy	P.K. Kunhalikutty [31.8.'04 - 4.1.'05] / V.K. Ibrahim Kunju [6.1.'05 - 11.5.'06] Dr. M.K. Munir E.T. MuhammedBa- sheer AryadanMuhammed	Industry, Com- merce Public works Education Electricity	IUML IUML IUML INC-I
Twelfth 2006 - 2011	20. V.S. Achuthanadan	PaloliMuhammed- Kutty Elamarum Kareem	Local Self-Govt. Industry	CPI-M CPI-M
Thir- teenth 2011 -2016	21. OommenChandy	P.K. Kunhalikutty V.K. Ibrahim Kunju Dr. M.K. Munir E.T. Abdurubb Manjalamkuzhi Ali AryadanMuhammed	Industry, Com- merce Public works Local Self-Govt. Education Urban Affairs and Minority Devel- opment Electricity	IUML IUML IUML IUML IUML INC-I
Four- teenth 2016 onwards	22. PinaraiVijayan	A.C.Moideen K.T.Jaleel	Co-Operation and Tourism Local Self-Govt.	CPI-M CPI - Mi
AIML - All India Muslim League CPI- Communist Party of India CPI-M - Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI - Mi - Communist Party of India (Marx- ist - Independent) INC - Indian National Congress INC-S - Indian National Congress (Socialist) INC-U - Indian National Congress (Urus) IUML - Indian Union Muslim League SSP - Samyuktha Socialist Party				

Source :MalayalaManorama Election Guide 2006 (Malayalam),
and <http://www.stateofkerala.in/niyamasabha/20th%20ministry.php>

during the periods of seventh (1982-1987), ninth (1991-1996), eleventh (2001-2006) and thirteenth (2011-2016) Assemblies, there were six Cabinets with three Chief Ministers⁴. Each one of these Governments followed a convention of accommodating five Ministers belonging to the Muslim community. The Muslim League has found a place with four members in all these Ministries. Although the second OommenChandy Government begun with the same convention, on its way, the Muslim League acquired the fifth berth⁵, by a tight bargaining within the UDF, and it registered the presence of six Muslim Ministers which was the highest score ever had. There were only one Muslim Minister in five Cabinets the first (1957-1959), third (1962-1964), tenth (late 1979)⁶, twelfth (1981-1982) and the fourteenth (1987-1991) Cabinets.

The Indian National Congress/Congress (I) has followed a tradition of offering only one berth, as its own quota, to Muslim community in the Cabinet. It is said that the minimization is the part of maintaining communal equations, as all the times (except in the Government led by R.Shanker), the Muslim League consisted. The undivided-Communist Party/CPI(M), has accommodated each Muslim in the cabinet five times (1957-1959, 1967-1969, 1987-1991, 1996-2001, 2016 onwards) and two ministers once during 2006-2011, on its account during the seven chances. In the present cabinet led by CPI(M) has given the ministerial berth to one among the five independent MLAs who were fielded by the party. Another occasion, during 1980-1981, when the Congress (U) and AIML were the partners of the Left Democratic Front, Muslim representation was fulfilled by accommodating each minister from those parties. Besides, the list of other political parties which had provided chance to Muslims to be Ministers consists of the Congress (U) twice (1981-1982 and 1982-1987); CPI (1996-2001), Congress (S) - once (1996-2001) and the SSP - once (1967-1969). It is clear that whenever maximum ministers belonged to the Muslim community were there, the Muslim League had its accommodation in the Government. On this strength, the party has an attempt to highlight it and capitalize the maximum support of the community.

The Muslim population in Kerala, at the time of linguistic reorganization of State was 20.01% [Azeez, 1992 : ii] and the further growth by decades recorded them 26.56% [Census, 2011]. Since the 1957 election, many elections to the State Legislative Assembly are decided by razor-thin margins of victory. Although communal politics is not theoretically accepted, it has been shown that religious communities and communal factors have been so far considered in elections. By virtue of the numerical strength of the Muslim community, role of organizations representing the community is a decisive factor. In Malappuram District, they can elect number of representatives to the Kerala Legislative Assembly without much support from other groups. Whenever the Muslim League joined hands with other parties, such alliances have equally benefited to the League and allies. There are only a few occasions in Kerala politics that the Muslim League was found a negligible factor. Even then, it was clear that a faction of Muslim community stood with whom had come to power. However, the political attitude of Muslims in Kerala does not have any uniform nature. The electoral trend in Kerala, though not absolutely communal, has generally expressed that religious and communal groups have to play a great role. So, the space of Muslims in Kerala politics is relevant and undeniable.

Notes

1. The IUML won only six seats out of 16 contestants in 1965. It was the 4.51% of the total elected members. As no political party or coalition could not win sufficient majority to form government, the Assembly had not been constituted and hence election was considered abortive.

2. Non-Muslim candidates from Muslim League contested in Manjeri (Reserved for SC) in 1957, 1960, 1967 and 1970; Kunnammangalam (Reserved for SC) in 2001 and 2006 and Kunnammangalam (General) in 2011. The AIML also fielded non-Muslim candidates in Kunnammangalam (Reserved for SC) seat in 1977, 1980 and 1982. (Statistical Report on General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala 1957-2006, Election Commission of India, New Delhi).
3. In 1957 and 1960, it was dual-member constituency (General and Reservation) and later converted to a single member-reserved for SC during 1965, 1967 and 1970.
4. K.Karunakaran twice during 1982-1987 and 1991-1995; A.K.Antony twice during 1995-1996 and 2001-2004; Oommen Chandy twice during 2004-2006 and 2011-2016.
5. Manjankuzhi Ali sworn in as the fifth Minister representing the Muslim League on 12th April, 2012.
6. C.H. Muhammed Koya was the Chief Minister, and the only one Minister, for 51 days from 12th October to 01st December, 1979.

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U.S. Policy Towards Cuba in the 21st Century

Satheesh Kumar P.K.

Abstract

After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, bilateral relations between both the countries disrupted. The U.S. had try to dismantle the Cuban government through 1961 Bay Pigs Invasion (1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). America expelled Cuba from OAS. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. tightens the embargo against Cuba. Fidel Castro successfully overcomes the U.S.sanctions through the implementation of market oriented reforms. In 1999, U.S. President Clinton eased ravel restrictions and encouraged increased cultural exchanges. On 17, December 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro announced the beginning of a process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the U.S. On 20, March 2016, President Barack Obama visited Cuba, becoming the first U.S. president in 88 years to visit the island. The Obama administration loosened business and travel restrictions. But on 4June 2019, he Trump administration announced new restrictions on American ravel o Cuba.

Key words: UDHR, Embargo, Cuban Democracy Act, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, EU, WTO, OAS.

Introduction

In the gamut of International Politics, the relationship between Cuba the United States is a highly debatable subject in all times. Following the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the bilateral relationship between both the countries has deteriorated in different reasons. The U.S-Cuba relationship has been plagued by distrust and antagonism since 1959, the year Fidel Castro overthrow a U.S. -backed regime in Havana and established a socialist state allied with

the Soviet Union. During the half century that followed, successive U.S. administrations pursued policies intended to isolate the island country economically and diplomatically. The United States has sanctioned Cuba longer it has any other country. The Cuban government nationalised all U.S. based companies in Cuba, but not ensured the compensation for them. In 1961, Fidel Castro openly declared that, "Cuba will be a socialist country forever". After that the U.S. decided to dethrone the Fidel Castro from power and block the communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was undoubtedly the most notable and dynamic confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War. Kennedy was determined that this could not be permitted. After a week of secret deliberations with his most trusted advisers, he announced the discovery to the world and imposed a naval blockade on further shipments of armaments to Cuba. The blockade prevented additional materiel from coming in but did nothing to stop the Soviets from operationalizing the missiles already there. And a tense second week followed during which Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev stood "eyeball to eyeball," neither side backing down. Saturday, October 27, was the day of decision. "Thanks to secret tapes Kennedy made of the deliberations, we can be flies on the wall, listening to the members of the president's ad hoc Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm, debate choices they knew could lead to nuclear Armageddon". At the last minute, the crisis was resolved without war, as Khrushchev accepted a final U.S. offer pledging not to invade Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles (Gonzalez, 2002,42).

Bay of Pigs Invasion and Cuban Missile Crisis were the turning point in the relationship between the U.S and Cuba. In Cuba, the victory over the invaders was celebrated as the "the first defeat of imperialism in Latin America". From the U.S. perspective the installation of Soviet Missiles on Cuban soil was an intolerable threat to U.S. safety and to the balance of power. From the Cuban perspective, the missiles were a defense against another U.S. invasion, and the U.S. insistence that it remain the only nuclear power in the hemisphere, just another example of imperial arrogance. The 'crisis' from the Cuban perspective, was not the presence of the missiles, but the arbitrary U.S. decision to challenge the Soviets to a nuclear war. From a larger Latin American perspective, the Bay of Pigs was just one in a long, dreary list of U.S. invasions and occupations of their countries, largely unknown in the United States itself. These include, since 1898, the numerous troop landings in Cuba, the lengthy occupations of Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala, counterinsurgencies and low intensity conflicts

in Central America in the 1980s, and so on. The only thing that makes the Bay of Pigs unique is that the invasion did not succeed (Chomsky, 2011, 69).

American embargo against Cuba

Cuba was formerly excluded from participation in the Organization of American States under a decision adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 21 January 1962. The resolution stated that as Cuba had officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, was incompatible with the principles and objectives of the OAS. In 1962, Cuba was expelled from the OAS by a vote of 14 in favor, one (Cuba) against with six abstentions. Mexico and Ecuador, two abstaining members argued that the expulsion was not authorized in the OAS Charter. Multilateral sanctions were imposed by the OAS on July 26, 1964 (Wright, 2001, 60).

United States policy toward Cuba is dominated by the embargo, which includes economic sanctions and restrictions on travel to Cuba. The effect was limited to commercial, political and civilian relations between the U.S. and Cuba. The embargo dates back to Fidel Castro's institution of repressive and anti-American policies shortly after he assumed power in 1959, policies that included the expropriation of America's property in Cuba and the alignment of Cuba with the Soviet bloc. It led President Eisenhower, in October 1960, to establish the first provision of an economic embargo that continues to this day. U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated rapidly in the 1960s. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the end of the annual \$4 billion subsidy of Cuba in 1991 ended the Cold War context in which U.S. had formulated its policy toward Cuba (Horowitz, 2003, 455).

In 1992, Congressman Robert Torricelli sponsored the Cuban Democracy Act, which prohibited US firms from trading with Cuba and barred any ship into U.S. ports that would go to Cuba. Cuba's health sector suffered dramatically from this law, mainly because ships with medical supplies frequently sailed to the United States from Europe and Canada. In addition, the law allowed the government to fund right-wing Cuban exiles. In reaction to an immigration crisis, the U.S. government further tightened its unilateral sanctions in August 1994 by severely restricting family remittances and gift packages from the United States to Cuba and further curbing travel between the two countries (Kriehner, 1993, 117).

In 1992, the *Cuban Democracy Act* (CDA) – popularly known as the Torricelli Act was enacted, banning trade with Cuba from U.S.-owned subsidiaries in third countries. This trade had become an important part of Cuba's strategy of circumventing the economic sanctions. From 1980 to 1991, this trade had risen from \$292 million to \$718 million, with 75 percent of it

being in food and medicines. Furthermore, the CDA prohibited any vessel that entered Cuban ports from loading or unloading any freight in the United States for a period of six months after departure from Cuba, and prohibiting ships with an interest from entering a U.S. port. This dramatically increased the transportation costs incurred by the Cuban government. The sanctions are aimed at the health and, thus, the very lives of Cubans. As a consequence and because of the U.S. domination of the world pharmaceutical industry, Cuba suffers shortages of major medicines. Cuba was unable to obtain most antibiotics because most antibiotics are produced under U.S. patents and cannot be exported to Cuba under the terms of the embargo (Lievesley, 2004,29). As Robert Torricelli, the U.S. Congress member who sponsored the CDA, stated, the goal of U.S. economic measures is to “wreak havoc on that island” (Roy, 2000,29).

The sanctions regime was further strengthened by the passage, in 1996, of the *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act* (CLDSA), widely referred to as the Helms-Burton Bill. The significance of the Helms-Burton Bill lies in the fact that it cements into law the U.S. policy of hostility towards the Cuban Revolution, while deepening the sanctions. The CLDSA establishes that the sanctions against Cuba will not be lifted if either Fidel or Raul Castro are part of the Cuban government. Before there can be a normalization of relations between the two countries, there must be very specific political and economic changes in Cuba, namely the introduction of a political process deemed “democratic” by Washington and the installation of a free-market capitalist economy. The CLDSA further establishes that the U.S. government will provide financial and other means by which to assist individuals and groups opposed to the Cuban Revolution (Roy, 2000,29).

The Helms Burton Act contained four titles. Title – I, imposed sanction to isolate Cuba, by adding more strictures to the already existing embargo. Section 103 prohibited loans, credits, or financing by U.S. citizens or residents for transactions of confiscated property. Section 104, forced the United States to vote against admission of Cuba to international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank until democracy is restored in Cuba. Title – II, instructed the President to chalk out an assistance plan for the government of post-Castro period in Cuba. Title – III, allowed U.S. citizens to sue in the U.S. court system anyone who “traffics” in property confiscated by Cuba, and extended this right to people who were not U.S. citizens at the time of the confiscation. In other words, it demanded the return of properties expropriated by the Cuban government and allowed the U.S. citizens to sue anyone who currently invested in the properties. Title – IV, empowered the U.S. State Department to deny visas to executives of foreign companies who were deemed to benefit from such holdings. In other

words, it prohibited admission to the foreign citizens in the U.S. (corporate officers, families, shareholders, etc.), who trade in confiscated property (LeoGrande, 1998,80).

The Act incorporated existing U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba into law. Hence embargo against Cuba was further tightened and curtailed the U.S. President's authority to modifying the embargo without a further legislation by the Congress. The Cuban National Assembly identifies the essence of the Helms-Burton Act as 'the illusory aspiration to return property to Batista's followers and the old ruling class, robbing Cubans of their land, homes, schools, factories, hospitals, and everything that belongs to the people'. One important feature is entrenching the blockade and the commitment to overthrow the Cuban Revolution in law (Anderson, 2005, 35).

Under the Helms-Burton provisions, the U.S. has issued 'warnings' to a number of companies doing business with Cuba, which were, the Canadian Company Sheritt International, the Mexican Company DOMOS, the BM group of Israel, the Panamanian company Motores S.A., and the Spanish company Sol Melia. On the denial of visas, a U.S. government web site confirms that by August 2002, 18 executives of two foreign companies had been excluded from entry into the United States and more than a dozen companies had pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there because of the threat of action under the Helms-Burton Act (Anderson, 2005, 35).

According to analysts, the objective of the Helms-Burton Act was political. It was aimed at discouraging the foreign investments in Cuba, to accelerate the economic deterioration and thereby weak on Castro regime politically. So the Act was aimed at giving a final lethal blow to Castro's Cuba so that it succumbs. Obviously, in such a situation any hope of normalization of relations appeared remote. The Act gave rise to an intense debate among the commercial partners of Cuba and U.S. The hard -line policy of the U.S. created resentment in the international community. Soon after the Helms-Burton Act was implemented, countries such as Canada, Mexico, and the European Union voiced their protests. The European Union (EU), also charged the U.S. interference in international trade before a WTO judicial panel, claiming "the United States has violated international law by imposing penalties on foreign companies". United States refusal to comply with the investigation prompted further resentment in the international form. The U.S. was criticized for claiming that the Act was in consonance with its national security.

The OAS during the 1996annual meeting passed a resolution criticizing Washington's move against Cuba through the Helms-Burton Act. The Act was

denounced as a threat to international commerce and law. OAS criticized all laws that obstruct international trade and investment and free movement of persons. It also called for the Inter-American Judicial Committee to examine the validity of the Act, under international law. Due to opposition that the Helms-Burton Act faced, Bill Clinton suspended thrice the execution of Title III. The constitutional privilege of the federal executive enabled Clinton to suspend the Act for six months. In June 1996, Clinton waived it for the first time followed by in January and July 1997. However, the Act considerably constrained the commercial flow between Cuba and its trade partners as it generated insecurity in the commercial relations of Cuba (Roy, 1997, 97).

In spite of EU's opposition to Helms-Burton Act, the U.S. successfully bargained and reached a momentum of understanding with the EU. Interestingly, during the yearly meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the member states of the European Union passed a resolution opposing the socio-economic sanctions, and endorsed a measure supporting U.S. claims against Cuba for human rights violations. Ultimately, after a statement of protest all EU member states (and other European partners) voted in favour of the Helms-Burton Act (Roy, 1997, 97).

The U.N. has regularly protested against the blockade, while no other government has agreed to support the embargo outlined in the Cuban Democracy Act. Most aspect of the Helms-Burton legislation has now been codified into law, meaning that it cannot be replaced by the President alone, but will need the support of Congress if there is to be any complete lifting of the embargo on Cuba. Memories of the high standard in Health become questioned in Cuba. In the health service, signs of the emergence of a two-tier system of provision could be identified, with private clinics with first-class facilities for foreigners with dollars and public hospitals which lacked the most basic medicines (Aitsiselme, 2002, 38).

The national health budget declined from an annual \$250 per adult in the late 1980s, reaching a low of \$65 in 1993 and rising to \$160 by the late 1990s. The situation was compounded by the ageing population and the fact that more than 50 per cent of the budget was spent on importing pharmaceuticals. Most new drugs introduced into the world market are developed by US companies and third parties are banned from exporting US drugs, scientific technology and textbooks to Cuba. This aspect of the blockade has had particularly dire consequences for women, because of the shortage of X-ray film for mammography units, and for HIV- positive people (Aitsiselme, 2002, 38).

Travel Restrictions: About 1.5 million Cubans live in the United States. They comprise the third largest Hispanic group after Mexicans who were

born in the United States. Travel restrictions were introduced that have been successively tightened and loosened under different U.S. presidents. Restrictions are enforced through the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which prohibits U.S. citizens and permanent residents from spending money in Cuba without OFAC permission, since travel costs money, those who visit Cuba without OFAC permission can be fined for violating the regulations and could be subject to criminal prosecution under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. There are exceptions to the travel ban (Wilkinson, 2005).

Since the 1970s, Cuban Americans have been allowed to visit family in Cuba under varying conditions. From 1995 through 2004, Cuban Americans were allowed to visit family once a year without applying for a license from OFAC and could apply for permission to travel more frequently in cases of humanitarian need. In 2004, President George W. Bush's Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba recommended tightening the travel restrictions. The Commission argued that reducing family travel would decrease the amount of dollars entering Cuba and hasten the end of Fidel Castro's government (Wilkinson, 2005).

The restrictions that went into effect in June 2004 include – (a) visits by Cuban Americans to family in Cuba are permitted only once every three years instead of once every year, (b) humanitarian exceptions for response to family illness or crisis are no longer allowed, (c) visits are restricted to two weeks and limited to immediate family as defined by OFAC, eliminating the right to visit cousins, aunts, uncles, nephews, nieces, or more distant relatives, (d) for all family visits, a written application for licensed travel must be submitted to OFAC and approved, (e) the amount of money that may be spent during a family visit was reduced from \$167 to \$50 per day (f) the amount of money Cuban Americans may carry to Cuba to give to various relatives was reduced from \$3,000 to \$300, and remittances, not to exceed \$300 per quarter, were limited to the immediate family as defined by OFAC. Restricting the rights of U.S. citizens in the name of promoting rights and democracy elsewhere is duplicitous. The Cuban Government is criticized regularly for its control over the movement of its people and suppression of freedom of expression (Lemkau, 2008).

The other restrictions were (1) freezing of all Cuban bank accounts in the United States; (2) forbidding US companies abroad from doing business with Cuba; (3) refusal to allow international financial institutions to issue credit to Cuba; and (4) prohibition of foreign nations from using US dollars with Cuba etc. (Cuban Experience, 2013). A number of reputable studies have found that the U.S. sanctions have caused suffering and even death to Cubans. The American Association for World Health study on "Denial of

Food and Medicine: The impact of the U.S. embargo on health and nutrition in Cuba” determined that “the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens”. The same study found the U.S. sanctions responsible for 7,500 excess deaths each year through the depths of the crisis (Bourne, 1997, 38).

The case of Elian Gonzalez was great issue of both countries. The bizarre case of this 6 year old boy which hit the headlines during 1999-2000 helps highlight the strange relationship that exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Elian Gonzalez and his mother were among a group of refugees that tried to make the crossing to the U.S. Their boat sank and the mother drowned, but on the 25th November 1999 Elian was found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of Florida. He was saved and found himself temporarily in the U.S. in the care of his great-uncle. At that point, the relatives of Elian wanted him to receive asylum and stay in the U.S. However, the father of Elian was still alive in Cuba, and demanded the boy's return (Bartholet, 2000, 34).

The National Assembly issued a statement condemning the U.S. policy towards Cuba and urged the release of Elian Gonzalez. It stated that the economic warfare that the U.S. government has waged against Cuba since 1959 has been consistently intensified with the deliberate purpose of causing disease, hardships, and suffering. Washington jeopardizes travel and normal communications between the two countries and harshly punishes its own citizens when they violate its strict prohibitions, while grossly and underhandedly manipulating migration related issues. It is true that, the U.S. has been admitting all Cubans who reached U.S. territory without completing the necessary immigration procedures (Bartholet, 2000, 35).

On 5 January, The Federal Immigration and Naturalization Services, backed by President Bill Clinton, said that Elian ought to go home. Fidel Castro in the final analysis, emerged triumphant on the dispute as the U.S. immigration service carried out the decision of returning Elian to Cuba. Elian's case brought forth the frequent water boat escapes from Cuba to Florida. It also brought to fore the generous U.S. immigration rules for Cubans and the rise in paid refugee strugglers. The dangerous illegal immigrations taking place from Cuba to Florida became a hot issue. After the seven month lengthy legal political dispute Elian was returned to his home in Cuba. President Clinton in fact appeased Castro by sending INS agents on a commando raid to escort Elian from Miami. Fidel Castro also tried not to escalate the dispute into a wider conflict with Washington. Hailing the reunification of Elian, six year old boy Castro stated: “I would say that today is the day of truce, perhaps the only one in the course of the 41 years of confrontation with the United States” (The Guardian, 2013).

Scraping the Stigma of Cold War and a New Dimension in U.S. – Cuba Relations

The U.S. strengthened its embargo rules in 1992 and again in 1996 with the Helms – Burton Act, which applied the embargo to foreign countries that traded with Cuba and was issued in retaliation after Cuba shot down two U.S. civilian airplanes. The last decade has seen the U.S. tighten and then relax restrictions depending on the political climate. After spending nearly half a century trying to bring democracy to steadfastly Communist Cuba through crippling economic sanctions and travel restrictions, the U.S. was finally ready to change its attitude. A 2001 agreement to sell food to Cuba in the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle has so far remained in place. After this the U.S. President Obama announced that he would lift remittance and travel restrictions for those with family still in Cuba marked a small but significant change in the U.S.'s position toward the island. In the meantime President Raul Castro has indicated that he would like to open a dialogue with the U.S. (Time, 2015).

In May 2002, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited Cuba and had full discussion with Fidel Castro. He was allowed to address the Cuban public uncensored on national television and radio with a speech that he wrote in Spanish. In the speech, he called on the U.S. to end 'an ineffective 43 – year – old economic embargo' and on Castro to hold free elections, improve human rights, and allow greater civil liberties. He met with political dissidents, visited the AIDS sanitarium, a medical school, a biotech facility, an agricultural production cooperative, and a school for disabled children etc. The visit made Jimmy Carter the first President of the United States, in or out of office, to visit the island since the Cuban revolution of 1959 (BBC, 2015).

From December 15 to 18, 2006, a Congressional Delegation of ten Congressmen and women from the U.S. House of Representatives visited Havana. The delegation met with Cuban Foreign Minister, Felipe Perez Roque and other communist officials. But the delegation failed to meet with Raul Castro (Havana Journal, 2015). In July 2007, acting leader Raul Castro indicated he that would be open to a warming of relations with U.S.

A new poll suggested a majority of Cuban – Americans living in Miami favoured an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba. President Obama stated that he was open to dialogue with Cuba, but that he would only lift the trade embargo if Cuba underwent political change. In March 2009, Obama signed into law a Congressional spending bill which eased some economic sanctions on Cuba and eased travel restrictions on Cuban – Americans travelling to Cuba. Another restriction loosened in April 2009 was in the realm of

telecommunications, which would allow quicker and easier access to the internet for Cuba. The loosening of restrictions is likely to help nonprofits and scientists from both countries who work together on issues of mutual concern, such as diseases and ailments that affect both populations. At the 2009, 5th Summit of the Americas, President Obama signaled the opening of a new beginning with Cuba (Sherman, 2015).

The Cuban officials arrested Alan Gross, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) subcontractor in 2009. Gross had travelled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged he was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Vatican had been working with the U.S. government for more than one year to secure Gross' release. The Pope Francis hosted the final negotiation meeting at the Vatican, during which President Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro agreed over the phone to improve relations between their two countries. Gross' release was one factor in this agreement, which also included the release of three members of the "Cuban Five", held in American jails for more than 15 years on spying charges. The agreement also ensured the release of 53 prisoners from the Cuban jail (Labott, 2015).

On the whole, the 21st Century witnessed dramatic changes in the relationship between the Cuba and the United States with normalizing relations and lifting the economic embargo. On 10 December, 2013, at a state memorial service for Nelson Mandela, Barack Obama and Raul Castro shook hands. After that Cuban and U.S. officials held secret talks mediated by Pope Francis and hosted in Canada and Vatican City to start the process of restoring diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. On 17 December 2014, the U.S. President Barack Obama and Raul Castro jointly announced that the relations would be "normalized". Both the countries released their prisoners on the same day. President Barack Obama stated that, the U.S. policy towards Cuba had failed to "advance our interest". It has really come as the victory for Cuba. The Cuban - American Community in the U.S has welcomed the move. Obama has indicated that within a month he will take steps to steadily dismantle the trade embargo that the U.S. imposed on the island nation in 1960. It has been evident for the last few months that the relations between the two countries were improving. The Washington allowed Cuban Americans to visit their homeland more frequently and send increased amount of dollar remittances to relatives on the island (Cheriyen, 2015, 53).

Both these countries effort was strongly supported by the Catholic Church, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Human Right Watch, and a large set of agricultural enterprises. It was also well received in public opinion

polls, among a majority of younger Cuban – Americans. Obama said that, “these 50 years have shown that isolation has not worked. The U.S. maintains its commitments to freedom for Cuba. The question is how we uphold that commitment. I do not believe we can keep doing the same thing for over five decades and expect a different result”. Castro’s emphasis in his announcement was slightly different. “We have been able to make headway in the solution of some topics of mutual interest to both parties. The progress made in our exchanges proves that it is possible to find solutions to many problems”. Obama is easing restrictions on remittances, banking, and travel. Obama has instructed Secretary of State John Kerry to begin the process of removing Cuba from the list of states that sponsor terrorism (Wallerstein, 2015). Earlier the terror classification had prevented banks and financial institutions from doing business with Cuba.

Both Raul Castro and Obama thanked the Pope for helping in finalizing the “historic deal”. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, described the normalization between Havana and Washington as a historic development. “For us, social fighters, this is a historic moment. We imagined we would never see such a moment”. Under new rules implemented by the Obama administration, restrictions on travel by Americans to Cuba are significantly relaxed as of 16 January 2015, and the limited import of items like Cuban cigars and rum to the United States is allowed, as is the export of American computer and telecommunications technology to Cuba (Wallerstein, 2015). The move by Obama was the single most positive foreign policy decision he had made in his term of office, amidst a record that has been otherwise rather dismal. It is not magic, but it changes the atmosphere. At first Cuba was isolated by the United States. But after 50 years, they have reversed the situation. They have achieved diplomatic relations based on mutual respect. The left in Latin America now realizes the irrelevance of the U.S. embargo. It also believes that it will now be more difficult for the United States to embargo against Venezuela.

In Panama City, the Presidents of the two countries sat down for a formal meeting, for the first time since the 1959 revolution. There have been a few handshakes between American and Cuban Presidents in the last 60 years, but in Panama City the talks between Obama and Raul Castro lasted more than an hour. After the meeting, Obama spoke to the Cubans that ‘the Cold War was over and that Cuba was not a threat to the U.S. We are not in the business of regime change. But the U.S. is in the business of making sure that the Cuban people have freedom and the ability to shape their own destiny’ (Cheriyen, 2015, 53). The U.S. Treasury Department approved licenses on 5 May 2015 for passenger ferry service between the United States and Cuba (The Hindu, 2015,12). Industry experts suggest that travel by boat will be

less expensive than flights. It also provides the passenger with the ability to bring greater baggage weight. The day or overnight trips are expected to cost between U.S. \$300 and \$350, at least 25% less than the current charter flights (Havana Times, 2015).

Raul Castro has however, emphasized that the détente with the U.S. will not make Cuba's shifting from its commitment to socialism. "We shouldn't expect that in order for relations to improve with the United States, Cuba is renouncing the ideas for which we have fought for more than a century and for which our people have spilled so much blood and run such great risks". He elaborated that, Cuba was always ready "to engage in a respectful dialogue on equal terms to address any issues without a shadow over our independence and without renouncing a single one of our principles". Raul Castro reminded the Cuban people that, "many of the odious aspects of the blockade still remained. An important step has been taken, but the essential thing remained" (Cheriyen, 2015, 55).

Trump Administration

With the election of Republican Donald Trump as U.S. president, the state of relations between the United States and Cuba was unclear as of January 2017. While a candidate for the presidency, Trump criticized aspects of the Cuban Thaw, suggesting he could suspend the normalization process unless he can negotiate «a good agreement».

On 16 June 2017, President Trump announced that he was suspending what he called a "completely one-sided deal with Cuba". Trump characterized Obama's policy as having granted Cuba economic sanctions relief for nothing in return. Since then, the administration's new policy has aimed to impose new restrictions with regards to travel and funding, however traveling via airlines and cruise lines has not been prohibited completely. Moreover, diplomatic relations remain intact and embassies in Washington D.C. and Havana stay open. The most significant changes President Trump has made, which came via a June 2017 memorandum, are prohibitions on commerce with businesses owned by the Cuban military and security services and a ban on individual travel to Cuba.

Months later, the administration announced it would pull two-thirds of its embassy staff from Havana, after several American and Canadian diplomatic workers suffered unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive impairment. Most of the U.S. embassy's functions, including visa processing, have been suspended. The Cuban government has denied any involvement and urged the United States not to cut diplomatic ties. Meanwhile, the Trump administration continues to criticize the Cuban government for its poor human rights record and

single-party system, upheld by the country's new constitution. In 2018, Vice President Mike Pence and National Security Advisor John Bolton both gave high-profile speeches criticizing Cuban leadership for its ties to the embattled socialist regimes in Nicaragua and Venezuela. Bolton characterized the three states as a "troika of tyranny" that are the cause of massive human suffering and regional instability.

The Trump administration again turned up pressure on Cuba in March 2019, when it opened up a month-long window in which U.S. citizens could sue dozens of Cuban companies that traffic in confiscated property. Though Congress provided for this in the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, U.S. presidents had suspended this right ever since. The Trump administration may review this and related policies in April. It is also considering labeling Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism once again, a stance that is unlikely to change with new President Miguel Díaz-Canel in office.

Conclusion

Actually the survival of Cuba's socialist regime is due in large part to its unparalleled internationalism, its continuing struggle against imperialism, and its commitment to socialist ideals and socialist policies at home. It achieved independence and sovereignty, educated and made healthy its population, provided them with basic needs and its people to perform meaningfully on the stage of world history. Their pragmatic shift in the age of globalization is another testimony of the national commitment to modernization and development. The Cuban government is in the process of implementing important economic reforms that will create new business opportunities. The critics would realize that Cuba is committed to sustain a socialist state, and it is not broadening its business opportunities as a precursor to embracing capitalism. The overall aim of reform is achieving a 'prosperous and sustainable socialism', not adopting free-wheeling capitalism. Business people that want to do operate in Cuba must respect the tenets of socialism, be able to conduct business within the parameters of the state's political ideology, and adapt to the quantity of state control over business transactions. The Cuba government is not interested in attracting foreign business just for the sake of making money. Moreover, on the island, there are neither consumer sovereignty traditions, nor a large affluent consumer society with buying power.

On the whole, Cuba has successfully adapted to survive and develop in the neo-liberal age. Its strategies included a wide variety of reforms at the social, economic, cultural and political levels. Both domestic policies and foreign policies underwent changes. Unlike China's transition, Cuba was very cautious in mending its ways to market reforms. However its claims

of retaining the holistic socialist character will be subjected to review and criticism. Indeed there are remarkable difference in the policies of Fidel Castro and his successor Raul Castro. But the crucial challenge was to survive and progress in the globalized age when its ideological allies are either defunct or drastically changed its conventional theories and policies. Therefore the context in which Cuba is premised today is crucial for our understanding.

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150 Years Of Mahatma Gandhi : A Re-Reading Of His Vision On Environment And Development

Rajeevan R.

Abstract

Examining the recent development models based on scientific techniques with an objective of social welfare, we can find the predominance of human interest over nature's interest. The whole world is experiencing an inhumane environment difficult to survive on, the frequency of which is increasing day by day. The intelligence, skills, capacity and physical power of human beings have been harnessing nature for hundreds of years. The modern concept of development poses serious ecological and related problems such as the pollution of air, water, exhaustion of nonrenewable resources, poor management of soil, displacement of forest and other resources, unbridled consumption of fossil fuels, ozone layer depletion, climatic changes, atmospheric warming, rise in the sea level, global drying and rising salt pollution. The crushing effects of globalization through the destruction of traditional civilization and culture also pose threat to the very survival of human beings. The impact of man on the environment is a major global issue and on the other hand man's fate depends largely on whether he succeeds in achieving a new equilibrium between the environment he has conquered and the nature in which he was created. Mahatma Gandhi was one of the well-known environmentalists who detected these problems at an earlier time and prescribe the best medicine to cure it. He put forward an alternative notion of development which is apparently more humane and in harmony with nature. This paper is an attempt to bring out the present-day issues in environment and development and a new reading of his vision on the subject in the eve of celebrating his 150th birthday.

Introduction

The earth which is the lone known supporter of life is a small planet in the universe. No other planet of our galaxy has shown signs of life. This

means that the living beings especially human beings have no independent existence outside our mother planet. But human beings, who are described as the most fashionable and worthwhile of all the creations of nature, tried to monopolize everything to meet his needs and wants. He consciously disturbed and demolished the order of the planet. He has ideas and skills, abilities and technologies to change the already established order of the earth to suit his requirements. While making unnecessary changes in the order of the earth, he even forgets that his own life is in danger. He is becoming more and more greedy and is exploiting everything available in the earth to become rich and comfortable. Our mother earth faces severe environmental crisis due to this over exploitation.

The opening of the twenty first century saw the full effects of globalization, which contributed to the process of restructuring the state, civil society, polity, economy, culture and environment. Accumulation of private profit being the main motivation of modern capitalistic production techniques, uncontrolled destruction of nature becomes inevitable. It results in uncontrolled economic growth, urbanization and industrialization, destroyed forest, mine and land, over use rivers, dams and ground water system.

According to a famous American study, the time has come to have “real concern for the global environment. If we do not, we face the prospect that an overburdened biosphere will no longer sustain us and that we will ourselves be on a struggle to survive.” (Phillip W Quigg, 1973 P.55) So the issue of an inhumane environment is perhaps the single most crucial problem before the 21st century world. The need of the hour is to adopt policies and programmes for shaping a humane environment where man is the Centre of our concern and where development should be of the people, for the people and by the people. We should raise the slogan “conserve the world for tomorrow”.

Sustainable Development

It is accepted that the third world countries need economic growth to remove poverty and reach a level of prosperity. Both the developed and developing nations are massively using raw materials for economic production process, which has created new challenges in the form of large quantity of waste and large-scale pollution of the environment. The concept of sustainable development became popular in the beginning of the latter half of the 20th century with the realization that development must be ecofriendly. The issue was raised as a challenge to the careless use of chemicals by agricultural and industrial concerns to promote increased production. The issue got the immediate attention of the academic and policy framing circles and new debates were initiated on resource use and

environmental change. The debate on conservation of resources, wise use and prevention of the adverse impact on the environment demanded the need for institutionalization of the concept.

The UN Environment Protection Agency is a forerunner in this regard. Further similar agencies were established all over the world. The UNEP was formed at the international level to provide awareness about the environmental issues and shape preventive mechanism on environmental pollution. The organization is authorized with conducting scientific research and publishing reports about the environmental problems and developmental issues. The UNEP functioned as the central coordinating agency of the UN to monitoring, gathering information and calling for action to overcome environmental issues. The developed nations were forced to redefine the concept of economic growth and development. The concept of environment entered in to the existing production process based on huge profit at the risk of challenging the very existence of human beings and the globe itself.

The most widely used definition of sustainable development came from the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report titled 'our common future'. It defined sustainable development as 'development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The critical objectives and necessary conditions for sustainable development as identified by the WCED are reviving growth, change in the quality of growth, meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water and sanitation; ensuring a sustainable level of population; conserving and enhancing the resource base; reorienting technology and managing risk; merging environment and economics in decision making. (WCED. 1987) Pursuit of sustainable development, according to WCED requires: a political system that secured effective citizen participation in decision making; an economic system that provides for solutions for the tensions arising from disharmonious development; a production system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological base for development; a technical system that fosters sustainable economic development; an international system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and finance and an administrative system that is flexible and has the capacity for self-correction.

Ecological principles suggest environmental adoption of economic growth and industrial development. It means economy and ecology can be favorably combined on the basis of latest environmental theories. The Earth Summit provide a number of international instruments that will provide the frame work for sustainable development. Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development offered a practical approach

to applying sustainable development policies at the local and national levels. Convention on biodiversity and frame work convention on climaticchange also incorporated principles of sustainable development.

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, a set of 27 principles was perceived as progressive statement by all nations that enshrined the recognition of the indivisibility of the fate of human crime from that of the earth and established sustainable development in international frame work. The declaration promoted concept such as the centrality of human beings to the concern of sustainable development (Principle.1); the primacy of poverty eradication (principle.5); the importance of environment for current and future generations and its equal footing with development (principle. 3 & 4); the special considerations given to developing countries (principle. 6); the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR principle. 7) It is also enshrined the two critical economic principles of polluter pays. (principle. 16) and the precautionary approach (principle.15) It introduced principles relating to participation and the importance of specific group for sustainable development. (principles. 10, 20, 21, 22) Lastly it requested member states to put in place adequate legislative instruments to address environmental issues. Agenda 21 was meant to be “a programme of action for sustainable development world wide” Furthermore, as stated in its introduction, it had the ambition of being a comprehensive blue print for action to be taken globally from now in to the 21st century. The ambition was high, and so where the stated goals of the agenda: improving the living standards of those in need; better managing and protecting the earth’s eco system; and bringing about a more prosperous future for all. (Dr. ShajiVarkey .2013:75-89)

Environmental deterioration continues to increase with serious depletion of natural resources. To discuss these issues, different heads of states gathered at the United NationsHead quarters in 2000. In this meeting, the UN General Assembly adopted 60 goals related to peace, development, environment, human rights, hunger etc. These were the part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) The thrust of MDGs, which were implemented in 2000 with 15 years prospecting was to tackle the issue of shaping a humane environment where there is no hunger and poverty.

The concept of Sustainable Development Goals was emerged powerful at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Rio + 20 in 2012. A key theme that dominated the Rio + 20 was the so called ‘Green Economy’ (The Hindu, June 25, 2012) “Green Economy is a system of economic activities related to the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services that result in improved human wellbeing over the long term, while not exposing future generations to significant environmental

risk and ecological scarcities” (Jayaraman, Divya Singh and Sruti Mittal, 2012: 10-13)

The chief motto of sustainable development is to provide improved human well-being and prevent the loss of bio-diversity and eco system services. To finish the task, 2030 has been fixed as the target date to resolve to free the humanity from poverty, hunger, exploitation in various forms, secure a healthy planet for future generations and build peaceful and inclusive societies as a foundation for ensuring lives of dignity for all. (The SDGs Report 2017) It also aims at providing a sustainable environment to protect the planet from all types of exploitation.

It has become very clear that environmental problems cannot be resolved in isolation from developmental once. The UN has its institutional support to co-ordinate the efforts made by individual states, organizations of the states and other non-stateactors. Regional and global multilateral treaties on the environment are undermined by inadequate implementation and enforcement by the member states. To attract the participation of the developing states in the UN's environmental programmes, more positive assistance in the form of financial technical and educational aid has to be provided both inside and outside the UN system. (Roberts and Kingsbury . 1993: 381) This is possible only if the rich nations share their responsibilities by recognizing that they are primarily to blame for the present environmental degradation. As moral creatures, we have the responsibility to conserve the resource which we have inherited from our ancestors and pass it down to the future without destroying it. The next part of the paper examines in detail the scope of the application of Gandhian Principles as a means to achieve the SDGs in an easy way.

Gandhiji's Vision on Environment and Development (Sustainable Development)

Mahatma Gandhi was the first modern social scientist who made a thorough study in the area- the issues which adversely affect even the very existence of human beings. His contributions offer considerable hope to find a solution to our present-day ecological problems. Gandhiji envisaged a society of man which lived close to nature and closer still to each other. (Savita Singh 1999: 68) He said, “My ethics not only permits me to claim, but requires me to own kinship with not merely the ape, but also with the horse and the sheep, lion and the leopard, the snake and the scorpion....” This man - nature harmony is the hall mark of modern sustainable development. The ethical dimension of sustainable development recognize the inter dependence and interaction of not only living beings but non-living things as well.

To quote Shrimon Narayan (Shrimon Narayan 1976:1) “the more I think about diverse problems facing India at present, the more I feel convinced that Gandhian approach alone will be able to solve our difficulties on a long lasting basis. What Shrimon Narayan reflects about the Indian situation is true for the world in general and the developing world in particular. As stated by Ali Ashraf (Ali Ashraf 1993: 269) “The issue of contemporary crisis has been framed in terms of the relationship between development and environment, but in fact, it extends to the visions of a human life rooted in the co-operation and contentment, piece and non-violence and in harmony between man and man and between man and nature.

The Gandhian world order is based on three principles (Values) - truth, love and sarvodaya. The concept of sarvodaya is based on ‘universal well-being. It is an ideal society aiming at the greatest good of all. The three values propounded by Mahatma Gandhi have to be achieved by leading a non-violent and service-oriented way of life. He described the western civilization as ‘Satanic’ (Ali Ashraf. 1993: 270) It is highly industrialized and is too wasteful to be followed. It presents a paradoxical situation, which characterizes poverty amidst plenty, over production amidst under nourishment and wasteful life, over development amidst under development, and economic prospect at the cost of ecological crisis.

His Concept of Needs and Greed

The Gandhian assumptions are basic assumptions based on the essential goodness of human nature. He distinguished between wants and needs and also, he warned that the satisfaction of the greed of human beings might surpass the carrying capacity of the earth. He remembered the world that man should remain contented with his needs to become self-sufficient. The earth has capacity to satisfy our needs, but not our greed. Therefore, proper and need based use of natural resources are the demands of the hour. (S.H. Patil 1994: 415)

The clear distinction between man’s wants and his real needs points to the fact that the earth can satisfy the real requirements of human life, but it is beyond the bearing of the earth to satisfy his unlimited wants. Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs. It aims at meeting the basic needs of all, extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life. Man, by virtue of this ever-unsatisfied desire for more and more have made a hell of this planet. Increasing ecological imbalance, environmental degradation, fast vanishing flora and fauna, unhampered population explosion and deteriorating human values, all are the outcome of this greed of the modern

“Home-Sapiena’ (Rashmi Sharma 1997: 195) There is only one earth and its resources are limited. Hence emerged this slogan “One earth and One environment”

Criticism of Modern Large Scale Production

Gandhiji also realized the horrors of pollution. To him the modern industrial system is responsible for the pollution of air, water, near exhaustion of non-renewable resources, bulging cities and the expansion of capitalism. He added that the large factories that produced chemicals and weapons outwardly kills people, the pollution created by these factories kills people inwardly. He stressed on the need for promoting nonpolluting industries. It is well known that Gandhian Village and Small scale or cottage industries are the least polluting industries. He warned in different platforms that the modern industrial civilizations is such that one has only to be patient and it will be self-destroyed. Ideally Gandhi would rule out all machinery for “It is Machinery that has enabled big nations to exploit others. (Mahatma Gandhi 1931: 318) He made it clear that what I object to is the craze for machinery, not machinery, as such. The craze is for what they call labour saving machinery. Men go on saving labour till thousands are without work and thrown on the open streets to die of starvation. Machinery has begun to desolate Europe. Ruination is the chief symbol of modern civilization; it represents a great sin.

To Gandhiji, industrialisation is a curse. In order to overcome the evil effects of modern industrialisation, Gandhian remedies can be applied. Intermediate or appropriate technology is considered as the right technology to sustain development. Large scale technology ends up in large scale exploitation of resources and this causes the depletion as well as the waste of resources. Waste of finite resources of nature is the hall mark of modern throwaway society and is at the root of the air and water pollution and toxic waste. Even in the 21st century, if we follow Gandhiji, we can operate our cottage industries in a better manner by applying non-conventional sources of energy such as solar, wind, bio mass or hydel power energy.

Opposition to Modern Western Capitalism

The present-day developmental projects following the precepts of globalization are the modern manifestations of western civilization, which Gandhiji opposed. Gandhiji reminds us that the earth’s resources are not large enough to permit western style of urban life to be followed by the entire world, without inviting ecological disaster. It is this awareness that motivated Mahatma to attack the western civilization which is based on industrialism and dehumanized machine culture.

The modern world is facing an inhumane environment due to ecological crisis, which is the product of the western machine centralized civilization. He said the world influenced by the western culture was going in the wrong direction and like the proverbial moth, it would burn itself eventually in the flame around which it is dancing carelessly. (Pyarelal, 1959 : 4) He further said, "This modern civilization is such that one has to be patient and it will be self-destroyed."

The present-day development projects following the precepts of globalization are the modern manifestations of western civilization, which Gandhiji opposed. They are totally against the idea which the savodaya movement and the concept of Dharma try to instill in the society. Gandhi's clear, firm and uncompromising stand against the western civilization was based not on any obscurantist objection to the use of machine, but his protest was against the enslavement and alienation of man in the industrial civilization. (Ali Ashraf, 1993: 270) He advised that when man ran after the western style of life indulged in luxuries, he will lose the human aspect in him.

Mahatma Gandhi offered a new and alternative model of development and a production distribution and consumption system based on decentralization, conservation, labour intensive production (with simple tools) equitable distribution, democratization and mass participation. He put greater stress on moral than material values. He advised voluntary limitation of wants and consumption. He stressed the importance of individual personality. For him, the supreme consideration is man. (J.B. Kripalani, 1991 : 377)

Gandhism an Alternative to Globalization?

How do we build an alternative to Globalization? It is a very relevant question asked from various quarters. Of course the answer is Gandhism. Modern western economics right from its inception search for profit. More production and more income is the ultimate motto of their theories. Towards the close of the 20th century globalization was expanded to the whole world. The opening of the 21st century saw the full effect of globalization, which contributed to the process of restructuring the state, civil society, political economy, culture and environment. The new policies of globalization such as reliance on competitive market, step by step retreat of the state from its welfare commitments, over emphasis to modern technology and resorting to privatization, do not definitely promote the interests of the marginalized and the deprived people of the world, especially of the third world countries. The pressure of globalization to bring about global integration has led to the curtailment of social welfare activities by the international financial agencies like world bank, IMF and ADB, which compelled the third world states for structural adjustment that led to the detriment of the poor.

Globalization provides ample opportunities to the multinational corporations to enter the economy of third world countries like India. Through aggressive and dubious advertisements and sales promotions, their influence is spreading throughout these states, even to the remotest villages. They are monopolizing not only industrial sector but also the agriculture sector. Since agriculture is the chief source of livelihood of the third world states, the globalization of agriculture is a major threat to the freedom and survival of those people. It allowed global corporations to control agriculture which places right to trade over the right to food. It paved the way for 'intellectual property rights' and has introduced new genetic engineering technologies such as the terminator technology. The concept of genetic engineering has been violating the democratic rights of the people and they are denied their fundamental right to safety and security of their food.

Patents on seed have been used by corporations to violate the inalienable right of the farmers to save their seed. And also they will bear no responsibility for the ecological and social costs arising from genetic engineering. It will lead to a total control of corporations over the food system where the farmers have no freedom, consumers have no freedom and countries have no freedom. The soft drinks, ice-creams, chocolates, biscuits, toothpastes, detergents, plastic products etc. produced in large quantities by transnational corporations are unnecessary and even harmful. Hundreds of banned drugs produced by them are still available in the market of the third world nations. They have a 'Pill for every ill.' Globalization is almost a hunt for mere profit by exploiting even the last unit of the planet's resources. Here Gandhiji advise 'to desist from this mad desire to destroy distance and time, to increase the animal appetite and go to the end of the earth in search of their satisfaction.' Can be recalled.

Globalization denied the rights of the farmers to save, exchange and evolve their seed - which is the life blood of them. Organic standards and labelling are a means which people have created to ensure that food is free of chemicals. For small organic farmers it is a means of survival through ensuring safe food to the people. When globalization denied all these to the farmers, they lost everything including hope. Today suicide by Indian farmers is a regular news from various parts of rural India. They are sinking in debts and losing their self-confidence. Costly seeds and costly inputs increase their debts.

Swadeshi - the Best Alternative

Swadeshi had a deep relevance at the time of our struggle for freedom and Mahatma applied it as a strategic weapon. This model of swadesi upholds indigenous biodiversity as a source of freedom for species and farmers. It

is a positive concept of building resources, skills, institutions and to make changes to it as and when the need for it arise. It also stood for shaping for or building a society and economy free from oppressive and exploitive structures. Swadeshi economy is based on endogenously based development rather than externally controlled development.

Gandhian concept of swadeshi is the only path to reclaiming the rights and freedom of the people who are working hard for the progress and prosperity of the state. Today the corporates are controlling the whole system. -finance, knowledge and information and the government itself. Gandhism is the only way through which the liberation of the farmers is possible from the enslavement of corporates. Gandhism is also the best medicine for the freedom of seeds farmers and consumers. Gandhism is truly a movement for the protection of biodiversity. It necessitates to protect farmers to getting free from the bondage and addiction to chemicals, chemical pesticides, fertilizers and thereby to promote organic agriculture. It is also the lone way to protect ourselves (consumers) from a poisonous food culture.

Sarvodaya - The Way

By sarvodaya Gandhi means the awakening of one and all. It also refers to the awakening of the total human spirit and personality. Sarvodaya is also related to achieving the highest level of self-realization in which one see one's own manifestation in all others. (O.P. Dwivedi, 1993: 572) Gandhiji had dreamt of a nonviolent sarvodaya state which consists of villages or rural agricultural settlements where wants are few, greed is nil and co-operation, conservation and decentralization are the governing norms of social, civil and economic activity.

The Gandhian Sarvodaya Society consist of villages or rural agricultural settlements where the cottage industries and handicrafts comprise the production sector. Even education should be handicrafts centered. He advised to follow certain economic norms such as village self-sufficiency, bread labour (i.e winning one's bread through work done by one's own body labour) and non-possession (acquiring or using the minimum possible articles of consumption)

The sarvodaya state totally repudiates uncontrolled wants and greed. It is worthwhile to recall some of the words of Mahatma regarding unlimited wants. He says "We have to put a curb on our material wants. The mind is a restless bird, the more it gets, the more it wants and still remains unsatisfied. Our forefathers knew that if we set our hearts on such things, we would become slaves and lose our moral fiber." (Kamala Chaudhary, 1993 : 582) Unlimited wants and greed only result in more and more exploitation of the contributions of mother earth. When over exploitation takes place, nature's

balance becomes upset and there will be all-round biological deterioration. The balance of nature is very delicate, a slight disturbance is enough to upset the ecological system. Sarvodaya is Gandhian alternative to the existing ideologies for social change and social transformation. It brings about a value based, peaceful and nonviolent transformation. It opens the path towards a nonviolent revolution. It is also a viable alternative to the prevailing techniques of social and economic development. It could be the hope of the new generation.

Conclusion

In this contest we need a transformation from the capitalist-oriented world order to a humanitarian system based on Gandhian philosophy and techniques to protect the environment and ourselves. Gandhiji was in all respects a humanitarian par excellence. He stood for the realization of universal brotherhood of man. He taught the world the vision of oneness of life. Reverence for all life including birds, plants and animals is the basis of his humanism. His ardent love for humanity, human welfare, human goodness, human justice and individual freedom were the driving forces that influenced the shaping and the formation of his ideas and vision on human life.

He had a firm faith in karma theory. He reminded us of the proverb that says, "you reap what you sow." Everyone should be ready to face the consequence of what they do. High expectations often result in greater dismay. So, he advised simplicity in life. No doubt his thoughts holds a considerable promise for the solution of our present-day ecological crisis and many of his ideas can be profitably utilized for the betterment of our environment. It could be hoped that the 21st century would utilize his philosophy to save the world from total destruction.

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Community Policing: A Theoretical Perspective

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Abstract

Law enforcement in a democracy is a process by which public security is ensured by securing and enlisting the willing co-operation of the people who are the beneficiaries of such enforcement. Community policing is a type of policing which seeks the responsible participation of the citizenry in crime prevention at the level of the local community conserving the resources, both of the community and of the police, in fighting crimes which threatens the security of the community. It has grown from the early days of promising experiments in a handful of cities and towns for a worldwide movement. Along with the growth of the concept, a number of theories were put forward by eminent academics and police practitioners to give it a solid foundation. It encompasses a variety of philosophical and practical approaches and it is still evolving. The paper examines the theoretical basis of community policing by analyzing definitions, dimensions and theories. The paper also examines the community policing scheme of Kerala Police in the backdrop of these theories.

Community policing, as an alternative policing strategy, revolves round the principle of proactive policing through people-friendly policing practices, community participation and problem-solving leading to crime prevention, maintenance of order and improvement in the overall quality of life in the neighborhood. Community policing allows the law enforcement to get back to the principles upon which it was founded, to integrate itself into the fabric of the community so that the people and the police collaborate even before a serious problem arises. Here, police act as a catalyst in the social engineering experiment. To state succinctly, community policing is a useful holistic and proactive concept and a tool to transform the police image, strengthen the

force and create attitudinal changes both within the force and among the public (Mohanthy 2013:5). In its strategic dimension, it contributes to the individual, state and national health and as such reduces social pathology. Community policing provides decentralized, personalized police service to the community. It recognizes that police cannot impose order from outside, but that people must be encouraged to think of the police as a resource that they can use in helping to solve contemporary community concerns. It is not a tactic to be applied and then abandoned, but a new philosophy and organizational strategy that provides the flexibility to meet local needs and priorities as they change over time (Amadi 2014:19). Community policing, therefore, is a philosophy of policing based on the idea that if the police and the citizens in the community work together in creative ways to fight and prevent crime, then crime related problems of the community would be solved, fear of crime would be reduced, community residents would feel safer, and the physical conditions as well as quality of life in the community would be better. As Sparrow put it, “the concept of community policing envisages a police department striving for an absence of crime and disorder and concerned with and sensitive to the quality of life in the community” (Sparrow 1999:397). Here, the community is perceived as an agent and partner in promoting security rather than a passive audience. At the same time the police also must assume new roles and carry out their duties and responsibilities quite distinct from the traditional model of policing. In addition to law enforcers, they must serve as advisors, facilitators and supporters of new community-based initiatives.

Defining Community Policing

The term community policing has been defined in different ways, some of them seemingly contradictory. It is a concept that has been used to refer a wide range of programs and activities and as a result it means many different things to many people. The office of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) of the US Department of Justice notes the following; “Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem- solving, community engagement and partnerships. The community policing model balances reactive responses to call for service with pro- active problem- solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively addressing these issues (Community Oriented Policing Services, 2005).

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux describe community policing as a philosophy and organizational strategy that promotes a new partnership between the people and their police. It is based on the premise that both

the police and the community must work together as equal partners to identify, prioritize and solve contemporary problems such as crime, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and overall neighborhood decay, with the goal of improving the overall quality of life in the area (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1998:6). Oliver defines community policing as a systematic approach to policing with the paradigm of instilling and fostering a sense of community within a geographical neighborhood, to improve the quantity of life (Oliver 1988:5). It achieves this through the decentralization of police and the implementation of the synthesis of three key components: (a) Redistribution of traditional police resources, (b) interaction of police and all community members to reduce crime and the fear of crime through indigenous proactive programs and (c) concerted effort to tackle the cause of crime problems rather than to put band aids on the symptoms.

Although forms of community policing vary widely, two core components appear in most initiatives: (1) a commitment to community involvement and co-operation and (2) a commitment to problem-solving. Regarding the first component Mastrofski notes that community policing is, in its broadest sense, 'any concerted endeavor to bring together the police of a jurisdiction and those in that jurisdiction who are not the police (community)' (Mastrofski 1993:63). The philosophy also seeks to reduce the boundaries between the police as an 'occupation force and community as the invaded territory'. The second core component of problem-oriented policing involves a process in which problems are systematically defined and investigated. Alternative solutions are explored through an interactive process involving both the police and the community (Riechers and Roberg 1990:105-114). The two core components are separate yet inter related pieces, and each is dependent on the other. Responsiveness is a core issue for both components. The police are to become more responsive to citizens and listen more to their problems. Similarly, citizens are to be more responsive to the community's problems and take an active role in working with the public to solve them.

Dimensions of Community Policing

According to Rosenbaum "community policing is still in what might be called the conceptualization phase of development" (Rosenbaum 1998:4). Kelling and Coles outline what they consider the six most common elements of community-oriented policing. They are, a belief in broad police functions, greater reliance on the citizens, greater discretion to police officers, adoption of specific tactics and serving of multiple aims by police including crime reduction, reducing fear, protecting neighborhoods, helping citizens manage problems and policing according to legal, moral and civic standards (Kelling and Coles 1996:34). Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux list out nine P's or principles of community policing and state "community policing is

a philosophy of full service personalized policing, where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership (Goldstien 2000:3-22) with citizens to identify and solve problems». The nine P's or principles of community policing are (1) philosophy, (2) personalized service, (3) policing, (4) patrol, (5) permanence, (6) place, (7) proactive, (8) partnership and (9) problem solving. Theorists also differentiate community policing in philosophical, strategic, programmatic and organizational dimensions.

(a) Philosophical Dimension

Community Policing can be seen as an ideological system that emphasis co-operative relations between the police and the community. Similarly, acceptance of community policing as an operating philosophy affects all aspects of life with in the department including resource allocation, work force deployment, and priorities assigned to each task or function. To Gary Cordner, the philosophical dimension includes broad police function, citizen input and personalized services (Cordner in Geoffry 1998:45-62). Broad police function means that the responsibility for the maintenance of order in a community must be shared by both the police and the members of the community. When the task of public safety is addressed through the joint efforts of the police, the community and local government, resources can be combined to the benefit of all. Essential to the success of these joint efforts is the ability of the police to not only develop new strategies for addressing the community's problems, but also, they create those solutions in such a way that they encourage others to participate through support and aid. In the traditional policing model, policing is conceived and implemented throughout the nation in a uniform manner. There, individual or local preferences are almost nil. But community policing provides quality, personalized police services in a way that reflects local norms, values and individual needs (Cordner in Geoffry 1998:45-62).

(b) Strategic Dimension

Community policing stresses the need for developing new strategic concepts in day to day operation. There are three major strategic elements. They are re- oriented operations, geographic focus, and an emphasis on prevention (Cordner in Geoffry 1998:45-62). Random and routine patrol is the most effective way to prevent crime and to apprehend the accused in the professional model of policing. With its emphasis on crime prevention, community policing replaces this reactive strategy with more proactive ways of policing. Instead of waiting for calls, community policing asks police officers to try to identify and target problems and actively implement tailored solutions to those problems. Community policing encourages the increased use of interactive patrolling methods such as foot patrol, directed patrol, door

to door policing and other alternatives to random and routine patrolling. It also places a heavy emphasis on establishing geographic responsibility and accountability to police officers, establishing relatively permanent shifts and beats for personnel assignments and limiting cross-dispatching of officers away from assigned areas (Weisel and Eck in Rosenbaum 1994:65). Patrol officers are assigned to a certain area on a long-term basis, in order to foster familiarity between patrol officers and communities. Community policing also stresses crime prevention. Where traditional policing largely involves responding to calls for service once a crime has been committed, community policing involves identifying the underlying conditions that lead to crime and then organizing efforts to alter those conditions (Skogan in Rosenbaum 1994:18).

(c) Programmatic Dimension

The programmatic dimension is intended to translate ideas, philosophies and strategies into concrete programs and behaviors. Two major elements of the programmatic dimension of community policing include problem solving and partnerships with communities. As opposed to the traditional strategy of random preventive control where by police hope to decrease crime and disorder by their mere presence, problem solving is a strategy police use to fight specific crimes with specific plans (John and Moose 1997:291). Eck and Spelman¹ developed the widely accepted and used SARA model of problem solving. Building a partnership with the community is considered an essential step for greater co-operation between the police and the community. Active citizen participation in various activities including problem identification and problem-solving efforts, crime prevention programs, neighborhood revitalization and youth-oriented educational and recreational programs is desired (Moon 2006:40).

(d) Organizational Dimension

Community policing represents a changing organizational culture from the top-down command and control management to a more decentralized mode of operation. The success or failure of community policing programs is to a great extent affected by organizational structures and process that characterize modern day policing. Community policing as an organizational philosophy depends on the ability of the entrenched organizational structure to undergo significant changes. Theorists on community policing propose an entire restructuring of the police organisation (Vinita 2014:228-233). The proposed structural changes include de-formalization – delegation of more authority and responsibilities to commanders, supervisors and field officers, flattening – reducing the number of hierarchical layers and de-specialization, i.e., reducing the number of specialized units and personnel.

Theories of Community Policing

Researchers, academics, theorists and practitioners have put forward a number of theories regarding community policing. They are: -

- (1) Normative Sponsorship theory.
- (2) Contingency theory
- (3) Problem oriented policing theory, and
- (4) Broken windows theory

(1) Normative Sponsorship Theory

Normative Sponsorship theory is based on the assumption that almost all people have a stake in community- ownership and an emotional attachment to co-operation and challenge. The theory assumes that most community citizens, being of good, will co-operate with others to facilitate the building of consensus. This can be seen especially where citizens have a desire to improve their environment. Social action programs aimed to reduce crime, produce safe street, enhance the beauty of the area, and provide leisure activities and recreational areas, all fall into the category. However, normative sponsorship theory holds that if the social action does not support the value system of the majority of citizens, then it will not generate the necessary resources, activities and effort from the community (Sower 1957: 61).

The foundation of community policing is based on participation of people in policing activities. Conflict, the trade mark of traditional community organization, is rejected by community policing. Rather, community policing is based on the assumption of Normative Sponsorship Theory. The assumptions are:

- 1) Most people are willing to co-operate in order to accept a challenge, solve a problem and improve their situation.
- 2) Most people are willing and motivated to work to improve the quality of life in their community (Sower 1957: 61).

The theory postulates that the police department also must give up its power image and be more co- operative with citizens. Police must be facilitators of change within the community and act as a catalyst to more citizens to identify and solve their own problems.

(2) Contingency Theory

According to contingency theory, the driving force behind organizational change is the external environment, particularly the task environment with which an organization is confronted. The contingency perspective

features two cardinal assumptions about organizational change (Maggio 1995:147-161). First, individual organizations must adapt themselves to the external environment when their existing goals are affected by changes in their operating conditions. In addition, organizational environments are perceived as being dynamic, which leads to the second cardinal assumption that a 'fit' must be maintained between an organization and its environment overtime. Donaldson (Donaldson 1995:32) argues that to find an optional fit, organizations have to be able to alter both their goals and operations.

The contingency perspective seems to apply to the analysis of organizational change in policing quite well. The traditional strategies of crime control that were developed during the professional era become increasingly ineffective in 1970's and 1980's because of rapid increase in crime rates, urban disturbances and fear of crime. There was a poor fit between the societal environment and the prevailing structural and strategic organization of policing. To be more effective, police agencies should change.

(3) Problem Oriented Policing

Herman Goldstien is considered as the founding father of Problem Oriented Policing (POP). The SARA model often serves as the operational basis for problem- oriented policing activities and encourages the use of problems as opposed to incidents as the discrete piece of police business (Scheider, Chapman and Amy 2009:694-718). For example, officers engaged in problem- solving would attempt to prevent the occurrence or reoccurrence of particular problems, and develop plans or projects that go beyond merely responding to a particular call in order to address the underlying cause of the problem. In contrast to traditional, reactive policing, the focus of police effort with in a problem-solving model is on the underlying condition- when that is addressed then calls for service will decrease to a significant extent. Community policing and problem-oriented policing share common roots and emphasis the use of systematic problem-solving processes in much the same way (Eck and Spelman 1987:31-52). The redefinition basically involved the de-construction of three traditional police myths. The first myth was that the main aspect of police (Mohanthy 2013:24) work was the apprehension of criminals. The second myth was that punitive law enforcement was indeed the most effective way to curb crime. The third myth dealt with the traditional "mean-over-ends" focus of the police, an obsession with procedure and equipment that largely had no real impact on the safety of citizens.

(4) Broken Windows Theory

The origin of community policing can be traced back to the "broken windows" theory, first proposed by Wilson and Kelling in 1982. This

theory is based on the proposition that if social and physical disorder in a community is not addressed, more serious crimes may follow. Simply said, a broken window does not harm to a neighborhood if quickly addressed. But left unattended, it sends a signal that no one cares about their neighborhood and that it is safe to vandalize, litter and break things. Those who engage in such behavior will feel emboldened to commit these crimes. Once these minor miscreants have become well established, it may seem to be safe enough neighborhood in which to be openly drunk, to beg for money and possibly to extort it. In short, the smallest systems of anti- social behavior when left to fester will breed greater and greater crimes including murder (Wilson and Kelling 1982:29-38).

Wilson and Kelling argued that citizen patrols may be sufficient response to broken windows. Citizen patrols deter disorder that could not be deterred. Whatever their effects on crime, citizens find their presence reassuring and they contribute to maintaining a sense of order and civility. Wilson states, just as physicians now recognize the importance of fostering health rather than simply treating illness, the police and the community must recognize the importance of maintaining intact communities without broken windows (Wilson and Kelling 1982:29-38). In short, a community must address disorder early so as to prevent the spiral decline from eventually occurring.

Contextual issues in the implementation of community policing in Kerala

Inspired by the success of community oriented policing programmes around the world, Government of Kerala launched a community policing experiment in 2008 in 20 selected police stations across the State (Sandhya 2012:100). Gradually, it was extended to more police stations and by the beginning of 2017, the project was introduced in all the police stations in Kerala (Janamaithri Sureksha Project 2017:8). The community policing programme of Kerala Police is known as Janamaithri Sureksha Project and it is introduced with a three-fold objective of (a) prevention of crime (b) building healthy rapport between the police and the public and (c) to ensure better co-operation between the members of the locality in matters of security (Hand Book 2014:18) . The scheme also provides for a hierarchy of officers for its effective implementation in which the beat officer plays a vital role.

The Kerala model of community policing is an amalgamation of the best practices in the world especially USA and UK. The project is based on geographical divisions known as Beats and one or two police officers are put in charge of a beat area. They will interact continuously with the people of the locality to know the problems being faced by them, collect the details

and inform the Station House Officer who in turn will take measures to solve the problems. Continuous interaction between them has resulted in better flow of information from the public to the police. But the transformation from the traditional to community policing model is not a smooth and easy-going affair particularly in a State like Kerala where the historical colonial legacy still haunts the memory of the people. The most important difference between the community policing models in the developed countries and Kerala is that in the former, the programme is closely integrated with the organisation where as in Kerala it still remains as a separate entity distinct from regular policing. It is the responsibility of the organisation to create an atmosphere conducive to community-oriented policing. Though the adoption of community policing is in tune with the changed environment, as the contingency theory posits (Maggio in Hall and Quinn 1983:147-161), the hierarchical structures created during the British days still remain intact. The preposition of Organisational theory that organisations are more embedded in a particular social and cultural context and hence do not change easily (Meyer and Scott 1983:201) is also true with regard to Kerala police. The project is based on decentralization of authority but the baton still remains in the hands of superior officers. The project also envisages an attitudinal change from the part of community police officers towards the common man but the attitude of a section of superior police officers towards their subordinates is not cordial. There is also the issue of the application of community policing theories in the context of Kerala. Most of the theories are developed in the European context and its application in a State like Kerala create problems. In Europe, the police are civilized and the society is also civilized and the citizens are law-abiding. But in Kerala, there is a tendency on the part of the people to violate the laws and a section of the police, even though their number is small, use unnecessary force on innocent citizens. Moreover, the police is implementing democratic policing with the laws enacted in the 19th century. An examination of the working of the scheme revealed that though all the theories are relevant in the context of community policing in Kerala, more emphasis is seen given to the broken windows theory. The preposition of broken windows theory that if minor crimes are attended properly, it will lead to a reduction in the reporting of serious offences is proved by a number of micro level studies. It is also found that after the implementation of the project, there is a reduction in the reporting of violent crimes.

The author conducted a study on the impact of the project on Kerala society by selecting samples from the length and breadth of the State. Nineteen police stations, one police station each from a Police District², is selected for the study, All the stakeholders of the project viz, the beat

officers³, Janamaithri Samithi members⁴, middle-level police officers, senior police officers and the general public were contacted with a structured questionnaire to elicit their views on the working of the project. The assessment is done by analysing the impact of the project on law and order, crime rate and citizen satisfaction.

(a) Impact on Law and Order

Maintenance of law and order has become very challenging in the contemporary globalized society mainly due to the emergence of cyber space and consequent fading away of national boundaries and the emergence of new forms of crimes. The involvement of community in police work is of vital importance to help the police to achieve better control over crime and law and order. Experience shows that with community policing, the process of law enforcement has become very effective.

Table No.1
Law and order situation-improved or not?

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Improved	91	80
Not improved	15	13
Improved some extent	8	07
Total	114	100.0

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher

The table shows the responses of beat officers on the impact of the project on law and order. Eighty percent of them expressed the view that the law and order situation has improved much after the introduction of community policing. Seven percent see improvement in some extend and only 13% did not notice any improvement in this regard. Similarly, 63% of middle level officers, 85% of Samithi members, 82% of community relation officers and 83% of District Police Chiefs see a favourable impact on law and order after the implementation of the project. Seventy four percent of the general public also believed that law and order problems can be effectively tackled by community policing programmes. Likewise, 63% of the general public, 68% of the beat officers and 65% of the middle-level police officers expressed the view that problems have declined after the introduction of Janamaithri Sureksha Project. There is an increase in police presence. Presence of police in the street has led to a decline in rowdyism and petty crimes which had a lasting impact on serious crimes. It has been proved by the broken windows theory. Moreover 71% of the general public opined that they feel better

safety under Janamaithri policing because they have a feeling that a police man is a call away (Survey conducted by the author 2019).

(b) Impact on Crime

The crime rate is used by the media, elected representatives, political parties, the intelligentsia, the academics and others to measure the effectiveness of their police departments and the quality of life in the neighbourhood. James Wilson stated that 'crime in the street' (Wilson 1978:98) is an issue of great importance and directly influences political decisions about policing styles. But the paradox is that police is working in an environment in which it has no control over the social conditions prevailing in the society. In other words, police cannot create a favourable social condition easily to generate a crime index which is acceptable to all. There is strong evidence to show that community policing improves citizen satisfaction with police. But the impact of community policing on aggregate crime rate is unconvincing and open to doubts. According to Greene, community-oriented policing sometimes has a limited impact on crime (Greene in Honey 2000:299-370). But some criminologists (Zhao, Scheiden and Thurman 2002: 273-299) are of the view that the implementation of community policing in medium and large cities and towns contributed to significant reduction in both violent and property crimes.

Analysis and interpretation of data collected from various police stations revealed that there is no uniform pattern in the reporting of cases. In all the police stations selected for the study, there is an increase in the reporting of total cases after the implementation of the project. But the increase of serious offences is rather very low. For example, the total such cases reported in Nadakkavu (FIR Index, Nadakkavu Police Station) in Kozhikode Rural District in 2007 is 258, the figure rose to only 280 in 2017, i.e., an increase of only 22 cases over a period of eleven years. In some police stations like Thrissur East (FIR Index, Thrissur East Police Station) there is a decline in the reporting of serious cases. In 2007, the total IPC cases reported in the station is 528 but it fell down to 446 in 2017. It is also revealed that violent crimes like robbery, murder and rape are gradually declining in some of the police stations. For example, the total robbery cases reported in Adoor (FIR Index, Adoor Police Station) in 2007 is 13, the figure declined to one case in 2018. Four murder cases were reported in Mannarkad (FIR Index, Mannarkad Police Station) in 2008 but in 2018 only two such cases are registered. Three rape cases were reported in Paravoor (FIR Index, Paravoor Police Station) in 2006, the figure decreased to only one case in 2018. But some of the police stations like Irinjalakkuda (FIR Index, Irinjalakkuda Police Station), Perinthalmanna (FIR Index, Perinthalmanna Police Station) and Mananthavady (FIR Index, Mananthavady Police Station) an increase in

the reporting of violent crimes is visible. But the increase is only minimal. Moreover, there is a remarkable improvement in the crime clearance rate of violent crimes like robbery, murder and rape after the introduction of community-oriented policing.

(c) Citizen-satisfaction

There is difference of opinion among scholars regarding the impact of community policing on actual crime rate. But most scholars would agree that community policing, if properly implemented, improves the quality of engagement between the police and the policed. The Janamaithri Sureksha Project is implemented with a view to ensure better co-operation between the police and the public and to provide quality service to the people. Different from the traditional model where the police acts after the occurrence of an incident, here police adopt a proactive approach in dealing with crimes and criminals.

Table No.2
Change in the behavior of police

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Changed	278	73.3
Not changed	32	8.3
Only the name changes, the attitude remains the same	70	18.4
Total	380	100.0

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher

The table shows that 73% of people noticed a favourable change in the attitude of police towards them. Sixty six percent of Janamaithri Samithi numbers also noticed favourable changes in the behavior of police personnel. Similarly, 72% of beat officers opined that people are co-operating with police as witnesses in cases, furnishing of information and helping to nab offenders. More than 85% of the people like the project. Eighty two percent (Survey conducted by the author 2019) of the people of Kerala welcomed the beat officers in their houses, participate in the activities of the police and provide information about crimes and criminals. It shows the acceptance of the project by the people of Kerala. Majority of police officers shed their traditional attitude towards people and adopted a positive approach. The most remarkable finding of the study is that it has reduced police-public confrontations. Eighty percent of the police officers and 83% of the citizenry

are of the view that police-public conflict have reduced considerably after the implementation of the project (Survey conducted by the author 2019). Thus, both the police and the public are affected by an optimistic transformation after the implementation of Janamaithri policing in Kerala. Alexander Jacob, retired DGP, expressed the view that there is a favourable change in the attitude of people towards police and vice-versa after the implementation of Janamaithri Sureksha Project.

Conclusion

The community policing movement which emerged in the world in an organized manner after Sir Robert Peel's⁵ Nine Principles of Policing, gradually spread over to other parts of the world as an alternative policing strategy. Many theories were put forward by thinkers and police practitioners to make the concept more viable. The study revealed that community policing is much more than just a change of tactic or public interest in police operations. Rather, it is a total philosophy of policing which ensures total involvement of the community in police functions. Even though the concept is European and most of the theories were developed taking into consideration the law and order situation prevailing there, most of the countries including some of the States in India introduced the scheme with minor modifications to suit the conditions of the area. Kerala Police borrowed extensively from the schemes of other countries and applied it by making necessary changes suitable to the State. Within a short span of ten years, the project has got the acceptance of people and there is a favourable transformation in the attitude of people towards police and vice-versa. Though the study did not find any significant association between police involvement in community policing and improvement in index crime rates, it has resulted in better crime clearance rate, particularly of violent crimes like robbery, murder and rape. If citizen satisfaction is a yardstick to measure the effectiveness of community policing, the Janamaithri Sureksha Project has succeeded in transforming the police from its colonial style of functioning to a people-friendly organisation. It has improved the quality of engagement between the police and the community and reduced the barriers which separated police from citizens.

Notes:

1. Eck and Spelman developed the widely accepted and used SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment) model of problem solving, which identifies four stages of the problem-solving process.
 - a) Scanning- to collect information to identify a problem.
 - b) Analysis- to determine the nature and extent of the problem.
 - c) Response- through the creation of a specific strategy to address the problem,
 - d) Assessment'- to determine whether the response alleviated the problem

2. As against 14 Revenue Districts, 19 Police Districts are there in Kerala. Thiruvananthapuram, Kollam, Ernakulam, Thrissur and Kozhikode are divided in to two-City and Rural – to make it nineteen
3. Beat officers are community policing officers in charge of a Beat (geographical division).
4. It is a representative body appointed in each police station to advice the police on the implementation of Janamaithri Sureksha Project.
5. Robert Peel is regarded as the Father of community policing. In 1829 he put forward certain principles of policing which is popularly known as Nine Principles of Policing. It is considered as the foundation of modern community policing.

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